' SALEEM AKHTAR, J.---This judgment will dispose of all the appeals as the judgment impugned therein is common.
2. These appeals with the leave of the Court challenge the judgment passed by the learned Judge in Chamber exercising jurisdiction under the Companies Ordinance, 1984 (hereinafter called the Ordinance). For the purposes of these appeals, the facts relevant are that 12 out of 18 companies involved were formed under family set-up consisting of seven families headed by seven brother3, which was commonly called as Ittefaq Group. Seven families of Ittefaq Group were headed by Mian Muhammad Sharif, Mian Javed Sharif, Mian Ilyas Miraj, Mian Khalid Siraj, Mian Barkat Farooq, Mian Yousuf Aziz and Mian Idrees Bashir. As dispute arose amongst various families in the Ittefaq Group set-up, a memo. Of understanding dated 1-9-1991 was concluded between some of the families concerned for dividing the corporate assets of the Ittefaq Group. It is not necessary to give in detail the arrangement between the parties. In respect of this settlement respondents Nos.1 to 12 filed a petition under section 265(a)(ii) of the Ordinance before the Lahore High Court praying for direction to the Corporate Law Authority to appoint Inspector to investigate the affairs of the petitioner-company and to submit a report in that behalf. The appellants opposed, but the learned Company Judge by judgment dated 6-10-1994 accepted the petition and ordered investigation in the affairs of the petitioner-company by Inspectors to be appointed by the Corporate Law Authority. This judgment was challenged in the intra-Court Appeal which was admitted for regular hearing on 12-12-1994. Respondents Nos.1 to 12 had also filed a petition under section 290 of the Ordinance before the learned Company Judge of the Lahore High Court in July, 1994. During the pendency of this petition, a local Commissioner was appointed to prepare the inventory and to put his signature of authentication on the same, which was accordingly done. During the pendency of the main petition under section 290 of the Ordinance, respondents Nos. 1 to 12 filed an application under section 292 of the Ordinance praying that the management of the Company may be replaced by an impartial agency/board/administrator. This application was granted by judgment dated 19-1-1995 and the management of the petitioner-company was suspended/removed and Inspector already appointed by the Corporate Law Authority to conduct investigation was appointed as Administrator to act as Chief Executive of the Company and perform functions of the management. The appellants filed petition for leave to appeal, which was granted to consider, inter alia:--
(1) If from the order impugned in these petitions the right of appeal was available to the petitioners before a larger Bench of the High Court, and, if so, the appeals before this ' Court Are not competent or entertainabte; so far as the first part of the question is concerned it is one of first impression for this Court even though there are some judgments of the Lahore High Court in which a view in the affirmative has been expressed;
(2) if in the absence of the Directors of the companies, who, except for Mian Muhammad Sharif, were not impleaded as parties to the main petitions, the learned Company Judge was right in depriving them of the Management of the companies particularly when, as observed by him, no specific allegations of mismanagement or commission of a criminal act had been made against them;
(3) if the learned Company Judge had any basis for holding that the present management of the companies was responsible for the delay in the completion of the investigations; and,
(4) if the learned Company Judge had any material before him for holding that proper and fair investigations could only be held if the present management was suspended and a neutral management was installed in its place.
' As the first question related to maintainability of the appeals, the learned counsel for the parties have been heard on it.
3. Mr. Hamid Ali Khan, appearing in C.A. No,31/1995 and Ch. Muhammad Farooq appearing in C.As.
32 to 38/1995 for the appellants have taken the stand that the appeals_ are maintainable in this Court. The maintainability of the appeals has been challenged on the ground that in terms of section 10 of the Ordinance, appeal against the impugned judgment should lie to a Bench of two Judges of the High Court and not before this Court.
4. Before adverting to the contention of the parties it would be proper to examine the nature of the Court and proceedings in which impugned order was passed. The proceeding was initiated under the Ordinance which under subsection (11) of section 2 provides:-- ' the Court' means the Court having jurisdiction under this . Ordinance."
' Section 7 confers jurisdiction on the High Court in the following manner:- "Jurisdiction of the Courts.--(1) The Court having jurisdiction under this Ordinance shall be the High Court having jurisdiction in the place at which the registered office of the company is situate: ' Provided that the Federal Government may, by notification in the official Gazette and subject to such restrictions and conditions as it thinks fit, empower any Civil Court to exercise all or any of the jurisdiction by this Ordinance conferred upon the Court, and in that case such Court shall, as regards the jurisdiction so conferred, be the Court in respect of companies having their registered office within the territorial jurisdiction of such Court.
(2) For the purposes of jurisdiction to wind up companies, the expression ' registered office' means the place which has longest been the registered office of the company during the six months immediately preceding the presentation of the petition for winding up.
(3) Nothing in this section shall invalidate a proceeding by reason of its being taken in a Court other than the High Court or a Court empowered under subsection (1)."
Section 8 provides that the Chief Justice of the High Court shall constitute one or more Benches each known as Company Bench to exercise jurisdiction under section 7. The procedure of the Court is provided by section 9 which shall be summary. From these provisions it is clear that the High Court or a Court empowered under section 7(1) has been vested with the jurisdiction to entertain, hear, try and decide the matters and cases arising under the Ordinance. Such jurisdiction has been conferred by the Ordinance. The proceedings under the Ordinance are initiated in the High Court as a Court of first instance. While exercising such jurisdiction it has the characteristics and attributes of original jurisdiction. In this regard, reference may be made to the relevant provisions which provide for appeal against the judgment, order or decision passed by the Court:-- Section 10 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984: Appeals against Court orders .--(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, an appeal against any order, decision or judgment of the Court under this Ordinance shall lie to the Supreme Court where the company ordered to be wound up has a paid-up share capital of not less than one million rupees; and, where the company ordered to be wound up has a paid-up capital of less than one million rupees, or has no share capital, such appeal shall lie only if the Supreme Court grants leave to appeal.
(2) Save as provided in subsection (1), an appeal from any order made or decision given by the Court shall lie in the same manner in which and subject to the same conditions under which appeals lie from any order or decision of the Court.
(3) An appeal preferred under subsection (2) shall be finally disposed of by the Court hearing the appeal within ninety days of the submission of the appeal.
