1. ' MUHAMMAD YOUNAS SURAKHVI, J.--This appeal through leave of the Court has been directed against the judgment and decree of the High Court, dated 18th September, 1993, whereby the appeal filed by the appellants herein was dismissed by maintaining the judgments and decrees of the trial Court and first appellate Court.
2. ' The precise facts of the case are that the respondents Muhammad Yousaf and others initially brought a suit for possession of land measuring 9 Kanals on north eastern side, out of 44 Kanals 16 Marlas of land, comprising Survey No,441 situated in Village Lehri, Tehsil Mirpur. The suit was filed in the Court of Sub-Judge, Mirpur on October 17, 1980. It was averred that the suit land was under the ownership of plaintiffs and co-defendants. They purchased the land in 1967 through a registered sale-deed and took over its possession. Defendants 1 and 2, three years prior to the institution of the suit made encroachment in the suit land by making demarcation in the shape of abutments.
3. The plaintiffs being out of the country, the defendants in their absence took possession of the suit land. They were asked to surrender the land by removing unauthorised possession but they declined to do so. The defendants, in their written statement, denied the averments made by the plaintiffs and alleged that land measuring 4 Kanals 12 Marlas, out of the suit land was in their possession for more than 12 years. They were in continuous possession of the land in their own right, as their adverse possession had ripened into ownership. It was further averred that the defendants occupied the land in dispute 30 years before by raising abutments. The other averments were also rebutted. On January 13, 1985 the plaintiffs moved for the amendment of the plaint. It was pleaded that the original suit was instituted for possession of land measuring 4 Kanals 12 Marlas was still in possession of the defendants, whereas the possession of the remaining land was restored to the plaintiffs. The aforesaid amendment was allowed by the order of the Court and the case was sent to the Court of Additional Sub-Judge, Mirpur for disposal. The suit was decreed on December 30, 1989. The first appeal before the District Judge failed. The second appeal in the High Court, met the 'same fate. Hence this appeal with the leave of the Court.
4. ' Raja Muhammad Siddique Khan, the learned counsel for the defendants-appellants, contended that the suit was barred by limitation, as plaintiffs failed to prove institution of their suit within the period of 12 years from the date of dispossession or discontinuance of their possession on the suit land. In the estimation of the learned counsel for the appellant it was enjoined upon the plaintiffs to prove that their suit was within time i,e, within 12 years from the date of their dispossession or discontinuance as provided under Article 142 of the Limitation Act. The learned counsel made reference to the evidence on record and explained that subordinate Court as well as the High Court misdirected themselves by placing reliance on Khasra Girdawari for Kharif 1978. The said document, in the estimation of the learned counsel, was in conflict with the oral evidence as such the same could not have been relied upon. Reference was made to a recent decision of this Court titled Abdul Rahman v. Karamat Khan, decided on August 24, 1993 and announced on September 8, 1993, Aksar Ali and 2 others v. Fazal Karim and 11 others 1982 CLC 1309 and Hidayat and others v.
5. Najabat and others PLD 1966 Lahore 764.
6. ' On the other hand Mr. Muhammad Azam Khan, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents controverted the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants and supported the orders of subordinate Courts and High Court. It was vehemently contended that the title of plaintiff-respondents in the suit land was admitted and it was also proved from the evidence on record that dispossession took place in 1978 as such the suit was well within time. It was strenuously contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that once the title on the suit land of the plaintiff/respondents is admitted a heavy burden lies on the opposite side to prove their adverse possession on the suit land.
7. We have heard the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record made available with care. In our considered view the moot point involved in this case is as to which of the Article out of Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act would be applicable. Article 142 of the Limitation Act applies where the plaintiff was originally in possession of the disputed immovable property and was dispossessed or discontinued to be in possession. In order that he may succeed the plaintiff has to show that he was in possession, before such dispossession, or discontinuance of possession within 12 years of the institution of the suit. On the other hand Article 144 applies when the possession of the other party becomes adverse to the title of the true owner and in that case the limitation would start running from the date such possession becomes adverse. The starting point for this Article is the time when the possession of the other party becomes adverse. In a case falling under Article 142 the plaintiff must at the outset show that he had been in possession within 12 years before suit, and cannot rest merely on proof of title; while in cases falling under Article 144, the plaintiff may rest content with proof of title only, and the burden lies on the defendants to show that they have had a possession inconsistent with the title of the plaintiff more than 12 years before suit. The essential difference between Article 142 and Article 144 is that when the plaintiff is suing for possession on the basis of dispossession, relevant Article applicable is Article 142 and the burden lies on him to show that the date of his dispossession or discontinuance of possession which gave him the cause of action for the suit was within 12 years of the suit; while if the suit is not for possession based on the ground of dispossession, but is a suit for possession of immovable property falling under Article 144 than on proof of title the plaintiff is entitled to succeed; his suit cannot be dismissed until the defendant further establishes his adverse possession for more than 12 years. In such a case the burden is on the defendant to prove the adverse possession.
