' ABDUR REHMAN KHAN, J.---This judgment will dispose of the above two appeals as they arise from the common judgment of the learned Acquisition Judge dated 21-11-1994, whereby while accepting the objection petition filed by the objectors-appellants under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, the price of the land per Marla was enhanced to Rs,1,351.35. The prayer in R.F.A. No, 24 of 1995 is that this enhancement in the price is unwarranted and, therefore, the judgment may be set aside and the price of the land as given in the award of the Collector be restored. The relief claimed in R.F.A.
No,25 of 1995 by the objectors is that the price should further be enhanhced to Rs,2,000 per Marla and to the same extent the impugned decision may be modified.
2. The factual background of these appeals is that the Vice-Chancellor, University of Engineering and Technology, Peshawar approached the Deputy Commissioner for acquisition of the land for construction of New University Campus. Notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the land to be acquired was issued on 8-1-1991 and then the award was drawn on 30-11- 1992. As the land of the appellants in R.F.A. No, 25 of 1995 had been acquired in the award and as they were dissatisfied with the price of Rs,340.86 per Marla determined in the award, therefore, they filed objection petition under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act with the request to further enhance the rate per Marla to Rs,2,000 and they be paid the compensation of seven hundred trees which were standing in the acquired land. This objection petition was opposed by the acquiring department as they maintained that the price worked out in the award was correct and that there were no trees in the acquired land of the objectors.
3. The witnesses who were examined at the trial are: P. W.1 who exhibited on record the extract from Jamabandi 1989-90 as Exh.PW1/1. He also brought the copies of Mutations Nos.3250 to 3254 as Exh.PW1/2 to Exh.PW1/6. He produced one-year average Exh.PW1/7 prepared on the basis of mutations in-between 9-1-1990 at 8-1-1991 according to which per Kanal price came to be Rs,27,027 and per Jarib Rs,1,08,108. One of the petitioners Syed Wakeel Shah appeared for the petitioners as P.W.2 and stated that their acquired land is commercial one on account of its proximity with Peshawar City on the one side and Muhajir Camp and Municipal Committee Pabbi on the other. He also stated: "That area of 40-K in Khasra No,684 is on the road side (Pabbi Charate Road) and that is at a distance from six K.M. From Peshawar-Nowshera Road. The affected land is centrally located of nearly 30 villages of the Pabbi area who were all out to purchase pieces of land for construction purposes and order to deprive us of a higher rate, the area in question has been acquired to our detriment and financial loss. There is a Bus stop and Adda in front of the. Effected land extants to nearly two K.M. The land in question is situated at a place wherefrom three roads passed on one to Charrat second to Jalozai and third to Urmar area". P.W.3 Fazal Hadi was also examined by the objectors in their support who described the acquired area as commercial one and fixed its market value at Rs,1,00,000 per Kanal. He stated that the land in question is near to Pabbi Municipal Committee and Charat Cantonment area. On the other hand, respondents examined Saudullah Khan Girdawar Land Acquisition as R.W.1 who produced copy of the award as Exh.RW1/1 and stated that the price in the award is based on one-year average Exh.RW1/2. This witness also stated that one-year average produced by him as Exh.RW/P-1 covers the period from 9-1-1990 to 8-1-1991 and per Jarib price, according to it, comes to Rs,1,08,108. R.W.2 is Qasim Khan, Administration Officer, University of Engineering and Technology, Peshawar who simply deposed regarding acquisition and expressed his ignorance about the mutation produced from the side of the objectors. '
4. Mr. Shah Jehan Khan, the learned. Additional Advocate-General appearing for the Collector (appellant No,1) and Mian Muhammad Younis Shah, Advocate representing appellant No,2 (the acquiring department), argued that there is no evidence on record to substantiate that the acquired property of the respondents has attained commercial status or has some potential value to be used for commercial or construction purpose. They pointed out that the mutations shown in Exh.PW!/7 on the basis of which the reference Court has enhanced the sale price were attested on one and the same date and appeared to be collusive and manipulated ones. It was also pointed out that no other owner excepting the respondents objected to the sale price. Referring to AIR 1982 Himachal Pradesh 118, AIR 1979 Supreme Court 472, AIR 1969 Kerala 265, AIR.1975 Madhya Pradesh 46, it was pointed out that the sale statistic produced by the Revenue Authorities cannot by itself form basis for fixation of the price of the land but these transactions are to be proved by other evidence so as to find out their location and potential value as compared with the acquired land. It was also emphasised that in the instant case, the price mentioned in the mutation cannot be adopted as a criterion for fixing the price of the acquired land unless the distinctive features of the two lands are clearly brought out. It is an established principle of law that a rule laid down in one case cannot be applied universally on account of the diverse facts of each case. In the instant case, notification under section 4 was issued on 8-1-1991, ward was drawn on 30-11-1992, notification under section 17 was issued on 31-8-1991 and the possession of the land was taken on 17-9-1991. In a recent judgment reported in PLD 1991 Federal Shariat Court 398, it has been laid down: "---Basic and fundamental date for fixation of the compensation for the land acquired in the public interest was the market value on the date of actual acquisition of land---Date of the issue of notification under S.4, was not crucial date but it was the date of actual acquisition which followed the step taken in the matter of acquisition after disposal of objections under S.6, which was required to be substituted in S.23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894."