Section 3, Law Reforms Ordinance: Appeal to High Courts in certain cases .--(1) An appeal shall lie to a Bench of two or more Judges of a High Court from a decree passed or final order made by a Single Judge of that Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction.
(2) An appeal shall also lie to a Bench of two or more Judges of a High Court from an order made by a Single Judge of that Court under clause (i) of Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan not being an order made under sub-paragraph (i) of paragraph (b) of that clause: ' Provided that the appeal referred to in this subsection shall not be available or competent if the application brought before the High Court under Article 199 arises out of any proceedings in which the law applicable provided for at least one appeal or one revision or one review to any Court, Tribunal or authority against the original order.
(3) No appeal shall lie under subsection (1) or subsection (2) from an interlocutory order or an order which does not dispose of the entire case before the Court.
(4) Nothing contained in this Ordinance shall be construed as affecting--
(a) any appeal under the provisions of the Letters Patent applicable to a High Court or under section 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), which was pending immediately before the commencement of this Ordinance; or
(b) any appeal or petition for leave to appeal from a decree, judgment or order of a Single Judge of a High Court made to the Supreme Court before the commencement of the Law Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1972.
Section 15 of Ordinance X of 1980 Appeal to High Court in certain cases .--Notwithstanding anything contained in section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 (XII of 1972), an appeal shall lie to a Bench of two or more Judges of a High Court from an interlocutory order made by a Single Judge of that Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction."
In the facts of the present case, section 10(1) of the Ordinance cannot be pressed in service because one of the preconditions for its applicability is that the company should have been ordered to be wound up. If no order for winding up of the company has been passed, section 10(1) of the Ordinance will not be attracted. Mr. Hamid Ali Khan contended that the order passed is in the nature or in lieu of winding up and therefore this provision will be attracted. He has referred to Gokulchand D. Morarka and another v. Company Law Board and others (1974) 44 Company Cases
(44) 173). In this case, pending petition for winding up of the company, the Company Law Board filed a petition under sections 397 and 398 of the Indian Companies Act, 1956 and also applied for interim relief of removal of the sole Director and constitution of a Board to manage the Company.
The Company Judge removed the Director and constituted a Board of Directors. Appeal was filed before a Division Bench against this order in which preliminary objection about the maintainability of the appeal was raised and it was held that order passed under sections 397 and 398 was one which was passed in lieu of winding up and hence it was in "the nature of winding up" and therefore the appeal was maintainable. The provisions of appeal under section 483 of the Companies Act, 1956 are completely different, which provide for appeals from any order made or decision given "in the matter of the winding up of a .Company". In the Ordinance, section 10(1) clearly provides that appeal can be filed against judgment or order where the company has been ordered to be wound up which is not as wide as under the Companies Act, 1956.
5. The main question about maintainability of the appeals can be resolved by interpreting the provisions of law quoted above. The present case will be governed by section 10(2) of the Ordinance according to which except the cases mentioned in subsection (1), the appeal will lie in the "same manner" and "subject to the same conditions" under which appeals lie from any order or decision of the Court. This provision does not specify the forum in which the appeal is to be filed nor does it clearly state the conditions which will be attracted while challenging the order in appeal. It however, in clear terms states that the appeal will lie in the same way as appeal lies against an order of the Court. This provision confers a right of appeal against order and decision passed by the Company Judge in a case to which section 10(1) of the Ordinance does not apply. The words "manner" and "conditions" are comprehensive in meaning and wide in connotation to include the procedure to be followed in filing and hearing appeals, the period of limitation to be applied and the forum to which appeal would lie. It is by reference that provisions providing for filing appeal against an order of a Judge of the High Court passed in exercise of original civil jurisdiction are attracted. In M/s. Sunrise Textiles Ltd. And others v. Mashreq Bank PSC and others PLD 1996 Lahore 1, relying on in the matter of Indian Companies Act and in the matter of East India Cotton Mills Ltd. AIR 1949 Cal. 69 it has been observed that section 10(2) does not provide the forum of appeal which is to be found in section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance. In the East India Cotton Mills' case section 202 of the Companies Act, 1913, which had employed the terminology of 'same conditions and same manner' for filing appeal, was under consideration. A contrary view was taken by Mahboob Ahmed, J. (as he then was) in Eastern Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Gul Begum PLD 1980 Lahore 69. While interpreting section 202 it was observed that "the second part which deals with the manner and the conditions in which appeals may be preferred only refers to the Procedural aspect of an appeal and the forum in which an appeal would lie". In India also Chagla, C.J. In Bachharaj Factories Ltd. v.
Hirji Mills Ltd. AIR 1955 Bombay 355 observed that the second part of section 202 of the Companies Act which refers to "the manner" and "the conditions in which appeals may lie regulates the procedure and the forum with which appeal may be filed. This view was upheld by the Supreme Court of India in Shankarlal Aggarwala and others v. Shankarlal .Poddar and others AIR 1965 SC 507.. In our view the words "the manner" in which appeal lies refer to forum in which appeals lie from any order or decision of the Court. The first part of section 10(2) of the Ordinance confers a right to file appeal against any order or decision of the Company Judge. The forum, procedure, hearing and period of limitation for filing appeal have not been stated and will be regulated by such laws which apply to appeals filed against the order passed or decision made by a Single Judge of the Court.
