1. ' WAJIHUDDIN AHMED, J.---Civil Miscellaneous Application No,1101/94, under Order 41, rule 5, C.P.C., for stay of the impugned order, was placed before us for hearing today but because the questions to come up for examination in relation thereto were essentially the same as in this High Court Appeal we have, with the consent of the learned counsel, heard the main appeal itself and disposed it of through a short order, which runs thus:-- "For reasons, to be recorded separately, this appeal is dismissed and with special costs."
2. It is an order dated 28-9-1994 passed in Suit No,644/93 which gives rise to this appeal. Such suit was filed by the respondent No,1 (plaintiff), a banking company registered in Grand Cayman, Cayman Islands, currently under liquidation, for possession of the disputed property and mesne profits. The appellants Nos.1 and 2 (defendants Nos.1 and 2) were sued in the suit together with the respondent No,2 (defendant No,3), the first two as being in unauthorised occupation and the third as one instrumental in putting them in such occupation. Several applications were filed for interim reliefs in the suit, one of which was an application under Order 40, rule 1, C.P.C. (C.M.A. No,10429/93) for appointment of a Receiver, whereupon on 16-10-1993 an order was passed appointing the Official Assignee to prepare an inventory of the fittings, fixtures, appliances, furniture and other articles in the disputed property and the inventory according to the memo. Of appeal was prepared on 18-10-1993 and 19-10-1993, the Official Assignee's Report being submitted on 21-10- 1993. The learned Single Judge observes in the impugned order that the direction to prepare an inventory does not appear to have been objected to as the costs thereof namely, a sum of Rs,15,000 was required to be paid by the plaintiff upon a plea that it was at the plaintiff's instance that the referred inventory was occasioned. The next stage in the proceedings is reflected in an application under section 151, C.P.C. (C.M.A. No,10774/93) whereupon, pursuant to a recital that the plaintiff had taken out an insurance policy of the Villa and the furniture, fixtures etc. Including equipment's and paintings stored therein in the sum of U.S. $3.392 million which stood expired on 19-4-1991, it was prayed that the Court be pleased to order that the defendants Nos.1 and 2 do allow the insurance agent/insurance surveyor and an architect of plaintiff's choosing to survey the property so that a valuation and insurance of the property could be effected. Such order was passed, by consent, on 5-1-1994 but without prejudice to the respective contentions of the parties.
3. It is the case of the plaintiff that the survey was obstructed by the defendants and in particular by the defendant No,2, wife of the defendant No,1. At this stage (19-6-1994) was occasioned yet another application (C.M.A. No,3045/94) though this, time under section 94 and Order 39, rules 1, 2 and 7 read with section 151, C.P.C., seeking restraint against the defendants Nos.1 and 2 from interfering in any manner with the carrying out of the survey by the plaintiff's architects and engineers, M/s. Bilgrami & Faruque, as also from taking the necessary photographs of the movable and immovable properties together with detailed measurements of all the items, furniture and fixtures lying or affixed in the property in question pursuant to the consent order dated 5-1-1994.
4. Upon due examination, a learned Single Judge of the Court on 28-9-1994 passed the impugned order, allowing M/s. Bilgrami & Faruque to take the photographs and measurements of the property and of all items to'be found in the bungalow which were mentioned in the inventory prepared.By the Official Assignee.
5. ' Mr. Amanullah Khan, appearing for the appellants (defendants Nos.1 and 2), has urged that one Mrs. Qamrunnisa, who is a sister of defendant No,1 and sister-in-law of defendant No,2, obtained the property under reference on lease from Mrs. Rabia Abidi, wife of Agha Hassan Abidi acting through her attorney, defendant No,3, which lease was converted into a sale per sale agreement dated 11-11-1986 for a consideration of Rs,23 Million. As against this, it has been urged from the side of the plaintiff that the plaintiff itself is the sole purchaser through a deed of conveyance dated 27- 12-1986 which, in turn, was based on a sale agreement of August, 1979, executed by the same Mrs. Rabia Abidi through the same attorney namely, the defendant No,3. It has further been urged that Mrs. Rabia Abidi has subscribed to and endorsed the sale in favour of the plaintiff though the defendant No,3 has taken incoherent stands. Mr. Amanullah Khan, representing the appellants, has contended that the consideration for the purported sale in favour of the plaintiff is palpably inadequate and besides the plaintiff being a foreign company in liquidation did not have the necessary sanction for the same in accordance with the Pakistan law. As to the claimed inadequacy of consideration, Mr. S.A. Sarwana, appearing for the plaintiff, maintains that the sale price is to be gauged on the basis of valuation prevailing in August, 1979, the date of the agreement, and that due compliance of law was effected before concluding the sale. On his part, Mr. Amanullah Khan has been unable to show us the specific provisions of law which the alleged sale in favour of the plaintiff has contravened. That learned counsel, however, has urged that necessary parties namely, Mrs. Rabia Abidi, the transferor, and Mrs. Qamar-un-Nisa, under whose authorisation the defendants Nos.1 and 2 are in occupation, have not been joined even though such facts were disclosed by the two defendants at the outset of the proceedings in their joint written statement.
