; The facts relevant for the decision of this writ petition are that the petitioner is a Cooperative Society under the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 while respondent No, 3 joined its service as a Bus conductor on 1-2-1981 and his services were terminated on 15-5-1985. The employee served the society with a grievance notice and thereafter proceeded to file grievance petition before the Punjab Labour Court No,
2. The petitioner contested the petition. The Labour Court recorded evidence and after hearing the arguments granted the petition vide order dated 5-1-1988 which was assailed by the petitioner through an appeal before respondent No, 1 who dismissed the appeal vide order dated 29-2-1988. Now the present petition which was admitted to hearing and notice was issued to the respondents. Respondent No, 3 alone has appeared and contested the petition while the other respondents have been proceeded ex parte.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the Labour Court the respondent No,2 had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the grievance petition of the employee. In this behalf the learned counsel has referred to sections 54 and 70-A of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925. It is added that the matter was not covered by I.R.O. Because it applies only to workmen employed m commercial and industrial organisations whereas the petitioner society is neither an industry nor a commercial organization. The learned counsel in this behalf has referred to the aims and objects as well as bye-laws of the petitioner society to prove that its main object is to look after the needs of its members. The learned counsel in this behalf has preferred to the case of Pakistan National Centre. v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 2 Lahore etc. (PLD 1976 Lah. 1085). It is added that the petitioner society caters for the needs of its members and if functions are taken into consideration then the same has resemblance to Local Bodies and not to industrial or commercial organizations. The learned counsel in this behalf has referred to the judgments reported as Pakistan National Centre through its Chairman v. Presiding Officer Punjab Labour Court No, 2 and another (PLD 1976 Lahore 1085), Muhammad Dawood v. Mayor, Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (1981 PLC Lah. 879), and Dr. Muhammad Nasim Javed v. Lahore Cantonment Housing Society Ltd.
Through the Secretary, Fortress Stadium, Lahore Cantt. Etc. (PLD 1983 Lah. 552). It is argued that the termination of employee is covered by the business of the society therefore section 70-A was fully attracted. In this behalf the learned counsel has relied on the case of Afzal Hussain Syed v.
Government of Punjab and another (PLD 1980 Lahore 697). It is argued that respondent No, 3 was employed on contract basis therefore his services were legally terminated.
3. On the other hand the learned counsel for respondent No, 3 argued that since his client was employed as Bus Conductor he was a worker under Road Transport Workers Ordinance, 1961 and he could maintain the grievance petition. It is added that the action was mala fide as is clear from the fact that three of his juniors were retained while six more were recruited. In this behalf he has referred to Abdur Rashid v. Pakistan (PLD 1962 SC 42) and Lahore Improvement Trust (Housing Wing) Employees' Union and another v. Registrar of Trade Unions, Lahore Region, Lahore (1976 PLC 200). It is added that the sections 54 and 70-A of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 are not relevant in the service matters of employees. It is argued that the service of respondent No, 3 could not be terminated without assigning reasons in view of the provision of Standing Order 12(3) of the Standing Order Ordinance, 1961 and even in that eventuality the junior was first to go. In this behalf the learned counsel has referred to Standing Order 13. It is argued that there is nothing wrong with the orders of respondents Nos. 1 and 2. The same are fully justified by the facts on record and law.
4. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record as well as the provision of law and precedents cited on behalf of the parties.
5. The first point for determination is whether respondent No,3 is a workman and provisions of I.R.O.
Are applicable to him? Before proceedings with the point it is relevant to refer the definition of Road Transport Service as appearing in section 2(7) of Road Transport Workers Ordinance, 1961. This rule reads as under:- "'road transport service' means a service carrying passengers or goods or both by road in vehicles for hire or reward;"
It is clear from this definition that only ingredient is for carrying passengers or goods or both by road in vehicles for hire or reward. The transport service of the petitioner society, according to the evidence on record, was covered by this definition. It owned at the relevant time a fleet of twelve buses plied for carrying passengers, who would purchase tickets for travelling in these buses. This is admitted by R.W.1. Now the other relevant definition is that of `employer', which is contained in subsection (2) of section 2 of the Ordinance and reads as under:-- "'employer' means the owner of any road transport service in which workers are employed, and where the business of such service is not directly managed by the owner, means the Manager, agent or Representative of such owner in the said service and where the owner is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation any vehicle which is the subject of hire purchase agreement, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement."