6. One has therefore to look for the provisions of law, which provide for appeal against the order or decision of a Single Judge of the High Court. Immediately one is attracted to the Law Reforms Ordinance and section 15 of Ordinance (X of 1980), to determine the manner, forum and conditions for filing such appeal. Under section 3(1) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, appeal can be filed before a Bench of two or More Judges of the High Court from a final order made by a Single Judge in exercise of his original civil jurisdiction. Subsection (3) of section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance further provides that appeal will not lie against an interlocutory order or an order which does not dispose of the entire case before the Court. Admittedly, the application was filed under section 292 of the Ordinance under which an interim order is passed. Section 15 of Ordinance X of 1980 can be treated as an exception to section 3(3) of the Law Reforms Ordinance as it provides that notwithstanding anything contained in section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance appeal against interlocutory order made by a Single Judge of the High Court in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, can be filed before a Bench of two or more Judges of that Court. Therefore, intra-Court appeal/High Court appeal can be filed against an interlocutory order provided it has been passed in exercise of "original civil jurisdiction" of the High Court. Under both the provisions precondition for filing intra-Court appeal is that the impugned order must have been passed by a Single Judge in exercise of original civil jurisdiction. The question therefore arises what is meant by "original civil jurisdiction of the High Court"? This term may have a technical as well as a general meaning. The learned counsel for the appellants have contended that the term ' original civil jurisdiction' has a special and technical meaning which should be given while interpreting section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance and section 15 of Ordinance X of 1980. According to Black's Law Dictionary, this term means "Jurisdiction in the first instance; jurisdiction to take cognizance of a cause at its inception, try it, and pass judgment upon the law and facts. Distinguished from appellate jurisdiction." In Constitutional Interpretation by Craig R. Duct and Harold W. Chase, Fifth Edition, it has been stated that "Original jurisdiction is the authority of a Court to hear a case in the first instance, that is, to function as a Trial Court. Appellate jurisdiction is the authority of a Court to hear a case that has first been decided 'by a lower Court. It should also be kept in mind that the jurisdiction of a Court is never established by the Court itself but by some authority external to it, either in a statute or the Constitution". Original civil jurisdiction is such jurisdiction of a Court where it is empowered to entertain suits and such proceedings of civil nature which are initiated before the said Court and entertained by it as a Court of first instance and are decided by it. Such IK jurisdiction is in contradistinction to the appellate jurisdiction.
7. Ch. Muhammad Farooq, the learned counsel for the appellants contended that original civil jurisdiction derives its sanction from the Code of Civil Procedure where original proceedings are initiated by instituting a suit through a plaint and therefore the original civil jurisdiction will mean forum for filing a suit and its trial. Such jurisdiction has not been conferred on the Lahore High Court. In Ahmed Khan v. The Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court of West Pakistan and others PLD 1968 SC 171 following observation was made:-- "The ordinary original civil jurisdiction was confined to the trial of suits arising within the local limits of that jurisdiction. The extraordinary original civil jurisdiction was given for the removal and trial of suits pending or falling within the jurisdiction of Courts subordinate to the High Court. Every other jurisdiction of a civil nature conferred by the Letters Patent would as contended by the learned Attorney-General, be best described as special jurisdiction or as statutory jurisdictions, since some of those jurisdictions were to be exercised under existing statutes. In the case of the Lahore High Court, there was no power to receive suits in the ordinary original civil jurisdiction, there being no provision in the relevant Letters Patent in that behalf. The Lahore High Court had testamentary and intestate jurisdiction to be exercised in accordance with law, and matrimonial jurisdiction exercisable under its own law. The jurisdiction of a general nature that it possessed was that conferred by clause 9 and described as extraordinary original jurisdiction, which was confined to power to remove and try suits pending before its subordinate Courts."
The learned counsel for the appellants have relied on Eastern Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Gul Begum PLD 1980 Lahore 69 in which the order passed by a learned Single Judge appointing a receiver on an interlocutory application Ili the, winding up petition was challenged in appeal. A preliminary objection was raised that the Intra-Court Appeal was not maintainable under section 3(3) of the Law Reforms Ordinance as the impugned order was an interlocutory order and did not dispose of the entire case. The Court rejected this objection holding that the appeal was maintainable under section 202 of the Companies Act and dismissed the appeal on merits. It was observed that orders passed in winding up proceeding are not passed in exercise of original civil jurisdiction within the meaning of section 3(1) of the Law Reforms Ordinance and hence bar under subsection (3) will not operate against order passed under the Companies Act. The question involved in the present case was not considered. In fact the judgment in the referred case has proceeded on completely different premises. However, it was observed that "powers of the High Court under the Companies Act are not that of a Court of "original civil jurisdiction", but are in fact powers of statutory nature conferred on the High Court as such by a special statute". The appellant can rely on this part of the judgment but so far question of forum under section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance for filing appeal is concerned, the same was not considered there. Reliance was placed on Muhammad Ismail v. Secretary to Government of N.-W.F.P., Settlement/Rehabilitation Department PLD 1988 Peshawar 19 in which question arose whether Intra-Court Appeal against the order of a Single Judge granting application under Order I, Rule TO, C.P.C. Passed in a writ petition was maintainable under section 15 of Ordinance X of 1980. It was observed that writ jurisdiction and original civil jurisdiction are two separate and distinct jurisdictions therefore appeal under section 15 was not maintainable. The main reason being that appeal against an interlocutory order would lie and be maintainable if passed in exercise of original civil jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure. In the same context reference was made to Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan and 3 others v.
M/s. Kanal Enterprises Ltd. PLD 1995 Quetta 41 in which While relying on the aforestated judgment and Mirza Munawar Ahmad and another v. Official Liquidator and 3 others PLD 1980 Lahore 86 it was observed that as the High Court under the Companies Ordinance exercises jurisdiction conferred under a special statute and not the original civil jurisdiction Intra-Court Appeal was not maintainable. Relying on these judgments the learned counsel contend that appeal would lie before this Court. In all these judgments the common ground is that while exercising jurisdiction under the Companies Act or the Ordinance, the High Court does not exercise original civil jurisdiction but statutory jurisdiction. At this stage two judgments of the Lahore High Court, viz., Saleemuddin v. Pak Wheat Products Ltd. 1988 CLC 2147 followed in Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Ltd. v. M/s. Dilshad Hussain 1986 MLD 823 may also be noted. The Intra- Court Appeals were filed under section 202 of the Companies Act, 1913 under which appeal may be filed "in the same manner and subject to the same conditions in and subject to which appeals may be had from any order or decision of the same Court in cases within its ordinary jurisdiction". In Saleemuddin it was observed:-- "It is significant to note that an appeal from the decision of a Single Judge under the Companies Act does not lie by virtue of the provisions of section 3(1) of the Law Reforms Ordinance but that it is a creation of section 202 of the Companies Act. Now, to find out the forum we have to see what is the nature of the proceedings under the Companies Act. The words 'ordinary jurisdiction' as occurring in section 202 have not been defined in the Companies Act; they obviously refer to civil jurisdiction for under the Companies Act the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court may it be called special or statutory is essentially of a civil nature. Therefore, the appeal provided by section 202 would lie before the forum where appeals ordinarily lie in matters decided by a Single Judge in exercise of the civil jurisdiction of the High Court. It is not in dispute that under section 3(1) of the Law Reforms Ordinance an appeal lies before the Bench of two or more Judges of the High Court from a decree or final order passed by a Single Judge in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction.
