' The appellant Ghulam Dastgir Constable No,823/MN was posted at Police Post, Shish Mahal Police Station Multan Cantt. When he was served with a show-cause notice containing the following charges:-- "While posted to P.P. Shish Mahal P.S. Cantt. On 9-5-1981 absented himself from the place of his duty without leave or from prior permission from any competent Authority and went to his native town i,e, Chak No, 34/10-R, Tehsil and District Khanewal. On 10-5-1981 he alongwith his son Alamgir assaulted Ghulam Murtaza and Ghulam Mustafa on ground of previous enmity, hence case F.I.R.
No, 131, dated 10-5-1981 against him. He was arrested in the case and sent to judicial lock-up."
' The show-cause notice was statedly served on him on 18-6-1981 but he did not submit his written explanation till the Additional Superintendent of Police, Multan imposed upon him, vide his order, dated 13-3-1982 (page 11), the penalty of dismissal from service on the ground that he had "absented himself from the place of his duty without leave or prior permission from any competent Authority" on 9-5-1981 and had gone to his native place i,e, Chak No, 34-10/R, Tehsil Khanewal and on 10-5-1981, he alongwith his son Alamgir armed with knives assaulted Ghulam Murtaza and Ghulam Mustafa on account of previous enmity, resulting in the registration of a criminal case against him vide F.I.R. No,131, dated 10-5-1981 under section 307/34, P.P.C. At P.S. Khanewal culminating in his arrest. The fact that he was previously convicted in a case under section 307, P.P.C. Was sentenced to five years' rigorous imprisonment and was released on bail from Sessions Court was also kept in view when the aforesaid penalty was imposed on the appellant. The appellant filed an appeal against the aforesaid order on 9-5-1982. The Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Multan Range (i,e, the Appellate Authority) informed the appellant vide his letter, dated 3- 4-1984 that the appeal which was kept pending till the decision of the criminal case had been filed as the appellant had been convicted in the said case. The revision petition filed by the appellant was eventually considered by the Additional Inspector-General of Police who, after giving him personal hearing on 23-4-1986 rejected the petition vide his order, dated 12-5-1986 with the following observations:-- "The representationist has come up in appeal after his acquittal by the Sessions Judge, giving him the benefit of doubt. The petitioner was initially convicted by trial Court to one year R.I. I do not find sufficient grounds to change the order of dismissal as acquittal by virtue of benefit of doubt does not necessarily absolve the accused of his guilt or bad conduct as a police official. His representation is, therefore, rejected."
' The appellant consequently assailed the aforesaid decision vide his Appeal No,469 of 1986. That appeal was withdrawn. The appellant finally filed the instant appeal on 20-11-1989, followed by amended appeal filed on 16-9-1990.
2. In the course of his arguments, the learned counsel for the appellant challenged the decision taken by the respondents on the appeal/revision petition filed by him on the ground:--
(i) that despite repeated requests, the appellant was not given certified copies of the Roznamcha nor was the other relevant record provided to him to enable him to submit his reply; ' that the Additional Superintendent of Police, Multan (i,e, respondent No, 3) dismissed the appellant from service vide his order, dated 13-3-1982 (page 9) by taking ex parte proceedings against the appellant although finally he was given personal hearing by the said respondent on 13-3-1982, the result being that the appellant was virtually condemned unheard; that the departmental action was initiated against the appellant on the basis of criminal proceedings. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the respondents to have waited for final decision and should have passed order in the departmental case after the order of conviction had become final in appeal or revision or the limitation for filing the appeal had expired. On the contrary, the respondent No,2 dismissed the appellant from service before his appeal was decided by the learned District and Sessions Judge who eventually acquitted him;
(iv) that the appellant was acquitted of the criminal charges by the learned District and Sessions Judge. The respondent Department could not have, therefore, rationalised the penalty imposed upon the appellant merely on the ground that he had been acquitted of the criminal charges by the appellate Court by giving him the benefit of doubt;
(v) that there are a large number of cases in which the Police Officials had been convicted by the trial Court but they were still serving while their appeals against their convictions were pending before the Appellate Courts. The appellant was, therefore, clearly discriminated against although he had the edge over such Police officials (referred to in para. 8 of the memo. Of appeal), because the appellant was acquitted by the Appellate Court.
