1. ' ABDUL RAHIM KAZI, J.---By this petition the following reliefs, are sought:
(1) Set aside the order dated 30th March 1995 of the learned Tribunal No,1, at Karachi and the consent/compromise decree dated 14th November, 1993 passed by it and declare the same null and void and of no legal effect.
(2) Stay the execution proceeding pending before the Honourable Tribunal No,1 at Karachi.
(3) Grant any other relief which this Honourable Court deem fit in the circumstances.
2. ' The facts relevant for the purpose of this petition are that the present respondent No,1 had filed a Suit No,1481/93 before the Banking Tribunal, the respondent No,3 under section 6 of the Banking Tribunal Ordinance, 1984 for recovery of Rs,38,27,266 (Rupees thirty-eight lacs tewenty-seven thousand and two hundred and sixty six) and possession of the leased vehicle and machinery and equipment. The present petitioners and respondent No,2 were the defendant in the suit. One Kamran Nishat who has signed the present memo. Of petition and the Vakalatnama of the advocate was also defendant No,3 in the suit. The written statement in the suit was filed on 26-7- 1993. The written statement is signed by the present respondent No,2 as a Director of the company for self and on behalf of the company while the written statement is also signed by defendant No,3 in the suit who has signed the present petition. The written statement is also signed by the advocate for defendants Nos.1 to 3. Thereafter on 6-11-1993 an application for compromise under Order 23, rule 3 C.P.C. Was moved before the respondent No,3. This application is signed by the two defendants and their advocates and also the plaintiff and their advocates. A photostat copy of the said application has been filed by the petitioner alongwith the memo. Of this petition. On this application an order was passed by the respondent No,3 for accepting the compromise. According to this compromise the defendants Nos.1 and 2 had undertaken to pay the amount in dispute through 8 instalments as mentioned in the paragraph 2 of the application while the suit against the defendant No,3 was withdrawn. Thereafter an application under section 12(2), C.P.C. Was moved before the Tribunal. This application is signed by the said Kamran Nishat in capacity of Director of the present petitioners. This application also bears signature of their advocates Mr. Khairat H. Shamsi. The grounds urged by the petitioner in the said application under section 12(2), C.P.C. Are that the petitioners are a public limited company and under the provisions of Civil Procedure Code a suit cannot be filed by them unless an authority is given by the Board of Directors. The Tribunal after hearing the parties was pleased to reject this application by order dated 30-3-1995. Being aggrieved, the petitioners have instituted this petition. Mr. Mohsin Tayyabally, the learned counsel appearing for respondent No,1 on pre-admission notice has vehemently opposed this petition.
3. ' We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, the main grounds urged by the petitioners are that since the petitioners are a public limited company therefore even a director incharge of the company would not be competent to file a suit on their behalf unless so authorised by a resolution passed by the Board of Directors. He has placed reliance on the case of (Khan Iftikhar Khan v. M/s. Ghulam Nabi Corporation Ltd., Lahore) reported in PLD 1971 SC 550 and the case of (Government of Pakistan v. Premier Sugar Mills and another) reported in PLD 1991 Lahore 381. There is no cavil about the proposition as held in above-referred to two judgments. However, the facts of the present case show that it was a joint written statement filed by all the defendants. It is also admitted position that all the defendants had engaged the advocate and authorised him to act on their behalf in the Court. This application for compromise is signed by the present respondent No,2 for himself and on behalf of the present petitioner. The advocate had appeared on their behalf in the Court on 14-11- 1993 when the decree in the suit was passed according to the terms and conditions of the compromise. Mr. Mohsin Tayabbally has made a statement in Court that he has verified the record from the Registrar's Office and the respondent No,2 is not only the Director of the company but is also the Chief Executive Officer and as such he could have entered into a compromise. Even the first instalment of decretal amount had been paid.
4. ' We have considered above submissions of the counsel. However, the question involved in this case is that this is a compromise decree and in case the petitioners are aggrieved by this decree or if according to them the persons who had signed the compromise application were not so authorised to compromise then also the course open for the petitioner was to file an appeal as provided under section 9 of the Banking Tribunals. Ordinance. Sections 9 and 10 of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance of 1984 hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance read as under:- "9. Appeal.--(1) Any person aggrieved by any order of the Banking Tribunal passed under subsection (4) or subsection (5) of section 6 or a decree or sentence passed under this Ordinance may, within thirty days of such order, decree or sentence, prefer an appeal to the High Court: ' Provided that no appeal filed by the defendant against a decree shall be entertained unless the defendant has deposited with the Banking Tribunal the amount in the suit under subsection (6) of section 6 or the decretal amount: ' Provided further that, where the claim of the banking company is based on the default of the defendant in payment of agreed instalments the deposit shall be to the extent of the amount of instalments in default.
