' This judgment will dispose of Petitions Nos. 1179/73 to 1187/73 which have been filed against a common order dated 15-11-73 passed by the learned Sind Labour Court No, V, Karachi who affirmed the judgment of the Presiding Officer, Junior Labour Court No, IV dated 24-9-1973, whereby he had ordered the withdrawal of the notices of termination of service of 64 Serangs and Tindals by their Stevedores.
2. Briefly narrated, the facts forming the background of this case are that 64 Serangs and Tindals who are respondents in these petitions were employed with the petitioner who is all stevedores.
The Stevedores handle the goods in the ships arriving in Karachi port for which purpose they needed labourers. 7 he labourers supplied by the Tindals and Serangs who keep their own gangs of workers to work on the ships. The workers work under the supervision of Tindals and Serangs and carry out the duties of loading and unloading the ships. Besides supervising the work done by the workers, the 1 indals and Serangs also work themselves for which wages equivalent to other labourers are paid to them. These wages are in addition to the payment made to them for their supervisory functions. Previously, Tindals and Serangs were permanently retained by the Stevedores and their duties were to supply the labourers as soon as a vessel was required to be loaded or unloaded by their Stevedores.
3. In 1972, pursuant to a dispute between the workers and the Stevedores a meeting was convened under the Chairmanship of Mr. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, Federal Minister for Education and Provincial Coordination who had taken in hand the responsibility of setting the dispute between the Dock workers and Stevedores. Copy of the Minutes of this meeting has been filed as Annexure 'A' to the petition. In this meeting it was decided that in future the system of the work of Dock workers will be by Gang Rotation. Paragraph 4 of the Minutes of the meeting reads as under : "The future system of work at the Docks will by Gang Rotation-including Tindals and Serangs and it will be put into effect from September 1972."
4. After the above-said meetings, another meeting was also held on 1-11-1975 under the Chairmanship of Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, the then Federal Minister for Political Affairs and Communications. The introduction. Of Gang Rotation system was further considered and it was given a final shape after negotiations with the workers and Stevedores. Para. 4 of the Minutes of this meeting is relevant for the purpose of this case and is therefore reproduced below :- "It was generally agreed that the Rotation System introduced in August was popular with the workers and should continue but with some modification. Serangs and Tindals would be wedded to the gangs and will rotate with them. They would be unaccountable to the Stevedores they work for.
The short fall in the turn-out in a particular shift will he made up from amongst the Reserve Pool on a temporary basis for the workers of that shift only. The reservist would then revert back to the pool.
The nomination of reservists to fill up vacancies in the gangs will be made by the Dock Labour Board in accordance with the rules to be formulated by the Board."
' For the smooth functioning of the Gang Rotation System a "Dock Labour Board" was also formulated under the Chairmanship of the Chairman, Karachi Port Trust.
5. After the formulation of the Dock Labour Board and placement of all the Dock workers alongwith the Stevedores and Tindals/Serangs at the disposal of the Dock Labour Board the system of each Stevedore employing some Tindals and Serangs came to an end. Under the new arrangement whenever the Dock workers were required by any Stevedore to perform any duties be placed on his demand with the Dock Labour Board and the Dock. Labour Board supplied to him the requisite number of Dock workers. Alongwith these Dock workers, Serangs and Tindals were also provided to the Stevedore to supervise the working of Dock workers.
6. The Rotation system brought an end to the permanent employment of Tindals and Serangs with the Stevedores and therefore a notice was served upon all the Tindals and Serangs who are respondents in these petitions in the following form :- "Dear Sir! We regret to inform you that consequent upon the introduction of "Rotation System" and regulation of your employment through the Dock Labour Board, your services are no longer required by us, as your employment is NOT controlled by us as such any more. Your services retained as Tindal/Serang are therefore terminated with immediate effect and you may arrange to collect your settlement dues including one month's pay (Retaining Fee) in lieu of notice immediately from this office. Yours faithfully."
