1. ANWARUL HAQ, J.--This petition for leave to appeal, by the plaintiff Izzat Bakhsh, is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated the 9th of October 1972, by which his suit for possession of agri--cultural land by pre-emption has been dismissed with costs on the ground that it was barred by time. The suit had been decreed by the trial Court and the matter was brought to the High Court in first appeal by the vendees. The learned Judges of the Division Bench, who heard the appeal in the first instance, differed on the question whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the plaintiff was entitled to invoke section 18 of the Limitation Act. As a result, the matter was placed before a third Judge-under Clause 26 of the Letters Patent, and he has now held that the plaintiff had failed to satisfy the requirements of the said section.
2. The land in dispute is situate on Chah Totiwala in the estate of Chiniot in the Jhang District. It was sold to respondents Nos. 1 to 4 by the respon--dent No. 14, Bakhsh Elabi, acting for himself as well as on behalf of respondents Nos. 5 to 13, by means of a sale deed executed on the 8th of June 1962, and registered at Lahore on the 11th of June 1962. The petitioner filed his suit for possession by pre- emption on the 9th of July 1963, that is, after the expiry of the period of one year allowed by law in this behalf. We alleged that he was a co-sharer in the khata out of which the land in dispute had been sold and had, therefore, a preferential right to acquire the same as compared to the vendees.
3. He asserted that he had been fraudulently kept in the dark about this sale by the defendants, who had concluded the transaction of sale secretly at Lahore although the land was situate at Chiniot and both the vendors and the vendees were residents of that place. He also stated in the plaint that the sale was not reported to the village Patwari within one year of the execution and registration of the sale deed that the vendors continued to retain possession of the suit land in spite of the sale, that the land revenue was also paid by the vendors, and the tenants continued to attorn to them.
4. Considerable evidence was led at the trial by the plaintiff as well as by the vendees to establish their respective contentions. As already stated, the learned trial Judge was impressed by-this evidence and held in favour of the plaintiff. In the High Court, the evidence was analysed at some length by all the three Judges, two of whom have recorded the concurrent finding that the circumstances relied upon by the plaintiff did not suffice to show that there was any fraudulent concealment of the sale transaction from the plaintiff: They have been particularly influenced by the fact that in his own cross-examination on the 10th of September 1964, the plaintiff admitted that he had come to know of the sale 2 -- years before that date, and that he had in fact sent an uncle of his to Lahore to obtain a certified copy of the sale deed. They found that, on this admission, the plaintiff had acquired know--ledge of the sale from the very start in June 1962, and there could, therefore, be no question of his having been kept in the dark about this transaction. They found support for this admission of the plaintiff from the testimony of his own witnesses who stated that, as tenants of the land, they had started attorning to the new landlords almost two years before the date they were called upon to depose in the Court. Even the Sarbrah Lambardar of the village asserted that the sale was common knowledge in the village. In the face of this evidence the majority of the learned Judges in the High Court have come to the conclusion that the plaintiff had failed to show that the sale was fraudulently concealed from him.
5. Sh. Ghias Muhammad, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has strenuously contended that the admission made by the plaintiff in his cross-examination could not be regarded as conclusive against him, especial--ly when it is remembered that he is an illiterate villager, and had categorically asserted in his plaint as well as in his examination-in-chief that he had not acquired knowledge of the sale within one year of its registration. The learned counsel has next argued that the High Court has erred in appraising the evidence produced by the plaintiff in support of his assertion that a fraud was practised upon him by the vendors and the vendees for the purpose of defeating his suit.
6. After hearing Sh. Ghias Muhammad at some length, and examining the evidence adduced by the parties, we have no hesitation in agreeing with the view taken by the majority of the learned Judges in the High Court. They are undoubtedly right in saying that the fraud contemplated by section 18 of the Limitation Act, for the purpose of extending the. Period allowed by law for the filing of a suit, connotes a deliberate contrivance on the part of the opposite-party to suppress the transaction or the cause of action from coming to the knowledge of the plaintiff within the prescribed period or limitation. It must be shown that there was deliberate concealment of facts directly intended to prevent discovery. Mere inaction by the opposite-party, or its negligence to take certain steps which might have brought the transac--tion to the knowledge of the plaintiff, or mere ignorance on the part of the plaintiff that a certain cause of action had accrued to him, would not Con--stitute fraud as contemplated by this section. The learned Judges are also right in saying that the particulars of the fraud alleged must be fully described by the plaintiff and established by cogent evidence.
7. Now in the instant case, we find that although the petitioner had alleged certain facts, constituting the fraud, in his plaint, yet in his examination-in---chief in the trial Court he contented himself by merely asserting that he did not come to know of the transaction as it was registered at Lahore. He did not make a positive statement about Vie particulars of the fraud on which he was relying for the purpose of invoking section 18 of the Limita--tion Act. When cross-examined on behalf of the vendees, he frankly--- conceded that he had acquired knowledge of the sale 2 -- years before the date on which he was giving evidence in Court, and that he had in fact obtained a certified copy of the sale deed through his uncle named Karam. It is significant that this certified copy of the sale deed was not produced by him in Court, as it would have clearly disclosed the date on which it was obtained. From the admissions made by the plaintiff in cross-examination no doubt is left in out mind, that he had acquired knowledge of the sale almost soon after it was completed at Lahore, and, therefore, no question of invoking section 18 would arise.
8. Even if we agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that this admission miry not be regarded as conclusive against the plaintiff, we find that it is amply support by the testimony of the witnesses produced by tire petitioner himself. This evidence has been described at length in the separate judgments of the High Court, and it is not, therefore, necessary for us to repeat it here.
9. Suffice it to say that the tenants of the land have' clearly deposed that they had started attorning to the new landlords soon after the sale, arid that the plaintiff had come to know of than- fact as be also has his own land the same well, in the face of this evidence, the fact that the sale died was registered tat Lahore or that the mutation was not entered until after the expiry of a period of one year from the date of registration would be of no consequence.
10. For the foregoing reasons, we are satisfied that the matter, has been correctly decided by the sigh Court, and no justification is made out for our interference. This petition, therefore, failed and is hereby dismissed.