6. For the grant of interim relief it is never necessary for a Court to record a positive finding in favour of either party. On balance, the party claiming relief is only to be shown to have made out a prima facie case which, in turn, means an arguable and not an indefeasible case. If that be so, the next questions to be considered are those of balance of convenience and irreparable loss, where the relief claimed is that of an interim injunction. In cases seeking appointment of an interim receiver, allegations of waste are alternatively to be established besides the justness and convenience in the cause. The instant matter, however, involves merely what, it effect, may be called issuance of a commission which, in turn, is governed by Order 26, C.P.C. And also by section 151 of the Code, if, for want of specifics in Order 26, an order is designed to do complete justice between the parties, taking into consideration all aspects of the matter. Such an order, in terms of legal requisites is to issue if the Court, seized of matter, considers it just and convenient to do. To be precise, in the various provisions of the Code, vast interlocutory powers have been conferred on Courts of Civil Jurisdiction to ensure that relief is fashioned to cover the exigencies in each individual case.
7. ' It is in the foregoing perspective of the legal position that we have to examine the validity of the impugned order.
8. ' It is obvious that an inventory was prepared and suffered by the defendants more or less without contest. It is equally obvious that a consent order for survey by the insurance agent/surveyor and an architect of plaintiff's choosing emanated in the proceedings with the sole purpose of obtaining an insurance cover which admittedly was operative in relation to the property at one time or another: The sole objection is that such insurance cover did not detail the movables and that it is still not necessary to do so. The argument, however, bags the question that at that time the property was not in dispute and as of now there is no .Guaranteeing the fact that the goods and articles of which inventory has been prepared may not be substituted by others of lesser value with little possibility of retrieving the loss or damage. Indeed, photographing of such material would only confirm the inventorised goods and articles without in any way affecting the. Possession thereof or the entitlement thereto. We really cannot see as to how the kind of objections which have been taken may not imply that the defendants/appellants are minded to disturb the safe-keeping and maintenance in status quo of the items in the inventory, which is already on the Court's record.
9. ' There is also another aspect of the matter. The appellants/defendants are manifestly engaged in a proxy contest. The person with whom they are living, the alleged owner, according to their version, is a real sister, of the appellant/defendant No,1 and a sister-in-law of the appellant/defendant No,2, and is living under the same roof. She cannot be assumed in such circumstances to be ignorant of the proceedings in the suit and there is no ostensible reason, except one which may not commend itself to a judicial mind, for her not to appear and enter contest in order to safeguard her interest,' if any. In answer, Mr. Amanullah Khan has urged that the lady has filed a suit of her own and currently there are three suits between the contestants, which are likely to proceed together. Even if that be so, there still remains a big question mark on the lady for not having come forward and sought to be joined as a party in the instant suit. In context, it has also been urged that it was equally the duty of the plaintiff itself to have joined Mrs. Qamar-un- Nisa. We do not think so. Admittedly, there is no completed sale in favour of the lady and the seller has not subscribed to the transaction. The stage for determining whether the lady was a necessary or proper party is still to come, but before that her purported interest was assailed and she must have known it and yet she did not come forward. What is more, it is only she who could have been adversely affected by the impugned order and if so inclined she was fully entitled to have brought an appeal in Court before us. She did not do so. In such circumstances, no relief can be granted to the appellants much less when the appellants have no interest of their own to peruse in the matter.
10. ' For such reasons, we have through a short order, reproduced above, dismissed this appeal with special costs. In the circumstances of the case where even for preparing an inventory a fee of Rs,15,000 has been determined and paid, we would impose equal special costs in a similar sum of Rs,15,000 on the appellants as costs of this appeal.
11. ' Dismissed.