' MIR HAZAR KHAN KHOSO, J.---For murder of Mustafa Haider Imran on 15-3-1992 petitioners Zahid Hussain Shah, Mujahid Hussain Shah, Tasawar Hussain Shah and Mansabdar were booked and sent for trial before the Court constituted for Speedy Trial under Act LX of 1992. They challenged transfer and trial of their case by Special Court for Speedy Trial through Writ Petition No,919 of 1992 before the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi. The petition was admitted on 19-12- 1992 with the observations that the trial Court would continue with the case by recording the evidence but shall not announce the judgment. Before final disposal of the abovesaid writ petition the Special Courts for Speedy Trials were abolished by Special Courts for Speedy Trials (Repeal)
Ordinance; III of 1994. Under subsection (2) of section 2 of the abovesaid Ordinance all the cases pending in the Special Courts at the time of suck repeal were ordered to be transferred to the ' respective Court of Sessions or the area where the cases were registered. The case of the petitioners as such -came for trial before the Court of the Sessions Judge, Islamabad. Complainant Ghuiam Murtaza moved application, before the Court praying that the case be decided on the evidence already recorded by the Special Court. After hearing the counsel -for the complainant and the petitioners petitioners on 28-2-1995 the learned Sessions Judge, Islamabad, dismissed the complainant's application and decided to proceed with the case afresh. Complainant Gkulam Murtaza challenged the abovesaid order before the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi, through Criminal Revision No,32 of 1995. On 13-4-1995 a learned Judge in Chamber set aside the order dated 28-2-1995 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Islamabad, and directed him to conclude the trial on the basis of the material already brought on the file. Against the abovesaid Order the petitioners have come before this Court and sought for leave to appeal.
2. We have heard Syed Asghar Hussain Sabzwari, Advocate Supreme Court, for the petitioners. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that under section 350, Cr.P.C. It was discretion of the trial Court to proceed with the case on the evidence already recorded by the defunct Court. The learned counsel reiterated that the trial Court had exercised its discretion in accordance with the law. The High Court as such had no jurisdiction vested therein to interfere with the discretion exercised by the trial Court and order for deciding the case on the evidence already recorded. To fortify his contention the learned counsel invited our attention to subsection (2) of section 2 of Special Courts for Speedy Trials (Repeal) Ordinance, 1994 and section 350, Cr.P.C. The contention raised by the learned counsel have no force. It may be pointed out that the counsel for the petitioners before the High Court had conceded that he had no objection to allowing the revision petition as his clients were keen for conclusion of the trial by an early date. His learned counsel further conceded that there was no bar in the law for the Court of Session to have acted upon the evidence already recorded by the Special Court. As the counsel for the petitioners has conceded for disposal of the case on the evidence already recorded by Special Court and there is no decision from the High Court regarding legal aspect of the case, we as such are not inclined to interfere with the abovesaid order. Leave to appeal is refused and the petition is dismissed accordingly.