7. The notice of termination of services was challenged by the Tindals and Serangs, who are respondents in these petitions before the learned Junior Labour Court under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Only the petition of respondent No, 3 in Petition No, 1179/73 was tried. On the basis of the evidence recorded in this petition his case was decided on 24-9-1973.
Since the same point was involved in all the 64 petitions therefore the order passed in the petition of respondent No, 3 in Petition No, 1179/73 was followed in all other petitions as such all the petitions were decided by a common order. The learned Junior Labour Court allowed-the petitions mainly on the ground that although the Rotation system had come into effect but since any rules having statutory force have not so far been framed for the Dock Labour Board, therefore the notices of termination of services of Tindals and Serangs were not legal and valid. On this ground alone it was ordered that these notices should be withdrawn by the Stevedores concerned. Against this decision an appeal was filed in Sind Labour Court No, V by the petitioners in these petitions which was dismissed on 15-11-1973 as such the petitioners have assailed the validity of the order of Junior Labour Court No, IV in these writ petitions.
8. The main argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that with the introduction of new arrangement, the formation of Dock Labour Board and the Supply of Labour by Rotation System, the statute of Tinda and Serangs had undergone a revolutionary change. The Stevedores no longer exercised any control over Tindals and Serangs as they were not in their permanent employment and therefore they were also not liable to pay them Retaining Fee on permanent basis. The other argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the learned Junior Labour Court was bound under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 to decide the applications of the Tindals and Serangs within seven days from the date of their filing the applications, but admittedly, the applications had not been decided within the stipulated period, therefore on this ground also the order of Junior Labour Court was invalid and liable to be vitiated.
9. Mr. Nizam Ahmed, Advocate appearing for the Tindals and Serangs (respondents in these petitions) argued that the Tindals and Serangs were still performing their duties as before it and was due to an arrangement between the Stevedores and Karachi Dockyard that the Tindals and Serangs had to work according to Rotation System and were not as such permanently attached with any particular Stevedore. According to him this being an arrangement between the Stevedores and the Dockyard the Tindals and Serangs were not liable to be adversely affected.
According to him they were entitled to the supervisory charges, retaining fees and other benefits to which they were considered entitled before the corning into force of the Rotation System. Replying the argument that the petitions of the Serangs and Tindals should have been decided within seven days, he argued that as the law did not provide for any consequences in case of failure to decide the petitions within seven days therefore only by virtue of the fact that the applications took more than seven days to be decided it would not invalidate the decisions.
10. As far as the first argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is concerned, it is evident by the argument of both the parties that under the new system a Dock Labour Board was constituted and the services of all the Dock workers alongwith the services of Serangs and Tindals were placed at the disposal of the Dock Labour Board and the previous system of employment whereby Stevedores exercised a certain degree of control on the Tindals and Serangs by virtue of the payment of retainership fee having been discontinued, the Stevedores were no longer obliged to pay the retainer- ship fee to the Tindals and Serangs. The argument has considerable weight.
Apparently by the introduction of Dock Labour Board and coming into force the system of allotment of Dock Labourers by rotation the concept of employ- ment of any Serang or Tindal with a particular Stevedore vanishes absolutely. The Serangs and Tindals not being under the control of any particular Steve- dore or performing their functions for any particular Stevedore, the Stevedores in turn are not obliged to give them retainership fee or any other benefits to which they -were entitled under the previous system. The learned Junior Labour Court as well as the Labour Court have not touched this aspect o the case and have held that although the entire system of working had been revolutionized in such a manner that altogether new relationship between the Stevedores on the one hand and Tindals and Serangs on the other hand come into existence but since the rules had not been framed under the new scheme therefore the notices of termination of services of Serangs and Tindals given by the Stevedores were uncalled for. This view of the matter is patently incorrect. The Labour Court have omitted to appreciate the evidence which was led before them to prove that the new system had in fact come into force. The Junior Labour Court as well as Labour Court have been patently misdirected in their judgments. I am therefore, of the view that their findings are absolutely baseless and untenable in law.