We should, therefore, think under section 202, too, an appeal from a decision of a Single Judge would lie to a Bench of two or more Judges of the High Court."
The same view was expressed in Eastern Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. It may be noted that in that case the entire judgment turned on the interpretation of the expression "ordinary jurisdiction" used in section 202 and not "original civil jurisdiction" as contained in section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance which convey a completely different, meaning. A close scrutiny of the judgments holding that the Court under the Ordinance does not exercise original civil jurisdiction shows that they are based on the observation made in Ahmed Khan (supra), in which Cornelius, C.J. Has specifically mentioned that the ordinary original civil jurisdiction is _confined to trial of suits. Although in some judgments the word 'ordinary' has not been used, yet where the proceedings are initiated by filing a plaint as provided by the Code of Civil Procedure, it should be termed as ordinary original civil jurisdiction and not merely original civil jurisdiction. To clearly understand the meaning and impact of the term "original civil jurisdiction", it is necessary to differentiate between these two terminologies. The original civil jurisdiction cannot be restricted to proceeding initiated by filing plaint which in my view is ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a Court, as jurisdictions are conferred on the High Courts by statutes which provide for initiating proceedings before the High Court itself. It has been emphasised that such jurisdiction should be called statutory jurisdiction, but in any event it has to be considered whether it is an original jurisdiction or an appellate jurisdiction within the framework of even a statutory jurisdiction conferred by a statute. In Husain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commissioner PLD 1970 SC 1 it was observed that "as proceeding which deals with a right of a civil nature does not cease to be so merely because the right is sought to be enforced by having recourse to the writ jurisdiction. Judged from these aspects a proceeding under Article 98 of the Constitution relating to a civil matter is a civil proceeding although the High Court's jurisdiction in such a proceeding is Constitutional jurisdiction of an original kind". It clearly indicates that Constitutional or statutory jurisdiction can be of original nature having all the characteristics of an original jurisdiction. It was followed in D.F. Hasan v. Habib Bank Ltd. PLD 1974 Lahore 117 where Nasim Hasan Shah, J. (as he then was) observed that "the exercise of what is commonly termed as the writ jurisdiction, was considered to be a special original jurisdiction of the High Court and not ordinary original civil jurisdiction".
8. Under Article- 175 of the Constitution, a Court is vested with jurisdiction "as is or may be conferred on it by the Constitution or by or under any law". Therefore, the jurisdiction can be conferred on any Court including a High Court by a statute which. May provide for initiating the proceedings in that Court as a Court of first instance having power to entertain and decide it. Such Court will thus be vested with original jurisdiction. If it relates to civil dispute it will be termed as original civil jurisdiction. It is not uncommon that statutes are promulgated conferring jurisdiction on the High Court to initiate proceedings as a Court of first instance for purpose of exercises of jurisdiction. For instance under section 2(f)(ii) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, in respect of cases in which the amount of loan exceeds Rs,1 million, the High Court in exercise of original civil jurisdiction is the Special Court. Here by statute jurisdiction has been conferred on the High Court to exercise original civil jurisdiction and try the cases as specified. All the High Courts are exercising this jurisdiction. If a technical meaning to the term ' original civil jurisdiction' (i,e, having authority to entertain suits and try it) is given, then Lahore High Court, High Court of Balochistan and Peshawar High Court not having original civil jurisdiction in this technical sense cannot exercise jurisdiction conferred by the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance.
This will create absurdity which cannot be attributed to law. Therefore, in the statute under consideration the term ' original civil jurisdiction' has been used in the general sense. In Pakistan Fisheries Ltd., Karachi and others v. United Bank Ltd. And others PLD 1993 SC 109 while considering the nature of jurisdiction of the High Court as a Special Court as defined in section 2(f)(ii) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, it was observed as follows:-- "It seems to us that by the expression ' original civil jurisdiction' as used in the Ordinance, is meant the 'trial of the suit on the original side of the High Court. The term has not been used in the technical sense as understood will reference to the Letters Patent of some of the High Courts in the Sub-Continent, but has been employed in contradistinction to the appellate and revisional jurisdiction exercised by the High Court."
' Sunrise Textiles Ltd and others v. Mashreq Bank PSC PLD 1996 Lahore 1 also supports the contention that the jurisdiction of the Court under the Companies Ordinance is original civil jurisdiction conferred by the said statute.
' Reference may also be made to Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. v. The Chief Revenue Authority of Bombay AIR 1923 PC 148. It was a case under section 51 of the Income Tax Act, 1918 in which appeal was filed against the judgment of the High Court of Bombay. Clause 39 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Bombay provided appeal to the Privy Council from any judgment, decree or order made in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction by the High Court from which appeal did not lie to the High Court. Lord Atkinson interpreting the words 'original jurisdiction' observed that 'the words original jurisdiction' are only used in contradistinction to the words 'made on appeal'.
