' MUKHTAR AHMAD JUNEJO, J.---This appeal with the leave of this Court is directed against a judgment delivered by a learned Division Bench of Lahore High Court in R.F.A. No, 159 of 1977.2. Facts of the case are that a land measuring 79 acres, 3 Canals and 2 Marla's situated in village Darveshke, Tehsil Wazirabad, District Gujranwala, was acquired to be used by appellant Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Military Estate Officer, Karina Cantonment. Usual notifications under section 4 and under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 7-6-1967 and 13-11-1967 respectively. The land was acquired for the purpose of formation of Gujranwala' Cantonment.
Concerned Special Land Acquisition Collector, Gujranwala gave the award dated 12-3-1969 by which the acquired land was classified into different categories and a different assessment of valuation was determined for each of such classifications.
3. The respondents who were independent and exclusive owners of the acquired lands, filed a joint application under section 18 of Land Acquisition Act seeking reference to the Civil Court for determination of value of their lands, as they were not satisfied with the value of the land assessed by the land Acquisition Collector. The matter was referred to the Senior Civil Judge, Gujranawala who under his judgment and decree dated 23-6-1977 accessed compensation of the acquired land at the rate of Rs,6,371.20 per acre. The appellants challenged aforesaid judgment and decree in the Lahore High Court under R.F.A. No, 159 of 1977. Under the impugned judgment, Lahore High Court dismissed the appeal on a legal objection to the effect that the appellants being beneficiaries of the land acquired, had no right to challenge the compensation given to the deprived owners of the land by the competent Court. Hence this appeal.
4. Leave to appeal was granted on the ground that in the judgment reported in 1991 SCM R 2193 no note was taken of the Punjab Law/Amendments and that there was also a judgment by this Court in the case of Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Defense, Islamabad v. Maulvi Ahmed Saeed and another (Civil Appeal No, 389 of 1986), decided on 8-10-1991.
5. Mr. Maqbool Ahmed Sheikh, learned Deputy Attorney-General argued that the appellants were competent to prefer appeal against a judgment and a decree by the Court to which reference was made under section 18 of Land Acquisition Act. In support learned Deputy Attorney-General cited the case of Province of Punjab and others v. Naseer-ud-din and others (1994 SCM R 2091).
6. Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act provides the forum of High Court for any appeal against the award or any part of it. Said section does not specify as to which of the parties e.g. Beneficiary of acquisition or owners of land acquired or acquiring authority, shall have right of appeal.
However, a "local authority" or a "company" at whose cost the land is proposed to be acquired, shall not be entitled to demand a reference under section 18, vide the proviso below section 50 of said Act. The case of Pir Khan v. Military Estate Officer and others (PLD 1987 SC 485) relates to said point.
In said case it was held that section 50 (2) of Land Acquisition Act expressly and in terms controls section 18 and takes away the right from the local authority or company for whom the land is being. Acquired to demand a reference under section 18 and consequently so far as a local authority or a company is concerned, the award made by the Land Acquisition Collector becomes final and it has neither the right to ask for a reference under section 18 nor a right to prefer an appeal against a decision made by a Court upon a reference made under section 18 of the said Act. In the case of Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation Ltd v. Deputy Commissioner (East) Karachi and others (1989 SCM R 812) this Court declined to change its view earlier expressed in the case of Pir Khan (PLD 1987 SC 485). The case of Pir Khan was also referred in the case of Behram Khan and others v. Military Estate Officer and others (1988 SCM R 1160) where the view taken in the former case was reiterated. The bar contained in the proviso below section 50 is in respect of demanding a reference under section 18 of said Act. But as observed in the case of Pir Khan, an order of the Civil Court on reference made to it by the Land Acquisition Collector is not an independent order, but merely substitutive order, whereby the award of the Land Acquisition Officer is substituted by the order of the Civil Court, which order becomes the award. In the said case of Pir Khan, it was further observed that since by virtue of subsection (2) of section 50 of the Land Acquisition Act, the award made by the Land Acquisition Collector is final and cannot be challenged except by a party which has expressly been conferred the right of appeal, hence the Military Estate Officer and the Central Government, who did not have any such right expressly conferred on them, did not have any locus standi to file an appeal. These observations were reproduced with approval in the case of Behram Khan (1988 SCM R 1160).
