1. MUHAMMAD AKRAM, J.-The defence of the petitioner was struck off by the Rent Controller.
2. Gujranwala in accordance with the provision contained in section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Root Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The order was affirmed In appeal by the Additional District Judge, Gujranwala and uphold in second appeal dismissed by a learned single Judge of the Lahore High Court on the 24th October 1975. This is a petition or special leave to appeal from the order of the High court.
3. Briefly the relevant facts are these. The respondent filed a petition for the ejectment of the petitioner herein from the premises in dispute under section 13 of tae Ordinance. In the course of those proceedings on the 19th April 1973, the counsel for the petitioner appeared before the Rent Controller to produce receipts for Rs. 2,000 already deposited by the tenant as arrears of rent due to the landlord. On this the Rent Controller passed an order for the deposit of future monthly rent at the rate of Rs. 250 per month regularly before the 15th day of each succeeding month till the disposal of the ejectment petition before him. Thereafter on the 16th February 1974, the respondent filed an application before the Rent Controller complaining that the petitioner had failed to regularly deposit future rent as ordered and, therefore, prayed that his defence may be struck off.
4. The petitioner was allowed an adjournment to file his reply to the application. In reply he pleaded that he was not duly apprised of the order dated 19-4-1973, made by the Rent Controller, by his learned counsel, the alleged default committed by him was not wilful and, therefore, his defence was not liable to be struck off. In these circumstances, on the 1st April 1974, after hearing the counsel for the parties, the Rent Controller observed that the petitioner had failed to produce any receipt for deposit of the rent due for the month of April 1973. The rent for May 1973, was deposited only on the 26th June 1973, and similarly the rent for the months of July, September and November 1973, was deposited by the petitioner long after the due data. In his opinion the order dated 19th April 1973, for the deposit of the future monthly rent was made in the presence of the counsel for the petitioner and, therefore, the respondent could not escape the liability for the negligence of his counsel. He felt that in the circum--stances he had no option to absolve the tenant of the consequences of the default thus committed by him. He, therefore, proceeded to strike off the defence of the petitioner and ordered his ejectment from the premises.
5. In appeal before the Additional District Judge, Gujranwala, it was pleaded on behalf of the petitioner that he had already deposited the rent for the respective months in question although late. The order dated 19th 'April 1973, for the deposit of the future monthly rent was passed in the presence of his counsel and the Court was not prepared to believe that the petitioner had no knowledge about it. He had himself been depositing the monthly rent in Court showing that he had full knowledge of the order and, therefore, he could not escape the liability on a false pretext. The Additional District Judge, therefore, refused to Interfere and dismissed the appeal before him.
6. In second appeal the High Court observed that the order for the deposit of the future rents was passed in the presence of the counsel for the petitioner who had full knowledge about it. It was his duty to have himself diligently pursued his case and to have kept in touch with his own counsel and the proceedings taken before the Rent Controller. His duty did not end by merely engaging a counsel for his case and it did not absolve him of his liability towards the Court in this behalf.
7. Therefore, in the opinion of the High Court the petitioner was himself negligent in prosecuting his defence diligently in the ejectment application and, to keep himself abreast with the proceedings taken by the Rent Controller. The High Court did mot find any force in the further contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner to the effect that he was not allowed by any adequate opportunity to show cause against the striking off his defence by the Rent Controller. On these findings, therefore, the High Court rejected his appeal on the 24th October 1975. Hence this petition for special leave to appeal against the order by the aggrieved tenant.