9. The learned counsel for the respondents canvassed in favour of the general meaning and not the technical one and referred to National Bank of Pakistan v. M/s. Link Belt Industries and 3 others PLD 1992 Lahore 80 in which it was observed that under sections 2(f) and 6 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, the Lahore High Court is vested with original civil jurisdiction to try the suits arising under this Ordinance. This judgment was challenged in this Court in C.P. No, 923-L of 1992 (M/s. Link Belt Industries and others v. National Bank of Pakistan) in which while refusing to grant leave to appeal, Saad Saood Jan, J. Observed as follows:-- "The first contention raised in support of this petition relates to the constitution of the Special Courts which under the Ordinance are alone competent to entertain suits by banks for the recovery of loans. Section 2(f) of the Ordinance reads as follows:-- ' Special Court' means--
(i) in respect of a case in which the outstanding amount of the loan does not exceed one million rupees, or the trial of offences punishable under this Ordinance, a person who is or has been a District Judge or an Additional District Judge and is appointed by the Federal Government, by notification in the official Gazette, to be a Special Court to exercise jurisdiction within such territorial limits as may be specified in the notification, and, in the absence of such appointment, the District Court; and (ii), in respect of any other case, the High Court in the exercise of original civil jurisdiction; ' It is argued on behalf of the petitioners that the language of sub-clause (ii) is such that only that High Court which possesses original civil jurisdiction can perform the functions of Special Court, and, since the Lahore High Court does not enjoy original civil jurisdiction it cannot act as a Special Court within the meaning of the sub-clause. It is difficult to subscribe to this argument. The expression used in sub-clause (ii) is 'original civil jurisdiction'. Now, the original civil jurisdiction can be of two types; ordinary and extraordinary. It is not disputed that the Lahore High Court does possess extraordinary original civil jurisdiction. As sub-clause (ii) does not specify the particular nature of the original civil jurisdiction which a High Court must have before it can act as Special Court it is difficult to subscribe to the contention of the learned counsel. As a matter of fact the only High Court in Pakistan which enjoys ordinary original civil jurisdiction is the Sindh High Court. If the intention of the Legislative Authority had been that only the Sindh High Court should exercise the jurisdiction of the Special Court, the sub-clause would have clearly stated so."
Similar view seems to have been taken in Pakistan Fisheries Ltd. It, therefore, seems to be a consistent view that the High Court besides the jurisdiction already conferred on it may be vested with any jurisdiction including original civil jurisdiction by a statute. Under such original civil jurisdiction the proceedings are to initiate and conclude before the High Court. The Ordinance likewise confers such original civil jurisdiction on the High Courts, which is completely different from the ordinary original civil jurisdiction conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure. Mr. Muhammad Farooq the learned A.S.C. Has contended that the jurisdiction exercised by the Company Judge is special original jurisdiction and not original civil jurisdiction as the original civil jurisdiction is exercised under the Code of Civil Procedure. We are Unable to subscribe to this contention as under the Ordinance the Court is required to adjudicate upon rights and liabilities of the parties which are civil in nature. Such jurisdiction conferred by a statute has sometimes been termed as special or statutory jurisdiction, but it possesses all the attributes of original civil jurisdiction and remains nothing but the original civil jurisdiction as distinguished from the appellate jurisdiction.
10. In support of his contention that appeals are not maintainable, Mr. S. Jarnshed Ali, learned A.S.C.
For the respondents referred to Arjun Prasad v, Shantilal and others AIR 1962 SC 1192. While interpreting section 153(7) of the Companies Act, 1913, which provided that "an appeal shall lie from any order made by the Court exercising original jurisdiction under this section to the authority authorised to hear appeals from decisions of the Court", it was held that Patna High Court did not have original jurisdiction under the Letters Patent (like the Lahore High Court). It was observed that "the Company Judge while deciding the case was exercising original jurisdiction". It may be noted that subsection (7) of section 153 provides that the Court exercises original jurisdiction under section 153. This judgment can only demonstrate that by statute original jurisdiction can be conferred on a Court. In Jyoti Bhushan Gupta and others v. The Banaras Bank Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 403 it was observed that "the jurisdiction to deal with the claims of companies ordered to be wound up is conferred by the Indian Companies Act and to that extent Letters Patent are modified. There is, however, no difference in the character of the original civil jurisdiction, which is conferred upon the High Court by the Letters Patent and the jurisdiction conferred by special Acts. Further when in exercise of its authority conferred by a Special statute the High Court in an application presented to it as a Court of first instance declares liability to pay a debt, the jurisdiction exercised is original and civil and if the exercise of that jurisdiction does not depend upon any preliminary step invoking exercise of discretion of the High Court, the jurisdiction is ordinary". For reaching that conclusion, the Supreme Court of India adopted the view of the expression 'original civil jurisdiction' of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Candas Narrondas case ILR 13 Bombay 520 (PC). The Judicial Committee held, among others, that the expression 'ordinary jurisdiction' embraces all such as is exercised in the ordinary course of law and without any special step being necessary to assume it and that it is opposed to extraordinary jurisdiction... ... " The proceedings under the Ordinance are initiated in the High Court as a Court of first instance, dealing with rights of civil nature and are decided according to the procedure provided therein. The Court thus exercises original civil jurisdiction and therefore under section 15 of Ordinance X of 1980 appeal will lie to a Bench of two Judges.
11. The learned counsel for the appellants have referred to various judgments of this Court in which appeals against the judgments/orders of the Company Judge were entertained under section 10(2) of the Ordinance and decided on merits. He has referred to the following judgments:--
(1) Brothers Steel Ltd. And another v. Merajuddin and 15 others dismissed on 8-2-1995 PLD 1995 SC 320.
(2) C.P. No,74 of 1994 (Muhammad Ishaq Dar v. Shahid Nabi Malik and 3 others -- decided on 19-2- 1994).
(3) C.A. No,300 of 1991 (Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Ltd. v. United Textile Mills Ltd -- decided on 20-121992).
It seems that in none of these cases the question of maintainability of appeal was seriously raised or contended. Only in one case namely, C.A. No,300 of 1991 an oblique reference to this contention was made, but it was not considered. In the absence of any authoritative judgment on the issue involved in these appeals and in view of the fact that eight petitions for leave to appeal against the order of the Company Judge filed by the appellants, arising from the proceedings under the Ordinance from which the present appeals have arisen, were entertained and decided on merits the legal position for the appellants was very fluid and confusing, therefore, they were prompted to file petitions/appeals in this Court, which on proper and thorough scrutiny have turned out to be not maintainable. In these circumstances, in order to do complete justice between the parties and avoid any of the parties from being thrown out on technical ground, we would remit the appeals to the High Court. Mr. S. Jamshed Ali has raised objection that the appeals will be barred by time, but in the facts and circumstances of the case as discussed above, which are very peculiar, we condone the delay. In view of these reasons, the appeals were disposed of by the following short order:- "For reasons to be recorded, we hold that the appeals are not maintainable and are dismissed with no order as to costs. However,' we would remit these appeals to the Lahore High Court with direction that they shall be treated as ICAs pending before it, which will be decided after notice to the parties on merits in accordance with law."