' The learned counsel for the appellant also referred to the instructions issued by the Inspector:General of Police in the years 1984 and 1985 that in case a Police official was proceeded against on the charge of misconduct or corruption, it was incumbent upon the departmental authorities to hold regular enquiry to determine the actual facts of the case if the charges brought out against the appellant were controverted by him in the course of departmental proceedings.
The learned counsel observed that the departmental action was initiated on the basis of a criminal charge and before any decision was taken in the criminal case, the appellant was dismissed from service without holding departmental enquiry either. The learned counsel asserted that on the eve of imposition of the penalty of dismissal, from service on the appellant, neither criminal proceedings had been finalised nor the respondents had instituted an enquiry to find out the actual facts of the case. The learned counsel maintained that the appellant was condemned unheard and was, therefore, entitled to reinstatement in service with all the back benefits.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant finally referred to the instructions contained in the SGA&ID's Letter No, SORI-SOW/1/90/87, dated 14-2-1988 that if a civil servant was acquitted of criminal charges by the trial/appellate Court by giving him the benefit of doubt, such acquittal should, be considered as adequate for his reinstatement in service. As regards the observations made by the Additional Inspector-General of Police to the effect that the acquittal of the appellant by virtue of benefit of doubt did not necessarily absolve the accused of his guilt or bad conduct as a Police official, the learned counsel averred that in fact such acquittal could not be interpreted to mean that the appellant had actually been guilty of the criminal charge brought out against him because if the Court had found any tangible proof against the accused (i,e, the appellant), the Court would have straightway maintained/upheld the punishment imposed by the trial Court. The learned counsel consequently urged that the appeal was fit to be accepted.
5. The learned District Attorney relied on the objections filed by the respondents to controvert the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. He observed that the appellant was proceeded against departmentally under Rule 6(3) of Punjab Police (E&D) Rules, 1975, was served with a show-cause notice and was given personal hearing but he failed to produce any defence.
He also pointed out that the appeal was time-barred and, therefore, fit to be rejected on this ground alone.
6. As regards the question of limitation raised by the learned District Attorney, the position is that the revision petition of the appellant was decided by the Additional Inspector-General of Police vide his order, dated 12-5-1986 (page 27). The appellant accordingly filed Original Appeal bearing No,469/86 before this Tribunal on 16-6-1986 i,e, within the prescribed one month of the receipt of the requisite order by the appellant. The subsequent withdrawal of the appeal from the Tribunal on 13-11-1989 and the filing of the instant appeal on 20-11-1989 would not, therefore, be fatal to the appeal on the point of limitation.
7. I have also glanced through the entire record produced before this Tribunal. The statement given by Haq Nawaz, Constable No, 1025 before the Trial Court (pages 11--13) indicates that the said witness had written two daily diaries on 9-5-1981. In one of the reports, the appellant was shown absent from the Police post while, in the other, he was shown to have been present on duty.
According to the version of the said witness, when he refused to write second daily diary report because he had seen that the original report had been torn away, S.I. Muhammad Hussain insisted that the said witness must obey order and write daily diary again. The said constable also divulged that on the complaint of the appellant, he was dismissed from service and was reinstated later on and that departmental enquiry against Muhammad Hussain, S.I. Was being held by the respondent department. The said witness categorically stated that Muhammad Hussain, S.I. Had, in the presence of Sh. Aslam, S.I. Forced the witness to make alterations in the daily diary.