8. Before us in support of his case the learned counsel for the petitioner strongly relied on the observations of this Court in the case of Ghulam Muhammad Khan Lundkhor v. Safdar Alt (PLD 1967 SC 530) to the effect that the term "default" in the context of section 13(6) of the Ordinance necessarily imports an element of negligence or fault and connotes something more than mere non-compliance. In order to establish 'default' one must show that the non-compliance was due to some avoidable cause, for, a person ought not to be made Habit for a failure due to some cause for which he is, in no way, responsible or which was beyond his control. The most liberal interpretation that has been given to the word covers only defaults which are unavoidable or are due to cause for which the defaulter is, in no way, responsible. But the principle enunciated in the precedent case has no application to the facts and circumstances of this case. In this case, as rightly held gay the High Court not only the counsel but the petition also was negligent in the prosecution of his defence in his failure to keep himself fully informed of the order passed by the Rent Controller. It cannot, therefore, be held that the default in the deposit of the monthly rent was unavoidable and beyond the control of the petitioner. Before us the learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on Saeedan BiBi v. Ali Hussain (1975 SCMR 261) and Hashim Khan v. Ghulam Nabi (1973 SCMR 112). Both these cases are to the effect that wrong and mistaken advice of the counsel should not be visited with the penal consequences on his client. Both these authorities are distinguishable and not applicable to the facts of this case in which there was no question of any wrong or negligent advice having been given by the counsel to the petitioner. In the instant case the petitioner a himself to be blamed for his failure to keep himself fully informed of the progress in his case and to prosecute it diligently.
9. Last of all, the learned counsel attempted to argue before us that the petitioner was never allowed any reasonable opportunity by the Controller to show cause against the order striking off his defence. Bit there is hardy any force in this plea. We find from the record that the respondent moved his application for striking off the defence of the petitioner before the Rent Controller on the 16th February 1974. He was allowed sufficient time to file his reply on the 1st April 1974, when the Rent Controller, after hearing both the parties, passed his order striking off his defence. In that connection the High Court observed that the rent for several months was in fact not deposited before the 15 day of each succeeding month, that it was: delayed considerably each time and that the explanation, for the late deposit was considered to be not tenable. As such it could hardly be contended that the petitioner was not allowed sufficient opportunity to show cause against the striking off his dafence. The Rent Controller took into consideration all the pleas which were raised before him is reply on behalf of the petitioner. In this connection the learned counsel relied on the following observation by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court In the reported case of Syed Muhammad Akraar shah v. Ch. Ghulam Nabi (PLD 1967 Lah. 957) :--- "In my opinion, the learned Rent Controller was under an obligation to allow a proper opportunity to the appellant to adduce evidence in proof of the circumstances which prevented him from making the deposit add also is similar opportunity to the respondent, to meet the case set up by the appellant."
10. In that case the Rent Controller had allowed only four days to the appellant to deposit the arrears of rent of which two days were closed holidays. The Rent Controller was stated to be on leave and in his absence the Civil Nazir was not found in his seat. In these circumstances, the appellant deposited the amount on the 5th July 1966, a day too late. That case was decided on its peculiar facts and circumstances. It cannot be accepted as a precedent laying down as a proposition of law that opportunity must always be allowed to the tenant to adduce evidence before his defence is ordered to be struck of. Indeed strictly speaking the provisions of the Evidence Act and the Civil Procedure Code are not in terms applicable the proceedings before the Rent Controller under the Ordinance. In Ghalam Muhammad Khan Lundkhor v. Safdar Ali a similar objection advanced before the Supreme Court was repelled with the following observations :-- "Learned counsel for the appellant has also contended that in any event the Rent Controller should have given the defaulting tenant an opportunity to explain his default before striking out his defence. This latter question can only arise if it is accepted that the word 'default' in this section has a narrow connotation and does not embrace any or every kind of default. In the present case, however, it appears to us that this opportunity, was not denied to the appellant, for, both on the 3rd and on the 6th November 1961, the tenant was heard. Indeed on the 3rd November 1961, further time was at his request given to him to produce treasury vouchers for further pay-- meats, if any made, and eleven such vouchers were actually produced on the 6th November 1961. His lawyers were also heard on this date. There was thus no denial of opportunity to the tenant to explain his default if he had any reasonable explanation to offer. None was, however, given either at this stage or at even the appellate stages. Even in the petition before this Court no explanation of the delay has bees given. All that is contended is that since the tenant has in fact paid up all the amounts due up-to- date, relief should be given to him on principles of equity, justice and good conscience as embodied in section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act The latter section does not, of course, in terms apply.
11. All that is required is that the defaulting tenant should be allowed a fair opportunity to explain away the default on his part before his defend is struck off. It will be seen that in the instant case the petitioner was in fact allowed sufficient opportunity. His explanation did not convince the authority and was rejected as untenable.th As a result of the above discussion, we find that the order Passed by the High Court is unexceptional and this is not a fit case for our inter--ference. We have, therefore, no hesitation is dismissing this petition