' This petition, under section 115, C.P.C. By Town Committee Malikwal, is directed against the judgment and decree of affirmance passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Gujrat dated 13-6- 1993 whereby that Court dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner and maintained the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge, Mandi Baha-ud-Din dated 20-6-1991 decreeing the suit for declaration filed by the respondents.
2. The facts, in brief, are: that respondents were appointed as octroi clerks by the Chairman Town Committee, Malikwal on 23-6-1987, 17-5-1987 and 9-5-1987 respectively. They had been performing their duties and had completed their probationary period. It was on 24-6-1989 when their services were terminated by the Chairman, Town Committee, Malikwal. Feeling aggrieved, the respondents instituted a suit under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) against the respondents for seeking declaration to the effect that the impugned order was based upon mala fide; that it had been passed without affording any opportunity of hearing to the respondents and so was violative of the principle of natural justice; "that nobody should be condemned unheard"; that it was the result of political rivalry between the outgoing Chairman and in-coming Chairman of the Town Committee. The suit was contested. Necessary issues were framed. Upon the consideration of the evidence adduced by the parties, the learned trial Judge found that the respondents were the permanent employees of the Town Committee; that their services had been terminated vide impugned order, in malicious exercise of authority; that no notice had been given to them. On these conclusions the learned trial Judge vide his decision dated 20-6-1991 decreed the suit.
Feeling dissatisfied with this decision, the petitioners filed appeal which, too, was dismissed by the learned Appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 136-1993. While dismissing the appeal, the learned First Appellate Court came to the following conclusions: "It stands admitted on the record by the DW-2 that even prior to the disputed Audit Note, this witness had conducted Audit of this Town Committee and even at that time the respondents were serving over there as Octroi Clerks but strangely enough this witness did not raise any objection with regard to their appointments. It is also in evidence that there was political rivalry between Ch. Irshad, Ex-Chairman and the present Chairman. Admittedly the respondents had successfully completed the two years period of their probation. They are possessed of required academic qualifications for these posts. One of the respondents did produce the required card issued by the office of employment exchange. DW-2 made it clear that in his audit report, he had advised the Chairman that efforts should be made to get regularised the appointments of the respondents in due course or in the alternative their services should be dispensed with. It is worth consideration that the Chairman, Town Committee DW-1, made fresh appointment of one Ijaz, who was appointed as Octroi Clerk by Ch. Lrshad, Ex-Chairman alongwith the respondents but obviously he failed to regularize the services of the respondents or to make fresh appointments of respondents.
Only conclusion to be drawn would be that he was nursing mala fide intention against the respondents as having been appointed by the Ex-Chairman. DW-1 does not seem to be telling the truth when he stated that he had also orally asked the respondent to apply for being regularised as admittedly he never issued any such instructions to them in writing. Ijaz was stated to be a party man of DW-1 as was so asserted during the course of arguments."
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of this petition, contended that the Chairman, Town Committee had taken action on the basis of audit report wherein it was pointed out that the appointments of the respondents were made without recommendations of the Selection Committee and so on this report, the Chairman, Town Committee was justified to terminate the services of the respondents. He, however, was not able to controvert the findings of the two Courts below that the respondents had completed their probationary period and no notice, whatsoever, was given to them before passing the impugned order of termination. On the contrary, learned counsel for respondents supported the impugned decisions.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at a considerable length and perused the record. From the foregoing narration, it is not in dispute that the petitioners had served the Committee for more than two years and so had completed their probationary period; that no notice whatsoever was given to them by the Chairman, Town Committee before passing the impugned order. It is a settled law that the right of hearing is not confined to proceedings which are judicial in form but it extends to all the proceedings held by whomsoever which may affect the person or property or the rights of the parties. Reference be made to Chief Commissioner, Karachi v. Dina Sohrab Katrak (PI,D 1959 SC 45) and Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Fazlur Rahman (PLD 1964 SC 410). Applying this principle to the facts and circumstances of this case, it is quite clear that the impugned order was passed in violation of the principle of natural justice "that nobody should be condemned unheard". In view of this, the two Courts below were eminently correct in coming to the conclusion that the impugned order passed by the Chairman, Town Committee was wholly without jurisdiction and without lawful authority. The decisions of the two Courts below, hence neither suffer from any jurisdictional error nor from any legal flaw calling for interference in revisional jurisdiction of this Court.
5. For the reasons stated above, this revision petitions is found to be wholly destitute of merit and is accordingly dismissed. The petitioner shall bear the costs of proceedings throughout.