This petition is directed against the order dated 12th December 1974, passed by the Vth Sind Labour Court who upheld the order of the Junior Labour Court dated 2nd October 1974, directing the petitioners to re-instate the 3rd respondent in service with full back benefits.
2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that petitioners are a statutory body established under the President's Order No. 5 of 1957 and is known as, Karachi Development Authority. Under the provisions of Article 8 of the Karachi Development Authority Order the powers of making appointments to various posts and imposing punishment on employees are vested in the officers and authorities designated thereunder. Again the orders passed by these authorities remedy by way of appeal is also provided. Under Karachi Development Authority Order the petitioners enjoy the powers of making Regulations for the purposes of carrying into effect the Karachi Development Authority Order. These powers include the powers of framing Regulations to regulate the terms and conditions of services of the employees. The Governing Body of the petitioners made Karachi Development Authority Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Regulations, 1970. These Regulations - -govern the employees of the petitioners. According to the petitioners' averments prior to the coming into force of the aforementioned Regulations the services of their employees were governed by West Pakistan Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1960. In 1973, consolidated service regulations were made by the petitioners' governing body and these regulations are known as K. D. A. Employees (Service) Regulations, 1973. These Regulations were published in the official Gazette of 8th November 1973.
3. The respondent No. 3 was employed by the petitioners and was posted as Operator Grade II at Gharo Division, Engineering Department. The Director-General, K. D. A. Was his appointing authority and he was also competent to take disciplinary action against him. In 1972, the respondent No. 3 was found to be indulging in subversive activities, sabotage of equipment and machinery and other misconducts. He was accordingly charge-sheeted on 30th December 1972 under West Pakistan Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1960 read with K. D. A. Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Regulations, 1970 and departmental enquiry was held against him. The Enquiry Officer appointed in this case recommended imposition of extreme penalty upon the 3rd respondent i.e. Dismissal from service as such a second show-cause notice dated 8th May 1973 was served which was duly replied by him. Finally he was dismissed from service on 28th November 1974.
4. The respondent No. 3 challenged his dismissal from service before the 1st Junior Labour Court under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter called the "Ordinance of 1969)." His application was allowed and he was ordered to be re-instated in service with full back benefits on 2nd October 1974. The appeal filed by the petitioners was heard by Vth Sind Labour Court who dismissed it on 12th December 1974.
5. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that services of the respondent No. 3 were governed by K. D. A. (Efficiency and Discipline) Regulations of 1970 which were made under K. D. A. Order of 1957 and the same had statutory force as such the provisions of the Ordinance of 1969 did not apply to this case. According to him the remedy of the 3rd respondent was to file an appeal against the order of dismissal from service under Article 8 of the K. D. A. Order, 1957. Alternatively, he .Could file a regular civil suit as according to him the Law of Master and Servant governed the relationship between the petitioners and 3rd respondent. :He further contended that Industrial Relations Ordinance was a general law enacted to regulate the relationship between the employers and the workmen whereas the K. D. A. Order of 1957 under which K. D. A. Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Regulations of 1970 were made was a special - statute, and, therefore, the provisions of Industrial Relations Ordinance would stand abrogated as far as K. D. A. Employees were concerned. In this connection he relied upon the principle laid down in "Maxwell's Interpreta--tion of Statutes, 11th Edition, page 168" to the effect that the general law does not abrogate the special law by implication. He relied upon Muhammad Anjum Alias v. The State (PLD 1974 Kar. 459) wherein it is held that:- "When a special procedure has been laid down in any other special law or enactment conferring jurisdiction, then nothing in the Criminal Procedure Code shall affect such special jurisdiction, for Generalia speciali bus non derogant i.e. a general law does not abrogate the special law."
He has further relied upon R. T. H. Janjua v. National Shipping Corpora--tion (PLD 1974 SC 148). In this ruling it is held as under:- "The broad proposition laid down in all these cases was, that the Constitutional safeguards available to the generality of Civil Servants against arbitrary dismissal or removal from service are not available to the servants of a registered company, or a statutory corporation. The precedent cases (with the exception of the case of Pir Saifullah Shah which was the case of a Commercial Manager of a Co-operative Bank) related to the removal from service of Statutory Corporations like, PIAC, WAPDA and EPIDC, each of which was established by a statute, over which the Government exercised control in varying degree. In all these cases, the grievance related to alleged arbitrary dismissal from service of an employee by an incorporated company or statutory corporation in which the general law of master and servant was held applicable and it was laid down that the only remedy avail--able to the aggrieved servant in such cases is to sue for damages for wrongful dismissal and not a writ of mandamus/certiorari."
6. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 argued that the scope of K. D. A.
Order of 1957 and the Regulations made thereunder was distinct and different from the scope of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and both these pieces of legislation were not overlapping. I have examined the arguments advanced by both the parties. In fact the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 provides for the regulation of the relationship of master and servant of all the employees except those who have been specifically excluded by section 1. Those categories of the workers who are employed in the Administration of State shall not be covered by the Ordinance of 1969. All other categories of workers are covered by it and in cases of termination of services of such employees which are covered by the subsection (1)(3) they can approach the Junior Labour Court for redress of their grievance under section 25-A. Subsection (1)(3) is reproduced below: "It shall not apply to any person employed in the Police or any of the Defence Services of Pakistan and any services or installations connected with or incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistan, including an ordnance Factory maintained by the Central Government or to any person employed in the Administration of the State other than those employed as workmen by the Railways, Posts, Telegraph and Telephone Departments."
Admittedly, the 3rd respondent is not employed in any such service which can be termed as service in connection with the Administration of the State. His case would therefore fall within the purview of section 25-A of the Ordinance of 1969. As far as K. D. A. Order of 1957 or K. D. A. Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Regulations, 1970 are concerned the same provide the procedure of enquiry and the manner in which the services of a particular employee should be terminated. The K. D. A. Order, 1957 also provides for an appeal. The effect of enactment of these pieces of legislation is that the cases which would have normally been covered by West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 would now be covered by these enactments. Therefore, admittedly, the Standing Orders Ordinance, 19b8 is not applicable to the petitioners' case because the petitioners concern has its own statutory rules which govern the service of their employees. In case disciplinary action is required to be taken against any employee by the Karachi Development Authority they shall adhere to their own rules and would not take action under the rules provided for this purpose in the Standing Orders Ordinance of 1968. However, in any case it will be open to the employee to approach the Junior Labour Court under section 25-A if he is aggrieved by the enquiry held against him under the K. D. A. Order of 1957 and K. D. A.
Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Regulations of 1970 is not strictly adhered to. The Junior Labour Court would be a liberty to examine if the regulations under which the enquiry is held have been fully complied with or not. As a result of the above discussion it is manifest that the provisions governing the terms and conditions of employment contained in Karachi Development Authority Order of 1957 and X. D. A. Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Regulations of 1970 provide a substitute for West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. These regulations are not however a substitute for the Ordinance of 1969. The Ordinance of 1969 was held applicable by the Labour Court and the Junior Labour Court to the case of respondent No. 3. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners in this context is devoid of all force and is hereby repelled.
7. As far as the Sind Labour Court and the Junior Labour Court are concerned both the Courts have held that the enquiry was not conducted in accordance with the provisions of West Pakistan Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1960 which law was practically adopted in the shape of K. D. A. Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Regulations, 1970 and therefore the order of termination of services of the 3rd respondent was not in accordance with law. It was also held by the Junior Labour Court that the charge against the applicant (3rd respondent) was framed by Mr. Mohammad Amin Khan, Administrative Officer who was not competent to frame the charge under the Rules. The Court went on to say that the appointment of Enquiry Officer was not made by the competent authority and as such the enquiry conducted by the Enquiry Officer was ab initio void. I am reluctant to interfere with the findings of the Courts below as far as merits of the case are concerned. The Courts below had jurisdiction vested in them they were free to decide the case rightly or wrongly. In writ jurisdiction I do not feel inclined to interfere with their findings. In this view I am supported by Mohamed Hussain v. Sinkandar (PLD 1974 SC 139). In this case it is held by the Supreme Court that when jurisdiction is vested in a particular tribunal to decide a case the tribunal can decide it wrongly as well as rightly. The writ jurisdiction of the High Court is not designed to interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction by the tribunal except when their decision is without jurisdiction.
For the foregoing reasons I find that there is no substance in this petition which is hereby dismissed with costs.