(Sd.)
SALEEM AKHTAR, J.
(Sd.)
ZIA MAHMOOD MIRZA, J.
' I agree. I have added note.
(Sd.)
FAZAL KARIM, J.
(Sd.)
MUHAMMAD MUNIR KHAN, J.
(Sd.)
MAMOON KAZI, J.
' FAZAL KARIM, J.--I respectfully agree with the conclusion arrived at by my learned brother, Saleem Akhtar, J. As also with the reasons which he gives to support them. I add this note in deference to the comprehensive and careful arguments addressed by learned counsel for the parties.
2. As ours is a precedent-oriented system, not unnaturally a large number of decided cases were cited at the bar of this Court. Those cases have been treated admirably in the judgments of my learned brothers. I can, therefore, deal with the matter guided, but unhampered, by authority.
3. The orders in question are interim, or what is the same thing, interlocutory orders, made under section 292 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 pending the making of a final order in a petition under section 290 of that Ordinance. Section 290 entitles a member or members holding not less than twenty per cent. Of the issued share capital of a company, or a creditor or creditors having interest equivalent in amount to not less than twenty per cent. Of the paid-up capital of the company, to make an application to the Court complaining that the affairs of the company are being conducted, or are likely to be conducted, in an unlawful or fraudulent manner, or in a manner not provided for in its memorandum, or in a manner oppressive to the member or any of the members or the creditors. On such a petition being made the Court may, if it is of opinion that the company's affairs are being conducted, or are likely to be conducted, as aforesaid and that to wind up the company would unfairly prejudice the members or creditors, with a view to bringing to an end the matters complained of, make such orders including orders enumerated in section 291, as it thinks fit, whether for regulating the conduct of the company's affairs in future, or for the purchase of the shares of any members of the company by other members of the company or by the company and, in the case of purchase by the company, for the reduction accordingly of the company's capital, or otherwise.
4. The Court having jurisdiction under the Companies Ordinance "shall be the High Court having jurisdiction in the place at which the registered office of the company is situate"; but the Federal Government may, by notification in the official Gazette and subject to such restrictions and conditions as it thinks fit, "empower any civil Court to exercise all or any of the jurisdiction by this Ordinance conferred upon the Court, and in that case such Court shall, as regards the jurisdiction so conferred, be the Court in respect of companies having their registered office within the territorial jurisdiction of such Court". (Section 7 of the Companies Ordinance). In other words "the Court" for the purposes of exercising the jurisdiction under the Companies Ordinance is the High Court or such Civil Court as may be empowered by the Federal Government by a notification in the official Gazette to exercise all or any of the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court by the Ordinance.
5. Section 9 of the Companies Ordinance by its subsection (3), provides that "in the exercise of its jurisdiction the Court shall, in all matters before it, follow the summary procedure".
6. Section 10 of the Ordinance of 1984 provides for the right of appeal against "Court orders". That section reads:-- "(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, an appeal against any order, decision or judgment of the Court under this Ordinance shall lie to be Supreme Court where the company ordered to be wound up has a paid-up share capital of not less than one million rupees, and, where the company ordered to be wound up has a paid-up capital of less than one million rupees, or has no share capital, such appeal shall lie only if the Supreme Court grants leave to appeal.
(2) Save as provided in subsection (1) an appeal from any order made or decision given by the Court shall lie in the same manner in which and subject to the same conditions under which appeals lie from any order or decision of the Court.
(3) An appeal preferred under subsection (2) shall be finally disposed of by the Court hearing the appeal within ninety days of the submission of the appeal."
7. Mr. Hamid Khan who appeared for some of the appellants did at one stage canvass the point that subsection (1) of section 10 applies and that the orders in question are appealable to this Court under that section. But if I rightly understood them, at the end of the day learned counsel for the appellants agreed, and in my view rightly, that as the petitions before the High Court were not petitions for the winding up of the companies and the companies have not been ordered to be wound up, the appellants were not entitled to invoke that provision. There is however no question that subsection (2) of section 10 of the Companies Ordinance does give a right of appeal but that right is dependent upon the existence of another law, providing for appeals against such an order or decision of the 'Court'. That law, as we shall see, is section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980.
8. The reason why the law-maker adopted this legislative device is because if the jurisdiction has been exercised by a Civil Court then the forum of appeal, the manner in which and the condition subject to which an appeal will lie will be determined by the statute under which appeals ordinarily lie from any order or decision of the Civil Courts and if the order or decision is by the High Court, then the manner in which and the conditions subject to which the appeals will lie will be determined with reference to the law under which appeals lie from any order or decision of the High Court. There was some debate at the bar of this Court whether the words ' in the same manner' include the forum of appeal and a number of cases, including Shankarlal Aggarwala v.
Shankarlal Poddar (AIR 1965 SC 507) and Sunrise Textiles Limited v. Mashreq Bank PSC PLD 1996 Lahore 1 were cited. I should, I think, be content to say that, in order to make the right of appeal effective, section 10 (2) of the Companies Ordinance and section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980 must be read together.
9. By the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, section 3, subsection (1), "an appeal shall lie to a Bench of two or more Judges of High Court from a decree passed or final order made by a Single Judge of the Court in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction". Subsection (3) of that section provides that "no appeal shall lie under subsection (1) from an interlocutory or an order which does not dispose of the entire case before the Court. Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance was amended by section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980. The latter section reads:-- "Appeal to High Court in certain cases .--Notwithstanding anything contained in section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 (XII of 1972), an appeal shall lie to a Bench of two or more Judges of a High Court from an interlocutory order made by a Single Judge of that Court in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction."
10. The whole question is whether the orders in question were made by the High Court "in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction". If the answer be in the affirmative, then it must follow that appeals lay before a Bench of two or more Judges of the High Court and these appeals are not maintainable.
11. Learned counsel for the appellants agreed that the jurisdiction exercised by the Court under the Companies Ordinance is original jurisdiction, in the sense that the petitions or applications under the various provisions of that Ordinance are entertain able by the High Court as the Court of first instance. In other words, original jurisdiction of the High Court is to be distinguished by contrasting it with its appellate or revisional jurisdiction. They, however, invited us to hold that the jurisdiction that the High Court has under the Companies Ordinance is not 'civil jurisdiction'. It is not 'civil', so went the contention, because it is not exercised by a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure.
