The petitioner in this case has applied to this Court under section 16(3) of the Telegraph Act, 1885 for determination of the compensation payable to her by the respondents for having erected certain telegraphic installations on her lands situated in Malir at Karachi. She has valued this compensation at Rs. 3,78,000.
2. A preliminary objection has been taken by the Government of Pakistan (the respondents) to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain and hear the petition. The argument is that the application for determination of compensation under section 16(3) of the Telegraph Act lies to the District Judge within whose jurisdiction the property is situated since section 16(3) has named him to be the person who will determine such compensa--petition. It is, therefore, contended that the High Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain the matter. The learned counsel for the petitioner has answered this contention by saying that the District Judge under the Telegraph Act is not a `persona designate' but a Court. And it means the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction for the civil district of Karachi. According to him the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction for Karachi for proceedings over Rs. 25,000 is the High Court and not the District Judge of Karachi.
3. The term 'District Judge, has not been defined in the Telegraph Act itself. This is a departure from the pattern followed in statutes like the Succession Act and the Divorce Act which Acts, white conferring certain jurisdiction upon the District Judge, have also defined the District Judge to mean a Judge of a principal civil Court of original jurisdiction. This omission, however, creates no complexity because the General Clauses Act defines the term 'District Judge' in subsection (15) of section 3 of the Act as follows ---'District Judge' shall mean the Judge of a principal civil Court of original jurisdiction, but shall not include a High Court in the exercise of its ordinary or extraordinary original civil jurisdiction.--- Since the term 'District Judge' has not been defined in the Telegraph Act itself and there being nothing repugnant in the subject or context of the said Act, the definition of the term as' given is the General Clauses Act becomes applicable. But in the General Clauses Act, the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary or extraordinary original civil jurisdiction is excluded from the purview of the said definition. The question, therefore, is whether, sitting on the original side of this Bench, I am exercising the ordi--nary or extraordinary original civil jurisdiction within the meaning of section 3(15) of the General Clauses Act. 7his question has been ably answered by my Lord Mr. Justice Waheeduddin Ahmad in the celebrated case of Firdaus Trading Corporation v. Japan Cotton & General Trading Co. Ltd. (PL D 1961 Kar. 565). The learned Judge expressed his conclusion in the following terms ---I am clearly of the view that no change has been effected by the establishment of West Pakistan High Court in respect of the civil suits entertained on the original side of the Karachi Bench.
It seems to me that the jurisdiction exercised in such matters is a District Court jurisdiction and since it is exercised by the High Court it may be called as special original civil jurisdiction or extraordinary original civil jurisdiction, but certainly cannot be described as ordinary original jurisdiction of the High Court.--- I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed above, although I would, with utmost respect, submit that the reasoning on the basis of which the description of the original civil jurisdiction of this Court has been held as not amounting to `ordinary' original civil jurisdiction will equally apply to its alternative description as an `extraordinary original' civil jurisdic--petition, since both these jurisdictions enjoyed by the other High Courts owe their creation wholly to the Letters Patent of the respective High Courts. In other words the original civil juris--diction of the Karachi Bench is neither the `ordinary' nor the 'extraordinary' original civil jurisdiction.
4. So if the Karachi Bench on its original side is no exercising an ordinary or extraordinary original civil jurisdiction then the disability contained in the second part of the definition o a 'District Judge' given in the General Clauses Act disappears and the question would then be whether the original side Judge of this Court is a Judge of a principal civil Court of original jurisdiction.
5. So far as the civil district of Karachi is concerned the District Judge cannot by any means be termed as the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction since his jurisdiction on the civil side is a restricted one and is confined to a maximum valuation of Rs. 25,000. The word 'principal' is a term of comparative significance and implies that in relation to others in the hierarchy the body which it denotes should be the highest. The mere nomenclature, 'District Judge', is by itself of no significance whatsoever. It is wholly the jurisdiction and the powers that are exercisable by him which will be relevant in determining whether he is the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction of the district. A District Judge whose jurisdiction is confined to a maximum of Rs. 25,000 cannot to my mind, be termed as the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction.
6. This brings us to the question as to which Court can be rightly described as the principal civil Court of original jurisdic--petition for the civil District of Karachi. I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed by Waheeduddin Ahmad, J., in the case cited earlier. In his opinion, the Karachi Bench of the West Pakistan High Court was functioning or exercising the powers and performing the duties as the principal civil Court of original, jurigdicti6n in the civil district of Karachi. This view is consistent with the fact that the ordinary and extraordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Courts, where enjoyed, owe their creation entirely to the Letters Patent of the respectively High Courts. The present original civil jurisdiction enjoyed by the Karachi Bench of the West Pakistan High Courts has not bee conferred on it by the High Court of West Pakistan Letters Paten but has been preserved and continued by para. 5 of the 'Establish--ment of West Pakistan High Court Order, 1955, read with section 8 of the Sind Courts'. Act, 1926, as amended by the Karachi Courts Order No. 2 of 1956.
7. Mr. Mahmoodul Hasan the learned counsel for the respondent then contended that the District Judge named under section 16(3) of the Telegraph Act was a `persona designate' and was intended to act more as an arbitrator in the dispute. I, however, feel that there is no justification for drawing the suggested inference. If this was indeed the intention of the Legislature it would have been more expressly conveyed. Applying, however; the normal rules of interpretation I do not see how one could resist the inference that the term `District Judge' has been used in its connotation of the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction of the district. The intention that the jurisdiction was actually being conferred on the Court of the District Judge and not to him personally is further inferable from the fact that subsection (4) of section 16 of the Telegraph Act D goes on to refer to the `Court of the District Judge', as the Court into which the amount of compensation may be paid in cases of dispute as to the persons entitled to receive it. A similar question came up for consideration .In the case of Mian Abdul Aziz v. Punjab Government (AIR 1942 Lah. 186), where the argument was that the District Judge named under section 16(3) of the Telegraph Act was a `persona designate' and was not intended to act as a civil Court. The suggestions was repelled by Teckchand and Beckett, JJ, who observed that there was nothing particular in subsection (3) of section 16 of the Telegraph Act to suggest that the District Judge was intended ltd act as otherwise than in a judicial capacity when deciding the amount of compensation which should be paid and the learned Judges were clearly of the opinion that the District Judge should be held to be acting as a civil Court in dealing with applications' under section 16 of the Telegraph Act.
8. In view of the foregoing discussion I would hold that the 'District Judge' named in section 16(3) of the Telegraph Act, 1885 is not a `persona designate' but a Court. It means the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction for the District o B Karachi. The principal civil Court of Karachi for proceedings over Rs. 25,000 is the Karachi Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan and not the District Judge of Karachi.
9. In the result the respondent application under Order VII, rule 10; of the Civil Procedure Code suggesting that the main petition be returned be returned for presentation to the proper Court is rejected.