' AJMAL MIAN, J.---This is an appeal with the leave of this Court against the judgment dated 27-8- 1992 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal, in Appeal No,128(R) of 1991, filed by the respondent for claiming arrears of pay and increments with effect from 19-5-1983 consequent to the order dated 13-3-1990, whereby the respondent was allowed seniority in BPS-20 and fixation of pay with increments, allowing the same.
2. The brief facts are that the respondent entered Federal Government by way of lateral entry as a First Secretary (Grade 18 + Special Pay Rs,440) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 7-12-1973. He was subsequently designated as a Deputy Secretary (Grade-18) and posted in the Federal Secretariat as such. He was promoted as a Joint Secretary (BPS-20) through Establishment Division Notification No,39/521/89-E-I, dated 31-10-1989. On the respondent's representation, he was assigned seniority as the Joint Secretary in the Secretariat Group with effect from 19-5-1983 and consequential fixation of pay with increments in BPS-20 from the above date but was not allowed benefit of arrears of pay as per Establishment Division Memorandum dated 13-3-1990. Since his representation and other efforts did not succeed, he filed the above service appeal, which was allowed. Reliance was placed by the Tribunal on the judgment of this Court in the case of Syed Sultan Shah v. Government of Baluchistan (1985 SCM R 1394), wherein it has been inter alia held that a civil servant who, for no fault of his own, is wrongfully prevented from rendering service to the State in higher post to which he was admittedly entitled to. Should be given salary for the higher post. Thereupon the appellant filed a petition for leave to appeal, which was granted to consider the question, whether the ratio of the case of Syed Sultan Shah v. Government of Baluchistan (supra) has been rightly applied to the present case.
3. In support of the above appeal, Mr. Mumtaz. Ali Mirza, learned Deputy Attorney-General has pointed out that in another petition; while granting leave, it was ordered that the appeal arising out of the above petition be heard with this appeal.
4. The respondent, who was present in person, pointed out that the above petition had nothing to do with the present case as in the case in hand, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Muhammad Khan Junejo, approved the proposal contained in para. 14 of the summary dated 23-4-1986, which he has filed along with the additional documents filed in the above appeal. The above Para. 14 of the summary reads as follows:-- "14. In the circumstances, it is proposed that in the interest of justice and equity, the present appellants, namely, Mr. Muhammad Sirjees Nagi (S. No,13 of the list) and Syed Khan Mossazai (S. No,14) as well as the three other persons similarly situated, namely, Mr. All Akbar Qureshi (S. No,15), Mr. Fatehul Mulk (S. No,16) and Mr. Mukhdoom Noor Ali (S. No,17) may also be granted seniority in their new equivalent posts like others at S. Nos.1 to 12 of the list from the date of their original appointment by lateral entry in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with consequential benefits. Similarly, Mr. Ghulam Mujaddid Isran (S. No,18) formerly in Secretariat Group (Grade-19) who was appointed to a lower post in Grade-18 in OMG may also be allowed seniority in OMG in Scale 18 from the date of his original appointment in Secretariat Group by lateral entry with consequential benefits."
5. A perusal of the above Para. Indicates that the respondent was allowed not only seniority but also consequential benefits.' It is not the case of the appellant that the above order of the Prime Minister has been reviewed/reversed by the competent authority. In this view of the matter the question, whether ratio B of the case of Syed Sultan Shah v. Government of Baluchistan (supra) has been rightly applied by the Tribunal, has become academic for the purpose of the present case.
We are, therefore, of the view that the impugned judgment of the Tribunal does not call for interference. The appeal is. Therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.