1. ' This Revision Application is directed against the order dated 21-12-1994 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Karachi, West in C.MA. No,27 of 1994 and order dated 5-3-1994 passed by learned IIIrd. Senior Civil Judge, Karachi East, rejecting applicants' prayer for grant of temporary injunction.
2. ' Pre-admission notice was issued to the respondents who have put in appearance and a counter- affidavit has been filed by respondent No,1.
3. ' Applicants filed Suit No,15 of 1994 against the respondents for declaration that they were entitled to conversion of their respective licences in respect of quarry gravel into lease for the area in their possession in terms of Mining Concession Rules, 1960 (hereinafter referred the Rules) or at least entitled to further extension of their respective licences on payment of prescribed fees and any action taken by respondent No,2 affecting their excavation rights resulting in cancellation of their respective licences and grant of licence in favour of respondent No,1 in respect of applicants' right of excavation is illegal, mala fide and ultra vires of the Rules. They also prayed for a mandatory injunction to direct respondent No,2 to decide their cases pending for lease/licence extension in accordance with Rules after providing an opportunity of hearing to them and a permanent injunction restraining him from giving effect to licence, if any, granted to respondent No,1.
4. ' It was pleaded by the applicants that they are carrying on business of quarry excavation and stone crushing at Karachi. Applicant No,1 was granted a quarry license dated 25-10-1984 for gravel excavation over an area of 20 acres of Government land situated near Hub Dam Road, Manghopir, Karachi which was extended from time to time and lastly extended up to 24-10-1989. Applicant No,2 was granted licence dated 3-12-1981 for gravel excavation over an area of 110 acres of Government land situated near Band Murad Road, Manghopir, Karachi which was subsequently reduced to 34 acres with effect from 7-3-1985 and was lastly extended up to 22-5-1988. By letter dated 19-7-1989 respondent No,2 informed applicant No,2 that quarry licence granted to him had been treated as expired on 22-5-1988 without any further renewal as he had failed to produce "No Dues Certificate" from auction-holder and defaulted in payment of dues amounting to Rs,15,563.40 up to 6-3-1988 and also failed to reply to show-cause notice dated 19-4-1989. Applicant No,2 replied this letter on 30-10-1989 clarifying his position as regards the alleged dues and requested for renewal of the licence up to 1989-90 as requisite licence fees had been deposited by him. Both the applicants claiming to be in possession of their respective areas and alleging unlawful trespass on the part of respondent No,1 filed a joint suit as stated above and prayed for a temporary injunction seeking to restrain respondent No,1 from interfering with their possession and/or dispossessing them from the land without due course of law.
5. ' The application for injunction was resisted by respondent No,1 who also moved an application under Order VII, rule 11, C.P.C. For rejection of the plaint. On consideration of parties' respective contentions, learned Senior Civil Judge dismissed the application for temporary injunction and rejected the application under Order VII, rule 11, C.P.C. As against the order dismissing injunction application, applicants filed C.M.A. 27 of 1994 which upon hearing came to be dismissed vide order dated 21-12-1994. Both the orders have been impugned in this Revision Application.
6. ' Learned counsel appearing for the applicants vehemently contended that in his letter Annexure "F" dated 30-10-1989 applicant No,2 had referred to an earlier application dated 20-1-1988 seeking renewal of the licence granted in his favour but respondent No,2 without deciding the fate of the application, proceeded to grant an area of 49-3 acres including 20 acres of land granted to applicant No,1. His further contention is that under rules 35, 45 of the Rules, licences granted in favour of both the licensees were, eligible for conversion into lease but respondent No,2 failed to discharge the statutory duty imposed on him by law.
7. ' On the other hand, representative for respondent No,2, urged that both the applicants had not applied for renewal of their licences before expiry thereof. According to him while the license in favour of applicant No,1 expired on 24-10-1989, the licence granted to applicant No,2 expired on 22- 5-1988. He further submitted that no application for conversion of licence into a lease was made by applicant No,2 and that renewal of a licence is a condition precedent for conversion into lease. For proper understanding and appreciation both the Rules may be reproduced as under:-- "35. Right of the licensee for renewal of his prospecting licence on applying for a mining lease.--The licensee having before the expiry of a prospecting licence applied for a mining lease shall have the right to renevial for the prospecting licence until the mining lease applied for has been granted or refused.
45. Right of the licensee to a mining lease.---On or before the determination of his licence the licensee shall have a right:
(a) In the case of minerals other than precious stones, to a mining lease in accordance with the terms contained in the Rules for mining leases.
(b) In the case of precious stones, to the first offer of such mining lease as the Central Government may think fit to grant.
8. ' Such lease may include so much land, comprising the whole or a part only of the area for which the prospecting licence was granted, as shall not exceed the area specified with respect to mining leases in Rule 49."
9. From a perusal of the impugned orders it would appear that both the Courts below had found that the applicants had failed to make out a strong prima facie case for the grant of a temporary injunction inasmuch as the licences granted in their favour had expired and were not valid on the date of filing the suit. It would appear from a narrative of this judgment that there is no controversy as regards the expiry of the licences initially granted in favour of applicants and renewed from time to time which came to an end on the dates mentioned above. Respondent No,2, thus, prima facie acted within the scope of authority vested in him by granting another licence for gravel in favour of respondent No,1 to which no exception could perhaps be taken by the applicants by way of a suit. It is not borne out from the record whether the applicants had actually asked for renewal of their respective licences to the respondent No,2 within time prescribed under the Rules. On the contrary applicant No,2 had been found to be in arrears so far the payment of licence fees is concerned.
10. This circumstance is also supported by his own admission in his letter, dated 30th October, 1989 addressed to Additional Director, Mineral Development, Government of Sindh, Annexure "F' filed in the trial Court and Annexure "P/5" in this Revision Application.
11. ' Both the Courts below in my view having concluded that there was no prima facie case for the grant of discretionary and equitable relief of temporary injunction in favour of applicants, neither acted illegally nor with material irregularity. This is not a case of non-exercise of jurisdiction vested in the lower Courts or exercise of authority in excess of jurisdiction.
12. ' Learned counsel for applicants submitted that he had raised a fair question for consideration at the trial and as such the applicants were entitled to the grant of temporary injunction but as observed earlier there has been no jurisdictional error of law to be corrected by this Court in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction which is restricted and limited in nature. After the close of arguments, learned counsel has cited judgments reported in PLD 1964 (West Pakistan) Karachi 149, PLD 1957 (West Pakistan) Karachi 241, PLD 1970 Karachi 332, PLD 1970 SC 180, PLD 1971 Karachi 793, PLD 1986 SC 88, 1988 CLC 362, 1988 CLC 460, AIR 1939 Patna 216 and AIR 1951 Patna 469 which lay down the principles for grant of temporary injunction and the considerations for exercise of revisional powers under section 115, C.P.C. Without discussing the proposition of law laid down in the above judgments, it would appear that in the distinguishable facts of this case, these are of no avail to the applicants.
13. ' For the foregoing reasons, there is no substance in this Revision Application which is dismissed in limine.