' The only ingredient is employment of 'workers', which has been defined in subsection (10) of the same section and reads as under:- "'worker' means a person engaged on mobile duty, and includes drivers, cleaners, conductors and checkers employed by or in a road transport service."'
The provisions Of Standing Orders 10-B, 10-C and section 15 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment Standing Ordinance apply to these workers. The petition before respondent No, 2, therefore, was competent and legally accepted. The rules framed under the Ordinance of 1961 are known as West Pakistan Road Transport Workers Rules, 1962 and according to Rule 6 the service of worker shall not be terminated unless the worker is informed of alleged misconduct and given an opportunity of hearing. The impugned, order of society was not in line with the provision of these rules, therefore, bad in law, besides being mala fide because if it was a case of simple termination then the junior most was to go first and there was no scope for recruitment of another six persons.
6. Now I take up the legal question of jurisdiction raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
The objection is based on sections 54 and 70-A of the Cooperative Societies Act, therefore, it is worthwhile to reproduce the same:-- "54. Arbitration. ---If any dispute touching the business of a society other than a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by the society or its committee against a paid servant of the society arises--
(a) between members or past members of the society or persons claiming through a member or past members, or
(b) between members or past members or persons so claiming and any past or present officer, agent or servant of the society, or
(c) between the society or its committee, and past or present member of the society, or
(d) between the society or its committee, and any past or present officer, agent or servant of the society, or a surety of such officer, agent or servant, whether such surety is or is not a member of the society, or
(e) between a financing bank authorised under subsection (1) of section 34 and a person who is not a member of a society, ' it shall be referred to the Registrar for decision by himself or his nominee, or if either of the parties so desires, to arbitration of three arbitrators who shall be the Registrar or his nominee and two persons of whom one shall be nominated by each of the parties concerned.
' A dispute shall include the question whether a person is or was a member of a society and also claims by a society for debts or demands due to it from a member, past member or non-member or the heirs or assets of a past member or non-member whether such debts or demands be admitted or not: ' Provided that if the question at issue between a society and a claimant, or between different claimants, is one involving complicated questions of law and fact, the Registrar may, if he thinks fit, suspend proceedings in the matter until the question has been tried by a regular suit instituted by one of the parties or by the society. If no such suit is instituted within six months of the Registrar's order suspending proceedings the Registrar shall take action as laid down in paragraph 1 of this section."
"70-A. Bar of jurisdiction. ---(1) Notwithstanding anything provided in any other law for the time being in force but save as expressly provided in this Act--
(a) no Court or other authority whatsoever shall have jurisdiction to entertain, or to adjudicate upon, any matter which the Provincial Government, the Registrar, or his nominee, any arbitrator or liquidator, a society, a financing bank, a cooperative bank or any other person is empowered by or under this Act, or the rules or bye-laws framed thereunder, to dispose of or to determine;
(b) the validity of anything done or an order passed by the Provincial Government, a society, a financing bank, a cooperative bank, the Registrar or any other person referred to in clause (a), under this Act or the rules and bye-laws framed thereunder, shall not be called in question in any manner whatever before or by any Court or other authority whatsoever; and
(c) no Court or other authority whatsoever shall be competent to grant any injunction or pass any other order in relation to any proceedings under this Act or any rules or bye-laws framed thereunder before the Provincial Government, a society, a financing bank, a cooperative hank, the Registrar or any otherperson referred in clause (a).
(2) The provisions of subsection (1) shall be applicable to proceedings, appeals and revisions pending adjudication or disposal before or in any Court or other authority whatsoever on the date that the Cooperative Societies (Amendment) Ordinance, 1966, comes into "force and any order passed in such proceedings, whether before or after the coming into force of the said Ordinance, in regard to matters referred to in subsection (1), shall stand vacated and be without any force."
