' SALEEM AKHTAR, J.--- These two appeals will be disposed of by this judgment which arise from the common judgment passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, whereby the appeals filed by the respondent against the orders imposing penalty and removal from service, were allowed.
2. The respondent was employed as Line Superintendent Grade-I with WAPDA, the appellant. He was served with a charge-sheet with different charges to which he replied. The Enquiry Committee constituted by the competent Authority after hearing the parties submitted its report holding that the respondent was guilty of charge No 3 and technically guilty of charge No2. On receipt of the enquiry report a notice to show cause was served on the respondent which was replied and the competent Authority by its order dated 2-10-1986 imposed the penalty by reverting him to the post of Line Superintendent Grade-II and placement, at the bottom of the. Seniority list of Line Superintendent Grade-II. The respondent filed a departmental appeal. As no reply was received, he filed an appeal before the Tribunal which was registered as Appeal No 93(R) of 1987.While the appeal was pending the authority issued notice to -the respondent and after reply was received, by order dated 29-6-1987 enhanced the penalty to removal from service. This order was challenged departmentally but as no reply was received, the respondent filed appeal before the Tribunal which was registered as Appeal No 415 (R) of 1987. Appeal No 93(R) of 1987 was dismissed holding that the impugned order had merged in the order of removal from service and, therefore, it had become infructuous. The other. Appeal 415(R) of 1987 was dismissed on ground of limitation holding that after the order of removal was passed, the respondent should have filed appeal directly to the Tribunal as no departmental appeal was provided. Therefore, the time spent in moving the authority was not excluded and the appeal was held to be buried by time. The respondent challenged this judgment of the Tribunal before this Court in CA. No 89/90 which was allowed by judgment dated 30-3-1992 holding that Appeal NoA15(R) of 1987 was not barred by time and remanded the same to the Tribunal for, decision according to law. The Tribunal by the impugned judgment, held that the party of reversion to the lower grade originally awarded to the respondent was not proper and justified and converted it into reduction to the lowest stage in Grade-I from 2-10-1986 to 1-10-1993. While considering this appear} against the order of reversion, it was observed that the placement at bottom of seniority list was not a penalty warranted by law and further it was observed as follows:- "This may be so but from the order of the competent Authority and for that matter from the order of the Authority we have not been able to find out as to on what ground a view different from that of the enquiry committee was taken. In fact when the report of the Enquiry Officer or its findings are not agreed to then it is the responsibility of the competent authority to give reasons for differing with the report and for coming to a different conclusion. We, therefore, do not agree with the learned counsel for the respondents that the appellant could be found guilty of charges which have not been proved by the enquiry committee in the absence of plausible reasons."
3. Consequently the order of reversion was converted as foretasted. It was further ordered that "On restoration future increments shall not be postponed. The period during which the appellant remained out of service shall count for pension and increments. However, arrears of pay shall not be admissible to him." As regards the appeal against the order of removal from service it was allowed and the order of the authority was set aside.
4. . Leave was granted to examine whether in view of decisions of this Court in WAPDA v.
Muhammad Riaz Butt (1993 SCM R 1134) and Syed Mir Muhammad v. N.-W.F:P. Government through Chief Secretary (PLD 1981 SC 176) the legal course open to the Tribunal was not one of remanding the matter to the Authority exercising powers of enhancement to record reasons of the order passed. .
5. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the Tribunal should have remanded the case to the authority to record the reasons and pass the order instead of converting the sentence and setting aside the order of removal from service. Reference has been made to WAPDA v.
Muhammad Riaz Butt (1993 SCM R 1134). In this case the Tribunal had set aside the order of removal from service passed by the Authority although the employee had been exonerated by the competent Authority from the charges levelled against him. The Tribunal had noted that the Authority had no power to revise an order arbitrarily without giving any reasons. It seems that the order passed by the Authority was set aside as it was not a speaking order and was held to be arbitrary. In the referred, case the appellant at the time of seeking leave to appeal had contended that the entire file on the basis of which the provisional authority had exercised jurisdiction was before the Tribunal which contained noting, recording of opinions and decision by the Authority from time to time but they were ignored and if they would have been read with the office orders, the decision of the Tribunal would have been different. While granting leave to appeal, it was observed "whether in case the observations made by the Tribunal are upheld in the context that the "Authority" committed a technical error in not repeating the material contained in the files in the orders themselves, would it not have been necessary or at least proper for the Tribunal to remand the case to the "Authority" for fresh decision and/or rewriting of proper judgment." It was in this background that in appeal it was observed; "The need for fresh decision and detailed order by the appellant not having been seriously disputed, we in the light of the foregoing discussion allow these appeals, while setting aside the impugned orders and remand the matte to the Authority for decision afresh." This judgment, therefore, cannot be an Authority for the proposition that where the Authority has passed an illegal order without giving any reason, it is necessary to remand the case for rehearing or re-writing the decision. . No such firm rule can be made applicable to all cases.
Such decision depends upon the facts of each case and it is after examining those facts that the Court can come to the conclusion whether case should be remanded for rehearing or re-writing the judgment. Remand of case is not a routine matter nor it should be adopted as a matter of course to allow a party or an authority to fill in the lacuna or to improve upon the case. .
6. The learned counsel also referred to Syed Mir Muhammad v. N.-W.F.P. Government through Chief Secretary (PLD 1981 SC 176) where the case was remanded to the Enquiry Officer in the following circumstances:- "In this case, a copy of the Enquiry Report was not supplied to the accused Officer by the authorized Officer and he was not allowed an opportunity to submit his explanation with regard to the findings of the Inquiry Officer, which were adverse to him; nor was he apprised of the action proposed to be recommended against him. Consequently, the authorized Officer, before formulating his recommendations for the authority, did not have the benefit of the explanation of the accused Officer in relation to the material brought on the record during the enquiry proceedings and the findings recorded thereon by the Enquiry Officer. This being essential in order to satisfy the requirement of the Rules, the failure to do so invalidates the recommendations of the authorized Officer and the ultimate order passed on their basis by the authority against the accused Officer.
