' In this revision petition under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), the following two propositions have been raised for determination:--
(i) Whether a licensee under section 24 of the Electricity Act (IX of 1910) (hereinafter called as Act can cut off the supply of the residential premises for which the charge has been paid for the consumer's neglect to pay the, charges supplied to his industrial premises? And
(ii) if the answer of the proposition at (i) be in the negative whether the consumer is entitled to be rewarded damages by the rule of thumb?
' The aformentioned two propositions have arisen in the following factual background: Mian Hidayatullah, plaintiff-respondent was alleged by the petitioners to have defaulted in paying the electricity charges for his Ice Factory (hereinafter called as the Industrial Unit). The petitioners added the aforesaid charges to his electricity charges for his residential premises. On the respondent's failure to pay the charges against his Industrial Unit, the petitioners, under section 25 of the Act disconnected supply of electricity to the former's residential premises for the period from July, 1983 to March, 1984. In consequence, the plaintiff-respondent filed a suit against the defendants/petitioners for recovery of Rs,24,827 as damages for mental torture to the plaintiff- respondent and his family members and Rs,73 representing the meter charges which had been illegally recovered from him. The claim of the respondent was based on the premise that section 24 of the Act does not invest the licensee with the authority to cut off the supply of premises for which the charge has been paid for the consumer's refusal to pay the charges supplied to his Industrial Unit due to bona fide dispute between the licensee and the consumer as what was payable.
2. The suit was resisted by the petitioners saying that there was legal warrant for disconnecting the power supply to the respondent's residential premises for his failure to pay the charges against his Industrial Unit and, therefore, the respondent was disentitled to any damages. The learned trial Judge on the first proposition propounded in para. 1(i) ante-concluded that "the defendants were not justified to include the arrears of Industrial Unit in the domestic bill." The respondent was, therefore, held entitled to damages but the amount of damages was reduced from Rs,24,900 to Rs,10,000 on two-fold grounds: (i) that the respondent had claimed damages for his family members who were not impleaded as co-plaintiff and (ii) that "the amount claimed in the plaint as damages has not been exactly proved" vide judgment and decree dated 14-3-1992.
3. Feeling aggrieved from the judgment and decree aforesaid, Mian Hidayatullah, plaintiff- respondent, filed Civil Appeal No, 50/13 of 1992 wherein he had challenged the reduction in the amount of damages whereas the defendants filed Civil Appeal No, 56/13 of 1992 wherein the very basis of the decree for recovery of damages was assailed. The learned District Judge took up both the appeals together and by his consolidated judgment dated 7-3-1993, while dismissing the appeal filed by the defendants-petitioners, accepted the appeal of the plaintiff-respondent and enhanced the amount of damages to the extent of actual claim.
4. The defendants-petitioners still feeling dissatisfied have challenged the appellate judgment by way of the instant revision petition.
5. Mr. Nur Ahmed Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners, defended the impugned action of disconnection of electricity on the hypothesis that the respondent had shifted his Industrial Unit from the old place to a new site, therefore, the petitioners were left with no alternative but to cut off the supply of electricity to his residential premises. According to him, there was nothing in the Act to stop the petitioners from resorting to disconnection of electric supply to the respondent's residential premises if he was defaulter in paying the charges of his Industrial Unit. The learned counsel lastly submitted that the respondent had utterly failed to prove the exact amount of damages and the amount claimed by him was hypothetical and, therefore, he ought to have been non-suited.
6. Mian Hidayatullah, respondent, had personally appeared and argued and rightly so, that view of the trial Judge that as the plaintiff had not impleaded his family members as co-plaintiffs he was not entitled to the entire amount claimed by him as damages and further that he had adduced no evidence to prove the quantum of damages and still he had granted a decree for recovery of Rs,10,000.
7. Reverting to the first proposition, suffice it to observe that the controversy substantially involves the true interpretation of section 24(1) of the Act which reads as under:- "24. Discontinuance of supply to consumer neglecting to pay charge.--(1) Where any consumer neglects to pay any charge for energy or any sum, other than a charge for energy, assessed against him by a licensee in respect of supply of energy to his premises, the licensee may after giving not less than seven clear days' notice in writing to such consumer and without prejudice to his right to recovery such charge or other sum by suit or otherwise, cut off the supply and for that purpose cut or disconnect any electric supply-line or other works being the property of the licensee, through which energy may be supplied to such premises or to any other premises, other than domestic premises running distinctly in the name of such consumer, and may discontinue the supply until such charge or other sum, together with any expenses incurred by him in cutting off and reconnecting the supply and the minimum charges on account of continued reservation of supply during the period of such discontinuance, are paid, but not longer." (Underlining is by me).