8. The version of the said witness is substantiated by the contents of Memo. No, 17570/M, dated 23- 7-1989 (page 29) addressed by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Multan Range to the Superintendent of Police, Multan District. Its reproduction below is intended to sift the whole matter further:-- "Constable Ghulam Dastgir No, 823 of Polir Post Shish Mahal (under suspension) alleged through an application, dated 9-7-1981 (photostat copy enclosed) that on his return from duty to the Police Post on 10-5-1981 in connection with an accident on the evening of 9-5-1981, he found SI Muhammad Aslam, Additional S.H.O. P.S. Khanewal and S.I. Muhammad Hussain, I/C, Police Post Shish Mahal present at the Police Post. They tore out the Daily Diary, dated 9/10-5-1981 and replaced it by blank printed forms, which were rewritten later. Its examination revealed that the entries from S. Nos.1 to 15 were repeated on the old page as well as the fresh blank page added subsequently. The two pages make the forgery absolutely evident which in fact was intended to show the absence of Constable Ghulam Dastgir No,823 from the P.P. With effect from 18-00 hours on 9-5-1981. It has been further verified that this addition of the printed forms in the regular Daily Diary and the forged entries relating to the absence of the Constable had been made to off-set the plea of alibi by the said Constable, who was implicated in case F.I.R. No,131/81 under section 307/34, P.P.C. P.S. Khanewal which took place at 11-15 a.m. On 10-5-1981. Incidentally the individuals who undertook this job, forgot to take out the original page of the Daily Dairy, thereby leaving all the traces of their crime on record. Both the aforesaid S.Is. And the Moharrir of the Police Post should be dealt with departmentally after conducting necessary enquiries against them."
9. The perusal of the above letter of the Deputy Inspector-General of Police and the statement made by Constable Haq Nawaz confirms the contention of the appellant that he was present on duty at his Police Post on the date when the complainants in F.I.R. No, 131/81 were injured at Khanewal. The acquittal of the appellant by the Appellate Court cannot and should not have, therefore, been ignored by the departmental authorities merely because the learned Appellate Court had acquitted the appellant by giving him the benefit of doubt. Now that the statement made by Haq Nawaz is before this Tribunal and this Tribunal has also the facility of going through the letter referred to above in which the respondent No,2 had himself ordered the institution of an enquiry against the S.Is. Who were responsible for having forced Constable Haq Nawaz to make alterations in the daily diary to show the appellant absent from duty, there is hardly any justification for condemning the appellant on the alleged charge that he had wilfully absented himself from duty and that he had taken part in injuring the complainants in F.I.R. No,131/81, P.S. Khanewal.
10. It is indeed true that no enquiry was held to determine the facts of the case in question. The respondents could not have, therefore, imposed upon the appellant the major penalty of dismissal from service without determining the actual facts of the case. It is also true that the appellant was not given adequate chance of explaining his position at the very outset when the departmental action was taken by the Additional Superintendent of Police, Multan as competent Authority under the relevant (E&D) Rules. In normal course, the higher authorities might have chosen to remand the case to the respondent No,3 (i,e, Superintendent of Police, Multan) with the direction to hold de novo enquiry against the appellant to determine the facts of the case. Since, however, the statement made by Constable/Moharrir of the Police Post and the letter issued by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police to the Superintendent of Police, Multan reproduced above tend to confirm, in an unequivocal manner the fact that the appellant was actually present on duty at his post, it would be difficult to attribute the criminal charges levelled in F.I.R. No, 131/S1, Khanewal Police Station to him. It is indeed established beyond any shadow of doubt that the appellant had neither absented himself from duty nor he had taken part in injuring the complainants in the aforesaid F.I.R.
At Khanewal. In this case, therefore, I do not find any reason to order initiation of de novo enquiry proceedings either.
11. In view of the foregoing discussion, I allow the appeal, set aside the impugned orders and re- instate the appellant in service with all the back benefit.
12. The parties are left to bear their own costs.