' MUHAMMAD AQIL MIRZA, J.---This judgment shall dispose of the following appeals which involve the same questions of law and facts:-
(i) R.F.A. No,86 of 1995.
(ii) R.F.A. No,87 of 1995.
(iii) R.F.A. No,88 of 1995.
(iv) R.F.A. No,89 of 1995.
(v) R.F.A. No,90 of 1995.
(vi) R.F.A. No,91 of 1995.
(vii) R.F.A. No,92 of 1995.
(viii) (viii)R.F.A. No,93 of 1995.
(ix) R.F.A. No,94 of 1995.
(x) R.F.A. No,95 of 1995.
(xi) R.F.A. No,96 of 1995.
(xii) R.F.A. No,85 of 1995.
' The appellants in all the appeals are the co-judgment-debtors being the guarantors of the loanees while the decree-holder is also the same bank. However, the loanee judgment-debtor in each case is a different person.
2. The facts involved in R.F.A. No,85/95 are like this. Pirta Ram obtained loan from National Bank of Pakistan in respect of which a suit for recovery of Rs,13,222 was filed before the learned Banking Tribunal. This suit was decreed in favour of the respondent bank on 4-5-1995. The appeal which is barred by time by more than six months was filed in this Court on 19-12-1995.
3. An application for condonation of delay has been filed alongwith the appeal. It is stated in this application that they had filed a writ petition in this Court impugning the decree but the same was dismissed vide order dated 19-7-1995. It is stated that on receipt of the certified copy of the order of the High Court the appeal has been filed. A perusal of the certified copy shows that the application for obtaining certified copy was made on 7-8-1995 and it was prepared on 10-9-1995 and was delivered to the applicant on 3-12-1995.
4. The limitation for filing an appeal against the decree passed by the Banking Tribunal, under section 9 of the Banking Tribunal Ordinance, 1984 is 30 days. The appeal had to be filed in this Court against the decree. The decree could not be challenged in the writ jurisdiction. Therefore, no concession , regarding the condonation of delay, can be granted for the time consumed during pendency of the writ petition. However, the writ petition stood finally disposed of on 19-7-1995 and the appeal could be filed after the dismissal of the writ petition. Certified copy was applied for on 7- 8-1995 and the same was prepared on 10-9-1995 but nobody bothered to receive it from the Copying Agency. Even after receiving the certified copies on 3-12-1995 the appeal was not filed till 19-12-1995. It is now well-established that the delay of each day has to be accounted for but in the instant case neither such effort has been made nor there appears to be any such explanation available on the record. In these circumstances, we find no good ground to condone the delay.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed as time-barred.
5. So far as the other appeals are concerned they also involve exactly the same facts and, therefore, they are also dismissed as barred by time and the applications in all these cases for condonation of delay are not granted.
6. These appeals are otherwise also incompetent on the ground that the decretal amounts have not been deposited, as required under section 9 of the Ordinance. The condition precedent for entertainment of the appeal is that the defendant should deposit the decretal amounts. It is admitted by the learned counsel that the decretal amounts have not been deposited. He has attempted to argue that the provisions of section 9 of the Ordinance are ultra vires of the Constitution because the condition of depositing the decretal amounts takes away the remedy of appeal. After the decision by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Messrs Tank Steel and Re-rolling Mills
(Pvt) Ltd., Dera Ismail Khan and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 1996 SC 77), this argument is no longer worth consideration. In the precedent case it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as follows:- "We also uphold the findings of the learned Division Bench in the High Court that the provisions of the first Ordinance in general and those of sections 6(6) and 9 in particular are not ultra vires the Articles 23, 24 and 25 of the Constitution."
7. For what has been stated above, all the aforementioned appeals are dismissed in limine, being barred by time. The applications for condonation of delay, permission to furnish security equal to decretal amounts are dismissed. So far as the applications for exemption from depositing the process fee and production of the certified copies are concerned these have become infructuous in view of the dismissal of the appeals.