(2) An appeal under subsection (1) shall be heard by a Bench of not less than two Judges.
10. Finality of orders.--Subject to the provisions of appeal under section 9, no Court or other authority shall call, or permit to be called, in question any proceeding, order, judgment or decree of a Banking Tribunal or the legality or propriety of anything done or intended to be done by the Banking Tribunal under this Ordinance."
5. The above section 9 provides for filing an appeal against orders passed by the Tribunal under subsection (4) or subsection (5) of section 6 and also against the decree or sentence passed under the Ordinance. The period of limitation in such appeal would be 30 days. Section 10 provides that said orders would not be called in question in any proceeding except in an appeal filed under the abovesaid section 9. Thus it is established under the law that in case there is a decree of the Court then only an appeal would lie against the same. In the second part of the prayer in clause (1) the petitioners have sought the setting aside of the consent decree/compromise decree dated 14- 11-1993. This cannot possibly be done through present petition.
6. ' Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 provides that no petition would lie if any other adequate, alternate remedy is available. As pointed out above remedy of appeal is already available which has not been resorted by the petitioner. In the case of (Sheikh Gulzar Ali & Co. Ltd. And others v. Special Judge, Special Court of Banking and another) reported in 1991 SCMR 590, their Lordships were pleased to hold that the High Court under its Constitutional jurisdiction cannot takeover the function of machinery provided by the statute. In this case their Lordships were dealing with the case where the point under consideration was with regard to appeal provided by section 12 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans Ordinance, 1979. This provision is also analogous to the provisions of section 9 of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984.
7. In this view of the matter we are of the opinion that the course open to the petitioners was to have instituted an appeal against the decree.
8. ' The learned counsel for the petitioner has further argued that it is the order passed by the Banking. Tribunal on 30-3-1995 which has also been challenged in this petition and therefore, the petition would be competent as the said order was an unlawful order. In the first instance, it may be observed that it is not the jurisdiction of the Tribunal which has been challenged. The petitioner had moved this application under section 12(2), C.P.C. Before the Tribunal and therefore now it cannot be argued that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear or decide the said application.
9. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that law required that in such cases it was incumbent upon the Trial Court to have framed issue and allowed the party to lead evidence on the said pr orders. He has further argued that the Tribunal should have considered that the compromise decree was without jurisdiction as the compromise was made by the persons not authorised to do so. Mr. Mohsin Tayyabally has opposed this submission of the petitioner.
10. ' At the first instance, it may be observed that even this order passed on 30-3-1995 could have been challenged in the appeal under section 9 of the Ordinance as referred to above. The perusal of the provisions of section 9 above would show that the same could have been appealed against.
11. Even if the matter is considered from the angle of the applicability of the Civil Procedure Code then also revision application could have been filed against this order. In the case of (Munir Ahmad Khan and others v. Samiullah Khan and others) reported in 1982 CLC 625 the learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court has observed as under: "After the insertion of subsection (2) of section 12 neither the definition of the decree as given in Order II, rule 2, C.P.C. Was amended nor the adjudication made under the aforesaid subsection included in the appealable orders as given in section 104 with the result that neither a regular appeal would be maintainable nor any order passed under the aforesaid section shall be appealable as an order. Consequently the only remedy available to a person aggrieved by an order passed under subsection (2) of section 12, C.P.C. Would be to file a revision under section 115, C.P.C. The learned counsel for the appellant could not controvert the objection and requested that the appeals be converted into revisions. The High Court has always power to convert an appeal into a revision for which no authority needs to be cited. The two appeals, i,e, F.A.Os. Nos.250 and 251 of 1980 are converted into the civil revisions, and are to be treated as such. The appellant in both the appeals shall henceforth be termed as petitioner.
12. ' Similarly, in case of (Ahmed and another v. The Additional District Judge, Sargodha and others) reported in PLD 1990 Lahore 425, the same view has been taken.
13. In view of the above discussion we find no merit in this petition and as such the same cannot be maintained in law. Accordingly, we dismiss the petition in limine with no order as to costs. Above are the reasons for the short order announced in Court on 31-5-1995.