In the view of the learned counsel for the appellants, the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under the Companies Ordinance is a special jurisdiction conferred by a statute.
12. Article 175 of the Constitution, by its clause (1), ordains that there shall be a Supreme Court of Pakistan, and a High Court of each province, and recognises "such other Courts as may be established by law". Clause (2) of that Article provides that "no Court shall have any jurisdiction save as is or may be conferred on it by the Constitution or by or under any law". For the purpose of these appeals, it is sufficient to say that the Supreme Court of Pakistan and the High Courts have been established by the Constitution, that the Supreme Court of Pakistan and the High Court have such jurisdiction as has been conferred upon them by the Constitution, that they have also such other jurisdiction as is or may be conferred upon them by or under any law and that other Courts may be established, and will have such jurisdiction as may be conferred upon them by or under law. The expression 'law' here has been used to distinguish it from 'Constitution' (which is higher in authority) and obviously means an ordinary or sub Constitutional law made in exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution. Two propositions emerge clearly: First, that the jurisdiction of the Courts is never established by themselves, it is established by an authority external to them, either in the Constitution or in law. (See Constitutional Interpretation by Craig R. Duct and Harold W.
Chose, 5th Edn. At p.5). Secondly, it is for the Constitution and subject to the Constitution, for the law to determine the nature and extent of the jurisdiction and the forum upon which it will be conferred.
Article 175 of the Constitution does not use such expressions as 'ordinary', 'extraordinary', ' statutory' or ' special' in relation to 'jurisdiction' or 'Courts'. These expressions may have been useful in a particular context in the past, in the present context, they are equivocal and can, therefore, be misleading.
13. Civil Courts are general Courts of original civil jurisdiction. By section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure they "have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred". But as the Constitution, by its Article 175, empowers the establishment, by law, of ' other Courts', and ordains that the 'Courts' shall have such jurisdiction as may be conferred upon them by or under any law, the Parliament and the Provincial Legislatures, from time to time, carve out special matters out of the general jurisdiction of the Civil Courts and in the interest of economy, speed or expertise, give the jurisdiction to deal with them to the High Courts or Special Courts or Tribunals, especially created for the purpose. This legal position is reflected in the words 'excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred' in section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure as also by section 4 thereof which reads:--
(1) in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by or under any other law for the time being in force.
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the proposition contained in subsection (1), nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any remedy which a land- holder or landlord may have under any law for the time being in force for the recovery of rent of agricultural land from the produce of such land."
Cognizance of suits of civil nature is generally barred expressly or impliedly when by another law, jurisdiction to hear and decide a special matter is given to a Court or Tribunal other than the Civil Court; and section 4 expressly recognises the existence of a special or local law "or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special forum of procedure prescribed by or under any other law ". The point to emphasise is that the jurisdiction so carved out is 'civil jurisdiction'. It is plain that it will not lose that character merely because it has been conferred upon the High Court or upon another Court or Tribunal. Therefore, it is not the label that the law attaches to a Court or Tribunal which has been given the jurisdiction or the procedure which it is .Required to adopt in its exercise that provides the test; the test is the nature and character of the jurisdiction.
14. And when by law a Court or Tribunal is set up and a special matter carved out of the general jurisdiction of the Civil Court is remitted to it, then it becomes a question of policy as to whether to provide for an appeal. Sometimes that is thought to be appropriate; and sometimes it is not. Re: Racal (1981) AC 374 provides a classic instance; that too was a ease under the Companies law. The Court of Appeal had a general jurisdiction conferred on it by section 27(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925 to hear and determine appeals from a judgment or order of the High Court, but by section 441(3) of the Companies Act, 1948, it was provided that the decision of a Judge Of the High Court on an application under that section was not appealable. Similarly, as has been held by this Court in Pakistan Fisheries Ltd. "v. United Bank Ltd. PLD 1993 SC 109, the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 does not provide for an appeal against an interlocutory order of a Special Court under that Ordinance.
15. Suppose that there were no law, such as the Companies Ordinance and a person were to enforce one or other of the rights conferred or recognised by the Companies Ordinance. Learned counsel, Ch. Muhammad Farooq, was fair to make a formal concession that in that situation, that person would have to approach the Civil Court and that the jurisdiction that the Civil Court will have exercised will be 'civil jurisdiction'.
16. Section 7 of the Companies Ordinance itself proceeds on the assumption that the jurisdiction of the 'Court' is civil jurisdiction; this is manifested by providing that ' all or any of the jurisdiction by this Ordinance conferred' may be conferred upon the 'Civil Court'.
17. Yet, learned counsel for the appellants persisted, and in my opinion, persisted in error, in contending that the jurisdiction conferred by the Companies Ordinance, when exercised by the High Court is not 'civil jurisdiction'. This Court held in Hussain Bukhsh case PLD 1970 SC 1 that 'the High Court, though it also exercises civil jurisdiction, is not a Civil Court'. In any case, the incongruity of the appellants' position lies in its apparent and easily demonstrable inconsistency, namely that when the jurisdiction under the Ordinance is exercised by the Civil Courts it is civil jurisdiction, but when the self-same jurisdiction is exercised by the High Court, it is not civil jurisdiction. If the jurisdiction under the Companies Ordinance can properly be characterised as civil jurisdiction, it cannot lose that character simply because it is exercised by the High Court. The test being the real nature and character of the jurisdiction, and the real nature and character of the jurisdiction conferred upon the 'Court' being 'civil', it matters not that the High Court is not a Court of ordinary original civil jurisdiction, or that the name by which it may be described is ' special Court' or ' special tribunal'. To quote from Hussain Bukhsh case again, ' a proceeding taken for the enforcement of a civil right is a civil proceeding, whatever may be the source of the Court's jurisdiction involved for enforcement of such a right' and ' whether a proceeding is civil or not depends on the nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding and its object, and not on the mode adopted or the forum prescribed for the enforcement of the right. A proceeding which deals with a right of a civil nature does. Not cease to be so merely because the right is sought to be enforced by haying recourse to the writ jurisdiction'.