' We consider, therefore, that the Service Tribunal should have allowed the appeal and set aside the order of removal passed against the appellant, leaving it open to the relevant authorities to proceed from the stage from which the error could be corrected; namely by supplying a copy of the findings of the Enquiry Officer to enable the appellant to submit his explanation in regard to the material brought against him during the enquiry proceedings and the opinion formed in respect thereof by the Inquiry Officer, as well as the action proposed to be recommended by the authorized Officer."
7. In this case also it was remanded because the authorized Officer had not allowed the accused Officer to submit his explanation nor any notice of proposed recommendation made against him was given and, therefore, the entire inquiry proceedings were completely vitiated and could not be made basis for an adverse order against him. In these circumstances as there had been no inquiry worth the name which could be termed as legal and proper the case was remanded for holding proper inquiry according to law. This case also does not even suggest that in every case where order is set aside the Authority should be given an opportunity to rehear the case on remand.
8. The learned counsel also referred to WAPDA v. Sh. Zulfiqar Ali (PLD 1988 SC 693) in which the Tribunal ordered reduction of punishment. This Court maintaining the finding of guilty by the Tribunal was constrained to hold that no sufficient legal justification was shown for altering the penalty and the cases were remanded to the Tribunal for re-examination of the quantum of punishment. However, in this very judgment some questions of law were highlighted and the following observations were made:- "It is now well-settled that the Service Tribunals are forums of appeal on questions of law as also facts; with all the necessary powers to uphold, set aside or vary the orders, impugned before them.
It is subject to the limitations imposed by any law -- like section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act, 1958, as interpreted by this Court. That being so, the power to alter the punishment in appropriate cases has also been conceded to the Tribunals in a number of judgments by this Court. We, therefore, do not agree with the learned Counsel for the appellant that they have no such power.
' It is now to be seen whether there is any limitation on this power particularly in cases dealt under section 17(1-A) of WAPDA Act. One limitation is that the decisions of Tribunals being subject to appeal to this Court it is proper that, as on other questions, cogent reasons should be given for altering the punishment. This is also necessary so as to avoid criticism of arbitrariness on the part of the Tribunal itself.
' The other obvious limitation is that in fact also it should not be arbitrary. The reasons to be stated in the order should satisfy the standards of reasonableness. Guidance in this behalf can be sought from the cases of similar nature decided by the superior Courts. For example, in matters of corruption and/or bribe the recent judgments by this Court on quantum of punishment in criminal cases, can be kept in mind. See Malik Muhammad Khan v. The State PLD 1987 SC 500. See also the same case on review, re-heard and decided on 10-5-1988."
' It was further observed:-- "The question of alteration of punishment also came before this Court and it has been ruled that the Tribunal has the requisite power."
' Reliance was placed on WAPDA v. Shah Imroz (1986 SCM R 840) in which while relying on the observations made in WAPDA and another v. Muhammad Arshad Qureshi (1986 SCM R 18) it was observed that the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to hear and entertain appeals with regard to terms and conditions of the WAPDA employees. In Shah Imroz case referred above, the Tribunal after examining all the relevant facts came to the conclusion that the impugned order of the Authority was arbitrary and was not passed bona fide. Consequently in view of the rule laid down by this Court in the case of Muhammad Arshad Qureshi the Tribunal was not precluded from setting aside the order of removal passed by the Authority and substituting it with the order of reinstatement.
9. .From these judgments it is well-settled that the Federal Service Tribunal has the power to set aside or substitute any sentence as provided by law. It is not necessary that M all cases where question of sentence arises the case should be remanded to the authority/competent Authority to reconsider, rehear or re-write the order. If the documents and material on record are insufficient to pass a judgment, then the Court may remand the case. But where on examining the material on or undisputed facts which are brought on record, the Court comes to the conclusion that the sentence or order passed is completely arbitrary and illegal, it is not necessary to remand the case for rewriting the judgment. The principles for remand of case are no longer unsettled. The primary rule is that where there is adequate evidence on record to decide the case itself, the Court is not under an obligation to make order of remand. . Reference can be made to Pramatha Nath Chowdhury and others v. Kamir Mondal and others (PLD 1965 SC 434), Fateh All v. Pir Muhammad and another (1975 SCM R 221), Arshad Ameen v. Messrs Swiss Bakery and others (1993 SCM R 216) and Syed Abdul Hakim and others v. Ghulam Mohiuddin (PLD 1994 SC 52). In certain cases there may be some technical error due to which the Court may consider the remand. However, in cases of lack of bona fide, bias, prejudice and arbitrariness, it will not be safe to remand the case to the same authority for re-writing the judgment or rehearing.
10. . The learned counsel has also referred to Muhammad Habib Khan v. Pakistan Tobacco Company Limited and another (PLD 1991 SC 183) but it is not relevant to the point at issue in the present case. Applying the above principles to the facts of the case, we find that the Tribunal had the entire material before it which it had examined thoroughly and elucidating the reasons came to the conclusion that the order of the Authority was arbitrary. Nothing has been brought on record before us to show that such examination or conclusion was wrong, illegal or not based on record.
The facts of this case are completely distinguishable from the cases cited on the basis of which remand had been made. We, therefore, dismiss both the appeals. .