A bare reading of the subsection particularly the underlined portion makes it abundantly clear that it does not lay down that the licensee can cut off the supply of the premises for which charge has been paid for the consumer's neglect or his refusal to pay the charges for supply of the electricity to his other premises whether residential or commercial or industrial. The learned appellate Court, therefore, justified to have held the view which is completely in accord with the interpretation of subsection (1) of section 24 of the Act. The learned District Judge does not appear to have committed any illegality or material irregularity in arriving at a correct decision on the first proposition which cannot possibly be interfered with in the revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. The findings of the appellate Court on the first proposition being legally sound are affirmed.
8. The entire approach of the learned trial Judge, to say the least, is erroneous in law and was rightly set aside by the learned appellate Court. The learned trial Judge has altogether misconceived the concept of damages claimed for the mental torture, physical hardship and loss in reputation as against the damages claimed for monetary loss due to act of omission or commission of the delinquent party or arising out of its failure to carry out his contractual obligations. The former are in legal parlance called "General Damages" in contra-distinction to actual damages based on proof. "General Damages" referred to Iqbal Hasan Burney v. Ameen Tareen (PLD 1967 Karachi 840) and pointed out by Mayne and Mcgregor in the 12th Edition of their book on Damages at page 12 with reference to proof:- "are such as the jury may give when the Judge cannot point out any measure by which they are to be assessed,, except the opinion and judgment of a reasonable man Special damages are given in respect of any 'consequences reasonably and probably arising from the breach complained of.
This type of general damage is usually concerned with non-pecuniary losses, which are difficult to estimate, the principal examples being the injury to reputation in defamation and the pain and suffering in cases of personal injury. Pecuniary loss is also occasionally general damage within this meaning, both iii tort and in contract. In tort there is the loss of business profits caused by the defendant's inducement of breach of contract or passing off, while in contract there is the injury to credit and reputation caused by the defendant's failure to pay the plaintiff's cheques or honour his drafts, pecuniary loss which it is difficult to estimate at all accurately.
' When a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive, from the party who has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby, which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach, or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it."
As against this, there is another type of claim for damages for breach of contract and is governed by section 73 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872) whereunder the plaintiff can get compensation for such loss or damage as was caused to them by the commission of the alleged breach, and which naturally arose in the usual course of things, or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach. But they cannot claim remote or indirect damages.
9. At this crucial conjecture when we are at the threshold of 21st Century, the supply of electricity is not an amenity but is one of requirement of life. It is a common experience that whenever the electricity goes off during loadshedding or otherwise, one feels as if one is immersed in darkness of the past centuries. The psyche of the whole family evinces depression or frustration which has its adverse effects long after the electric light is restored. The farmers, the students, the children and the house wives apart from offices are the worst effectees. In the case in hand, there is evidence that sons of the plaintiff-respondent were students of various disciplines and different stages.
' Their frustration can be well-imagined by the parents who are usually of advanced age, mature and docile. All this mental torture and sufferings are not amenable to any legal standard of measurement. In a celebrated judgment delivered by the legal luminary of our country Late B.Z.
Kaikaus, J., as his Lordship then was, in Muhammad Sharif v. Nawab Din and another (PLD 1957 Lahore 283) has very aptly observed that if we are to assess damages only if the exact amount is proved, no damages can ever be decreed. Damages have so many times to be awarded by the rule of thumb and the fact that the exact c amount is not determinable can be no reason for dismissal of suit. These observations are enough to repel the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners.
10. Agreeing with the learned appellate Court on this point, I hold that the respondent is entitled to Rs,24,900 against the petitioners. The judgment-debt or (WAPDA) shall ascertain the names, present designation and place of posting of the officials who were responsible for the illegal cutting off the supply of electricity to the respondent and his family and recover the amount of damages from them personally in proportion to their liability. The Executing Court shall look into this personal liability of the petitioners in this case and effect recovery from them under intimation to the Registrar of this Court. Resultantly, this revision petition having no substance is hereby dismissed with costs throughout.