18. Broadly speaking the High Court has original civil jurisdiction and original criminal jurisdiction; it has also appellate civil jurisdiction and appellate criminal jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore civil jurisdiction has to be distinguished by contrasting it with criminal jurisdiction. This distinction may assume importance even in writ jurisdiction. Thus in George Tan Soon Gin v. Judge Cameron ((1992) 2 AC 205), a case from Hong Kong, civil jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal consisted of, by virtue of section 113(2)(a) of the Supreme Court Ordinance, 1989, 'appeals from any judgment or order of the High Court in any civil cause or matter'. The applicant before the Privy Council had been charged with various offences. He applied before the trial Court for the quashment of the proceedings. His application was dismissed and he applied to the High Court for the judicial review of the trial Court's decision. The High Court also dismissed his judicial review application. On appeal, the question before the Court of Appeal was whether the judicial review proceedings in the High Court ' constituted a civil cause or matter'. The Court of Appeal held that the appeal was not maintainable and the Privy Council upheld that view. It was held: "The language of the Ordinance directs attention, not to the proceedings which led to the order from which the appeal is brought, but to the nature of the cause or matter in which the appeal is brought. If the cause or matter is properly characterised as criminal, it cannot lose that character simply because at one stage it is carried forward by techniques which closely resemble those employed in civil matters... ... ...". In that connection reference was made to Amand v. Home Secretary ((1943) AC 147), in which Viscount Simon L.C. After pointing out the-distinction between cases of habeas corpus in a criminal matter and cases where the matter is not criminal, observed (at pp.56-57): "It is the nature and the character of the proceeding in which habeas corpus is sought which provide the test. If the matter is one the direct outcome of which may be trial of the applicant and his possible punishment for an alleged offence by a Court claiming jurisdiction to do so the matter is criminal... ... ...".
19. It is obvious that what learned counsel for the appellants invite us to do is to treat the expression "original civil jurisdiction" as a technical expression, or what is the same thing, as a term of art. This Court has in Pakistan Fisheries Ltd. v. United Bank Ltd. PLD 1993 SC 109, 128 held that the expression "has not been used in the technical sense as understood with reference to the Letters Patent of some of the High Courts in the sub-continent " but in deference to the arguments, I can give my reasons briefly why we must decline the invitation. There is a very learned discussion on what a technical term 'or' a term of art means and the process by which a word or phrase in common general use becomes a term of art by Diplock L.J. (as he then was) in Sydall v. Castings Ltd. ((1967)
1 Q.B. 302, 313-316): "Documents which are intended to give rise to legally enforceable rights and duties contemplate enforcement by due process of laws which involves their being interpreted by Courts composed of Judges, each one of whom has his personal idiosyncrasies of sentiment and upbringing, not to speak of age. Such documents would fail in their object if the rights and duties which could be enforced depended upon the personal idiosyncrasies of the individual judge or judges upon whom the task of construing them chanced to fall. It is to avoid this that these lawyers whose profession it is to draft and to construe such documents have been compelled to evolve an English language, of which the constituent words and phrases are more precise in their meaning than they are in the language of Shakespeare or of any of the passengers on the Clapham omnibus this morning.
These words and phrases to which a more precise meaning is so ascribed are called by lawyers 'terms of art' but are in popular parlance known as 'legal jargon... ...' The lexicon of terms of art it is to be found in the decided cases and in the textbooks consulted by legal practitioners. This does not entail... ... ... That the meaning of words and phrases which have become terms of art is incapable of evolution if the word or phrase is used in relation to circumstances of a kind which did not exist when its meaning as a term of art first became fixed. But the evolution of the meaning of a term of art is less rapid and less frequent than any changes in the meaning of words and phrases in popular speech, for the legal draftsma n, knowing the previous meaning of the 'term of art' can, if he wishes, extend or restrict that meaning by adding to it other qualifying words and phrases... ...
' The process by which a word or phrase in common general use becomes a term of art is by the progressive elimination of all possible ambiguities by successive judicial decisions... ... ..."
20. In short a word or phrase is a term of art if it "acquires that relative fixity of meaning", so as to distinguish it from a term which is not a term of art.
21. Here, far from having acquired that fixity of meaning which might give it the status of a term of art, the expression "original civil jurisdiction" was as far back as 1889 understood by the Privy Council, in a case from Bombay High Court, in the matter of Candas Narrondas (Navivahoo v.
Turner ((1889 13 ILR Bombay 520) in its ordinary sense. That was a case in which the judgment was the judgment of the High Court under the Indian Solvancy Act; it was held that the judgment was clearly ' entered up in exercise of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction' of the High Court; in the opinion of their Lordships, even the expression ordinary jurisdiction' had no technical meaning; it embraced ' all such as is exercised in the ordinary course of law and without any special step being necessary to assume it'; it was 'opposed to extraordinary jurisdiction, which the Court may assume at its discretion, upon special occasion and by special orders'.
22. There is another way of looking at the matter. Some words are, even in ordinary or popular usage, connected with legal meanings. For instance, there is no popular meaning of the term ex post facto law other than its ordinary legal meaning. So is, in my opinion, true of the word 'civil'; it is, when used in the context of jurisdiction, Understood, in its popular usage, as opposed to criminal.
23. It was contended that section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980 is part of the general law as contained in the Code of Civil Procedure and it does not apply to cases such as the cases under the Companies Ordinance in which the High Court exercises statutory jurisdiction. As observed above the question is what is the nature and character of the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court and as we hold that the jurisdiction that the High Court exercises under the Companies Ordinance is civil jurisdiction and the proceedings are civil proceedings, the Code of Civil Procedure applies to these proceedings by virtue of section 117 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This point too is concluded by the authority of this Court in Hussain Bukhsh case.
24. In the result it must be held that the cases such as Eastern Company v. Gul Begum PLD 1980 Lahore 69 in which the view taken was that the jurisdiction which the "Court" exercises under the Companies Ordinance, 1984 is not "original civil jurisdiction" were wrongly decided and that the view taken by the learned Judges of the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Messrs Sunrise Textiles Limited v. Mashreq Bank PLD 1996 Lahore 1 is the correct view.
(Sd.)
FAZAL KARIM, J.
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