' It is thus obvious that on account of upward trend of prices, it would not be fair to ignore the gap in-between the date of notification and the case of taking over possession. This gap by itself could be a ground for enhancement of the sale price. However, in the present case, we have the statement of P.W.2, one of the objectors, a portion of which has been reproduced above, which proves that his acquired land was situated on road-side and was near to built-up area and as such had potential value to be used for commercial and building purpose. P.W.3 has also supported him to some extent in this respect but their cross-examination reveal that no attempt has been made to shatter their depositions or to discard them or to prove the contrary. It has been laid down in PLD 1988 Supreme Court 32, "this Court has observed in Sub. Haider Zaman and others v. Government of N.-W.F.P. And others 198? SCMR 465 at p.467 that matters mentioned in section 23 of the Act as factor to be considered while determining the market value of the property acquired are not exhaustive. In other words factors other than those mentioned in section 23 can also be taken into account for the said purpose.
Although market value of the land is normally to be taken as existing on the date of publication of notification under section 4(i) of the Act, yet it is common knowledge that for determining the market value the Courts often look at the prices on which similar lands were sold during the preceding 12 months, and similarly in other cases factors bearing on the value of the same land in future e.g. The "potential value" of the property are also taken into consideration". It is, therefore, evident that the factors for determination of the market value of the land proposed to be acquired are not restricted only to the time of issuance of notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act or any period prior to it but can also relate to the period in future. i,e, after the issuance of notification under section 4 of the Act. It is for this reason that the potential value of the land i,e, the use to which it can be put in future has in a large number of cases being held to be a relevant factor. Similarly, in PLD 1986 SC 158 it was laid down: "Previous sales of land cannot always be taken to be an accurate measure for determining price of land intended to be acquired--factors to be taken into consideration while determining value of land to be acquired elucidated.
' There are factors which have to be taken into consideration (while determining the value of the land to be acquired) e.g. The land is not to be valued merely by reference to the use to which it is being put at the time at which its value has to be determined, but also by a reference to the uses to which it is reasonably capable of being put in future; and the market value is that potential value of the property at the time of acquisition which would be paid by a willing buyer to a willing seller, when both are actuated by business principles prevalent in the locality at that time."
' It has further been declared in the said judgment: "The Princhle that the use to which the land is capable of being put, to the advantage of the owner is a factor which ought to be considered by the assessing authority". The dictum laid down in PLD 1970 Quetta 35 is also to the same effect as it says: "Where the acquisition of land has to be made under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the compensation is to be assessed in accordance with principles laid down under section 23 of this Act. It is well-settled that under this section the owner is entitled to charge the price of his land fixed with reference to the probable use which will give him the best return and not merely in accordance with its present use and disposition. The compensation must be determined by reference to the price which a willing vendor might reasonably expect to obtain from willing purchaser. The land is not to be valued merely in accordance with the use to which it is being put, but also by reference to the uses to which it was reasonably capable of being put in the future.
' Where, therefore, there were vast possibilities of early development and there were already many Government offices and bungalows of important persons built in the locality in which the land acquisitioned was situate, it was held that in such circumstances, the District Judge was justified in assessing compensation for the lana not merely by reference to the use to which it was being put at time of acquisition. Its value had to be assessed as a building site with all its potentialities for its development in the future."
5. From the above-referred decisions, it is manifest that the value of the acquired land with all its potentialities is to be kept in view while assessing the market value. The testimony of the objectors and his witnesses, as pointed above, have gone unchallenged and no evidence has been led to prove that their acquired land has not that potential value as the objectors and his witnesses deposed to. We have, therefore, no reason to discard the evidence of the objectors. It has been laid down in PLD 1986 SC 158: "In appropriate cases, there should be no compunction even on relying upon the oral testimony with respect to the market value of the property intended to be acquired, because even while deciding cases involving questions of life and death, the Courts rely on oral testimony alone and do not insist on the production of documentary evidence". In the light of this rule of the Supreme Court, we can place reliance on the unrebutted evidence led from the objectors' side. Keeping all these factors in view, the learned Acquisition Judge has committed no illegality in enhancing the market value. Therefore, we find no merit in the appeal filed by the Collector and dismiss it with no order as to costs. We also find that there is no basis for further enhancement of the sale price to Rs,2,000 per Marla as claimed by the appellants in R.F.A. No,25 of 1995 and, therefore, we also dismiss this appeal with no order as to costs.