' This is an application for bail by Ismail son of Farzand Ali.
2. He is accused of offence under section 302, P. P. C. His earlier bail application (Criminal Misc. No, 5116 B-75) was dismissed by me on merits.
' He has now applied again for bail on the ground that since all the cases pending with the different Committing Magistrates in the district have been sent for trial to the learned Sessions Judge in view of the recent amendment in the Code of Criminal Procedure. That Courts have, therefore, been overburdened with work with the result that the case of the petitioner is not likely to be taken up for more than one year. He, therefore, submitted that the petitioner against whom challan was submitted in October, 1974, should be release on bail on the ground of possible delay which is likely to occur in the trial. In support of his contention he urged that many other persons accused of similar offences have been released on bail by other Benches of this Court on this ground.
3. I am unable to agree with this contention. If this plea is accepted then almost all the persons accused of murder and other offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life whose cases have been sent up for trial to the Court of Session would be entitled to be released on bail forthwith.
Earlier i,e, before the recent amendment in the Code of Criminal Procedure), the Supreme Court of Pakistan was pleased to lay down that under certain circumstances the persons accused of such offences can be released on bail when there was an inordinate delay in the completion of commitment proceedings. But the case was considered to be on a different footing after the accused had been committed to stand their trial. Now, as a result of the recent amendment all persons accused of (silences triable by the Court of Session have been sent up for trial and can be deemed to have been 'committed'. I feel that there is no authority A in law to grant bail to persons accused of offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life unless of course inordinate delay in the trial has already occurred due to the amendment in question and not where there is only an apprehension and 'possibility' of such delay.
4. The application is, therefore, dismissed.