8. In the instant case the claim of the plaintiffs is that they purchased the suit land through a registered sale-deed executed in 1967. They were dispossessed of the suit land 3 years prior to the institution of the suit. The defendants occupied the suit land in absence of the plaintiffs from the country. Thus, it becomes clear that plaintiffs alleged their possession of the suit land from the date of their obtaining the sale-deed in their favour and were dispossessed 3 years before the institution of the suit. On the other hand the defence was that the defendants occupied the suit land 30 years before the institution of the suit and acquired title by adverse possession spreading over a period of 12 years. The trial Court raised issues out of the pleadings of the parties. As many as 3 issues were framed by the trial Court. It appears from the judgment of the trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court that no objection with regard to the limitation was specifically raised by the defendants in their written statement. However, they were allowed to argue the point with regard to limitation during the course of arguments and all the Courts found that the suit of the plaintiff/respondents was well within a period of 12 years and the issue regarding adverse possession was decided against defendants.
9. The plaintiff/respondents in support of their case produced Muhammad Iqbal, Patwari, who produced Khasra Girdawari for the year 197783 Exh.PB., Muhammad Rasib on of the plaintiffs also appeared as a witness. In rebuttal Muhammad Khan, defendant appeared as a witness. This is sum total of the evidence produced by the parties in support of their respective claims.
10. In view of the pleading s of the parties, the case argued at the time of arguments and issues raised therefrom, the instant case falls within the preview of Article 142 of the Limitation Act. The period of limitation under this Article as said earlier is 12 years from the date of dispossession or discontinuance of the possession. This view finds support from the reasons recorded by this C Court in Abdul Rehman's case announced on September 8, 1993 and cited by the learned counsel for the appellant. The other authorities have no relevancy to the case in hand and as such the principle enunciated therein has no application to the present case.
11. ' Apart from Khasra Girdawari Exh.PB Muhammad Rasib one of the plaintiffs appeared as a witness, who deposed that the land was purchased by his father and uncle in 1966-67. It was in possession of the vendees prior to the execution of the sale-deed. Their possession was continuous. However, the suit, land was occupied by the defendants in the year 1978. It was explained by them that encroachment was made by the defendants as one of the Survey Nos. Of the defendants was contiguous to the suit land. In answer to a question in the cross-examination the witness deposed that the suit land measuring 4 Kanals 12 Marlas was in possession of the defendants and possession of the rest of the land measuring 4 Kanals 8 Marlas earlier entered in the plaint was acquired by the plaintiffs prior to the amendment application. It is interesting to note that the witness deposed in unequivocal terms that the defendants occupied the land in 1978 but the fact remains that no challenge was thrown to the evidence of this witness by the learned counsel for appellants during his cross-examination. It is a settled proposition of law that if the veracity of a witness has not been challenged on a particular point in the cross-examination, his evidence on that point shall be deemed to have been admitted by the other side. In our estimation the oral evidence of Muhammad Rasib plaintiff fully corroborates the entries of Khasra Girdawari to believe that prior to 1978 the suit land was in continuous possession of the plaintiff. Although the circumstances have not been explained sufficiently as to how the possession of the plaintiffs was discontinued or the land came in possession of the defendants. This aspect of the case as opined by the High Court may not fully discharge the onus of proof but the fact remains that the evidence of the witness read with Khasra Girdawari inspires confidence and leads us to the conclusion that plaintiffs were in fact dispossessed from the suit land in the year 1978. Even otherwise the preponderance of evidence is in favour of plaintiff/respondents and there is no cogent rebuttal of evidence by the defendants. It has rightly been observed by the High Court that Khasra Girdawari carries no initial presumption in its favour but in absence of rebuttal by strong evidence it has to be accepted as reliable evidence along with the statement of plaintiff, especially so when they go unchallenged throughout. Therefore, we have come to the conclusion that the suit of plaintiffs is well within time.
12. ' The authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellants in order to discard Khasra Girdawari from consideration are not of any help to his case, as, the testimony of plaintiff Muhammad Rasib substantially supports the entries in Khasra Girdawari. The question of adverse possession was very rightly not argued by the learned counsel for the appellants in the High Court as well as before us for the obvious reason that there is no evidence on record to substantiate this plea. In the light of what has been stated above we find no force in this appeal which is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.