It is clear from bare reading of section 54 that the jurisdiction of the Courts and the Tribunals is barred in respect of all the matters 'touching business of the society'. The terms business of the society has not been defined in Act, 1925 but the same has been interpreted in the case reported as Ch. Nazir Ahmad v. Agha Ahmad Raza Khan (1971 SCMR 305). The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the service matter of employees are not referable to arbitration as these are not 'dispute touching the business of the society' under section 54 of the Act, 1925. The same was the view of the Quetta and Sindh High Courts as is clear from the case of Muhammad Iqbal and J.J. Miranda v.
Fishermen Cooperative Society, Karachi and others (PLD 1978 Kar. 994 therefore, it is held that the matter of termination of services of respondent. No, 2 was not covered by section 54 of the Act, therefore, the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was not barred under section 70-A of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925.
7. Now coming to the other legal argument that the petitioner society was established only to cater for the needs of its members and it in functioning resemble to a local body but by no stretch of imagination can be called a commercial or industrial organisation, therefore, the grievance petition under section 25-A of the I.R.O. Was not competent. The learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the employees both referred to the bye-laws of the society specially to bye-law No, 4 dealing with the objects. The same reads as under:- ' Obects " The objects of the Society are to promote the economic and social interest of its members and more particularly to lay out,establish and maintain a garden town."........... .
' Thereafter, reference was made to functions particularly clauses (b) to (d). The same read as under:-- "Functions
5. For the achievement of its objects the society may perform the following functions:--
(a) ....................................................
(b) to bring into existence construct, manage and maintain works, services and institutions or various kinds for the convenience and benefit of members residing in the town;
(c) to sell, mortgage or lease land, houses, house sites and all other properties, movable or immovable, as may be necessary for the carrying out of any of the objects of the society;
(d) to construct residential houses and other buildings for private and public use and to provide amenities such as schools, hospitals, parks and playground for the convenience of members."
' Before proceedings any further it is relevant to refer to the definition of `Workman' as appearing in section 2(xxviii), which reads as under:- "'Worker' and 'workman' means any person not falling within the definition of employer who is employed (including employment as a supervisor or as an apprentice) in an establishment or industry for hire or reward either directly or through a contractor whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purpose of any proceeding under this Ordinance in relation to an industrial dispute includes a person who has been dismissed discharged, retrenched, laid off or otherwise removed from employment in connection with or as a consequence of that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge, retrenchment, lay-off or removal has led to that dispute but does not include any person---
(a) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity, or
(b) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity draws wages exceeding rupees eight hundred per mensum or performs, either because of the nature of duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of managerial nature."
' It is clear from the above definition that it includes persons employed in an establishment or industry, therefore, the definition of 'Establishment' becomes relevant. The same appears in clause
(ix) of section 2, which reads as under:-- "Establishment means any office, firm, industrial unit, undertaking, shop or premises in which workmen are employed for the purpose of carrying on any industry and except in section 22-EE, includes a collective bargaining unit, if any, constituted under that section in any establishment or group of establishments."
' While 'industry' has been defined in clause (xiv) of the same section and reads as under:- "Industry means any business, trade, manufacture, calling, service, employment or occupation."
Now if the above definitions are read with preamble of I.R.O. Then it becomes clear that the object/pursuit of the employer is immaterial. The only important thing is employment of persons for carrying out its aims and objects. The definition is wide and takes into folds all sorts of employment. I am fortified in my view by the provisions of section 1(3) of I.R.O. Which provides and it shall not apply to categories of employees mentioned in clauses (a) to (h) and subsection (3-a). If the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner was to be accepted then these categories already stood excluded from the purview of the I.R.O. And there was no point in once again excluding them. On the other hand, this proves that the Legislature wanted to extend the cover of I.R.O. To all sorts of workers except specifically excluded.
8. This is not all. Even the term 'Industry' mentioned amongst others includes 'Service'. If looked from this angle the petitioner society would be covered even by the term 'Industry'. The definition of 'Establishment' opens with the words means any office, etc. The society cannot be, at least excluded, from office and the other important ingredient is that it employed workers. The definition of 'Worker' as already noted means any person employed in an E establishment or industry for hire or reward, therefore, it is concluded that the provisions of I.R.O.
Were applicable to respondent No, 3 employed by the petitioner society.
9. The upshot of the above discussion is that there is no merit in this writ petition. The same is, therefore, dismissed with costs.