7. In the leave granting order reference has been made to the case of Government of Pakistan v.
Maulvi Ahmed Saeed and another (Civil Appeal No, 389 of 1986), decided on 8-10-1991. In said case it was held on the authorities of Pir Khan (PLD 1987 SC 485), Bahram Khan (1988 SCM R 1160) and Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation Limited (1989 SCM R 812) that the Federal/Central Government, its departments, the local authority, a company or an institution, which is beneficiary of land acquired, is not competent to file an appeal under section 54 of Land Acquisition Act against the decision of the Court on a reference under section 18 of said Act.
8. In the case of ICI Pakistan Limited v. Salahuddin and others (1991 SCM R 15) and (not 1991 SCMR 50 as mentioned in High Court judgment) it was observed as below:- "A word may be added that under the doctrine of eminent domain, the State acquires citizen's property. It does so for a public purpose. Land Acquisition Act allows acquisition for a ,company if it feels that the utilization of the acquired land by a company would be for the benefit of the citizens.
Whether the State does so for its own purpose i,e, public, or, for a company, on acquisition, the land vests in the State. The relationship or transaction is between the citizen and the Sate. No third party has any right. Even if it is permitted that a company for whose benefit the property is sought to be acquired may appear in a reference for determination of the compensation payable to the citizen, that does not mean that it is also conferred a right to appeal against the decision on reference. It is trite law that right of appeal is a creation of .Statute, If it does not confer, none has it. Invasive provisions over the rights of citizens have to be construed strictly. This is axiomatic."
' In the same judgment note was taken of the fact that under the Land Acquisition Act a citizen is being deprived of his land without any fault of his and that there is an expectation that the compensation is paid on determination by an officer of the acquiring authority, with a hope of its being equitable done on reference by a Court. As soon as that is determined, the affected party is entitled to be paid the compensation and left alone and not to be dragged in litigation by the party, which has got his land acquired and which is superior in power, resources or otherwise, as further held.
9. In passing reference may be made to the case of Iftikhar Hussain Shah and others v, Pals is tan and others (1991 SCM R 2193) decided by a Bench of seven Judges this Court, where note was taken of the Punjab Amendmvs to the Land Acquisition Act and it was observed as below:-- "The relationship of principal and agent as between Federal Government and the Provincial Government on the basis of the Constitutional provisions or on the basis of section 3(b) of the Act does not come into existence. Such a relationship exists between the Provincial Government and the Collector and this fact was taken note of in the case of Ezra v. Secretary of State for India (1903)
ILR 30 Cal. 36), approved by the Privy Council in (1905) M 32 ILR Cal. 605) and considered in N.
Bommon Behram and another v. The Government of Mysore and others (AIR 1970 Mysore 89) and the State of Mahrashtra (Public Works Department) v. Bapurao Dayanoba Chiddarwar and others (AIR 1973 Born. 231). The Collector acquiring the property on behalf of the Provincial Government has been held in these decisions to be exercising an executive authority and an administrative power and in doing so acting as an agent of the Provincial Government. The same principle cannot be extended to make the Provincial Government an agent of the Federal Government in the matter or the collector as agent of the Federal Government so as to clothe the Federal Government with an authority not otherwise possessed by it within the framework of the law."
10. It would be necessary to consider the case of Province of Punjab and others v. Naseer-ud-Din and others (1994 SCM R 2091) cited by learned counsel for the appellant where Punjab Amendments in the Land Acquisition Act were considered. In the said case it was held that the right of making a Reference as well as filing of an appeal in so far as the Provincial Government is concerned, was not affected by the amendments introduced in the Land Acquisition Act. There was no observation in the said case enabling the Federal Government to file appeal against decision of the Court under section 18 of Land Acquisition Act.
' For the foregoing reasons we approve the view taken by the Lahore High Court and dismiss this appeal with no order as to costs.