11. The next argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the cases of the Stevedores and rindals and Serangs should have been decided within seven days by the Labour Court as required by section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The learned counsel for the respondents replying the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon Muller and Phillips (Pakistan) Limited v. District Magistrate, Karachi and 4 others (1). The question involved in this case was that of the consequences which were to follow in case of failure to decide a matter within the period stipulated by law. Their Lordships held that:- "While prescribing the time limit, no consequence is provided for not complying with it. Therefore, in spite of the use of the word 'shall' the direction as to time, within which the public official has to perform his duty according to it, should be construed as directory."
' Section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 is also silent about the consequences which would follow in case the decision is not given by the Junior Labour Court within seven days. In this view of the matter and following with respect to law laid down in the above-cited case I am of the view that the provisions that the Junior Labour Court decide the case brought before it within seven days, is only directory in nature. As such the failure of the Junior Labour Court to decide the case within the stipulated-period would not vitiate its decision,
12. The learned counsel for the respondents (Tindals and Serangs) also challenged the jurisdiction of this Court and argued that the decision of the Junior Labour Court and Labour Court being based of mis appreciation of facts and misinterpretation of law, the same could not be challenged under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. He relied upon Muhammad Hussain Munk and others v. Sikandar and others (2). In this case which is bated on the interpretation of Article 98 (1) (a) (ii) of the Constitution of Pakistan (1962) and Article 199 (1) (a) (ii) of the present Constitution their Lordships have held as under :- "It is wholly wrong to consider that the constitutional provision was designed to empower the High Court to interfere with the decision of a Court or tribunal of inferior jurisdiction, merely because in its opinion the decision is wrong. In that case, it would make the High Court's jurisdiction indistinguishable from that exerciseable in a full-fledged appeal, which plainly is not the intention of the Constitution-makers. When there is jurisdiction to decide a particular matter then there is jurisdiction to decide it rightly or wrongly and the fact that the decision is incorrect does not render the decision without jurisdiction "
' The learned counsel for the petitioners on the other hand argued that the instant case was a case in which there was no evidence to show that the Serangs and Tindals were in the permanent employment of the Stevedores. There was also no evidence to establish that such circumstances still existed which could make it possible for the Stevedores to keep them in their employment therefore the learned Junior Labour Court and Labour Court were misdirected in coming to the finding that the notices of termination of services of Tindals and Serangs were unlawful. He placed reliance on Rahim Shah v. Chief Election Commissioner (3) wherein it was held that:- "In scope of interference in the High Court is, therefore, limited to the {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1974 Kar. 261 (2) PLD 1974 SC 139
(3) PLD 1973 SC 24 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' inquiry whether the tribunal has in doing the act or undertaking the proceedings acted in accordance with law. If the answer be in the affirmative the High Court will stay its hands and will not substitute its own findings recorded by the tribunal. Cases of no evidence, bad faith, misdirection or failure to follow judicial procedure, etc. Are treated as acts done without lawful authority and vitiate the acts done or proceedings undertaken by the tribunal on this ground."
' In the present case it is apparent that there was no evidence before the Junior Labour Court that either the Tindals and Serangs were in the permanent employment of the Stevedores or they could be kept in employment by the Stevedores under the changed circumstances, therefore, the finding was based on no evidence and the Court was patently misdirected in its decision. The Labour Court also did not appreciate this patent flaw and therefore the findir gs of both the Courts below are without lawful authority and the case does not fall within the purview of the ruling relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents (Tindals and Serangs). The argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction to upset the findings of the Junior Labour Court and Labour Court is devoid of force.
13. For the foregoing reasons I am of the opinion that the impugned orders are patently illegal and without jurisdiction. The petitions are therefore allowed. In the circumstances of the case I would not mulct the parties with costs.