ORDER SHAFI MUHAMMADI, J.- Applicant Sohail Jan s/o John Peter is facing trial in a case U/S 17(3) of Offences Against Property (E.H.O.) 1979, which is the out-come of an F.I.R., No.802/1991 registered at P.S. Ferozabad Karachi. His bail application was turned down by the trial Court, hence he preferred his bail application before the High Court in which he alleged that he was arrested by the police on '21.7.1992 along with others accused persons and was remanded to judicial custody on 22.9.1992 i.e. After about two months. The Court realised that if the allegations of the applicant were correct, then the conduct of the police was clearly in violation of Section 167/2) Cr. P.C. Because the Police Officer who was conducting investigation, could not be authorised to keep the applicant/accused for more than 15 days in the whole notwithstanding to the fact that there were more than one cases against the accused in the same police station, It is note able that the present applicant and his companions were interrogated by Inspector Tajamul Hussain of Special Investigation Cell and the said cell cannot be treated to be different from a police station. On account of these reasons I considered it. Necessary to call the I.O. Of the case namely Tajjamul Hussain to explain the custody of the accused person for a term exceeding the specified period.
2. On 29.8.1994, Inspector Tajjamul Hussain appeared in the Court and stated that the applicant and his companions were initially arrested by S.I Abdul Hammed Jactation in F.I.R.No.40/92, on 26.7.192 and not on 21.7.1992 as alleged by the applicant. They were released U/S 169, Cr. P.C. On 6.8.1992. He further stated that they were again arrested on 10.8.1992 i.e. After 4 days of their release in F.I.R No. 266/1992. Such novel story could not be believed, unless proved otherwise, that the accused had been released by the police especially when they had to be arrested after 4 days. I think that such release must be oh the papers only. It is not known how many times Inspector Tajjamul Hussain released and re-arrested the accused person before booking them in the present case, but he successfully shifted the burden from his shoulders and placed the same on the shoulders of the subordinate S.I. Abdul Hameed Jactation who, naturally could not be expected to go against the stand of such influential superior police official. However, the said S.I. Abdul Hameed Jatio was called in the Court on 8.9.1992 and when he was put in the witness box to answer certain questions, Mr. K.M. Nadem, the learned Assistant Advocate General, Sindh objected and submitted that the High Court had no jurisdiction to do so. The learned AAG further urged that the High Court, while hearing criminal cases, especially the bail application and exercising Criminal jurisdiction, cannot assume powers of holding investigation within investigation even U/S 561-A Cr.P.C, because the judicial powers and police powers are complimentary and not over-lapping. The learned AAG went on saying that the Judicial Authorities should respect the boundaries as set-forth by the Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter referred as The Code) and should not transgress.
3. Considering the above underlined portion of the submission as the 'Voice of his heart', instead of treating the same to be harsh on his part, I asked the learned AAG whether he could point out the line of demarcation which could differentiate the boundaries between the judicial powers and the police powers. However the reply of the learned A.A.G, was that the Code itself was evident with reference to such powers. Sections 169,170 and 561-A of the Code were referred by the learned AAG along with several citations including the case of Shahbaz Begum Versus The Honourable Judges of the High Court of Sindh and Baluchistan reported in PLD 1971 S.C.677 in support of his Contention.
The only impression, which could be drawn by this Court, from the submissions made by Mr. K.M.
Nadeem was that the police had certain impregnable powers which could not be questioned at bail stage especially the powers of police under Sections 169 and 170 of the Code by any Court.
The submissions advanced by the learned AA.G. Were flashed in Daily DAWN Karachi on 11.9.1994.
Any silence on the part of the Court could create far-teaching affects of mis-understandings in the minds of judicial officers and police officials, hence, keeping in view the above apprehension, background as well as the hot-discussion between the learned AAG. And the advocates appearing on behalf of the parties, the following question was formulated by the Court:- "Whether at bail stage, the Court has powers to put any question to the I.O. Of any case in order to satisfy itself on any issue concerning the case with reference to powers U/S 169, 170, 173, 4(K), 4(L)
Cr. P.C. Read with Section 561-A Cr. P.C."
Main arguments were advanced by Mr. Shaukat! Hussain Zubedi on behalf of the applicants and Mr. K.M. Nadeem AA.G for the State.
4. The learned AA.G. Has drawn my attention to Article 175(2) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan according to which "No Court shall have any jurisdiction save as or may be conferred on it by the Constitution or by or under any law."
He submitted that this Article was fully discussed in PLD 1980 Karachi 498 wherein it was observed that "High Court is as much slave of the Constitution and law as any other Court, their powers being regulated by law or Constitution. The contention that High Court as Superior Court possesses jurisdiction to determine its on jurisdiction is not correct."
On the basis of the above cited judgment, the learned AA.G. Submitted that the High Court should determine the scope of its jurisdiction with reference to Section 169 and 170 read with Section 561-A of the Code.
Without touching the back-ground of the cases cited by the learned AAG, I would like to make it clear that I would be the last one to go beyond the boundaries of my jurisdiction set by the Constitution and I have no doubt in my mind that the Courts are creatures of the Constitution, slave of the Constitution, bound to act according to the Constitution and have to derive their powers and jurisdiction from the Constitution within the limits set forth by the Constitution. At the same time, I want to make it clear that I was not working against the Constitution when I wanted to ask question from the I.O of the case to satisfy myself about certain ambiguous facts of the case.
However, I would like to discuss the scope of Section 169 and 170 Cr.P.C, in detail on account of the objections raised by the learned AA.G.
5. So far as Section 169 Cr.P.C, is concerned it deals with the powers of "Officer In charge of the Police Station" or to the police officer making the investigation while Section. 170 Cr.P.C, seems to be concerned only with the "Officer In charge of the Police-Station.
For our ready reference both these Sections are reproduced below:- "169. Release of accused when evidence deficient. If, upon an investigation under this Chapter, it appears to the officer-in-charge of the police- station, for to the police-officer making the investigation! That there is not sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, such officer shall, if such person is in custody, release him on his executing a bond, with or without sureties, as such officer may direct, to appear, if and when so required, before a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police- report and to try the accused or send him for trial."
"170. Case to be sent to Magistrate when evidence is sufficients.. (1) If, upon' an investigation under this Chapter, it appears to the officer-in-charge of the police-station that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground as aforesaid, such officer shall forward the accused under custody to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence upon a police-report and to try the accused or send him for trial or, if the offence is bailable and the accused is able to give security, shall take security from him for his appearance before such Magistrate on a day fixed and for his attendance from day to day before such Magistrate until otherwise directed."
It is evident from the above that the words within parenthesis Section 169 Cr.P.C, do not appear in Section 170 Cr.P.C and such difference cannot be deemed meaningless. It seems that for the purpose of release of an accused on the grounds mentioned in Section 169 Cr.P.C, two persons are empowered to do so i.e. (i) Officer In charge of the police station as well as the (ii) Investigating Police Officer but for the purpose of treating any accused to be involved in an offence only Officer In charge of the police-station is competent to book an accused. It is impossible for the Officer In charge of a police station to conduct investigation of each and every case, therefore investigation of a case can be done by any other officer also as is evident from Section 169 Cr.P.C. But in Section 170 Cr.P.C., there is only mention of officer In charge of the police station, and not any other Investigating Officer. Hence the intention of the law must be nothing except that the officer In charge of a Police-Station must carefully go through the investigation done by any of his subordinate and when he is satisfied that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable grounds exist to justify the forwarding of the accused to Magistrate to try the- accused or send him for trial, it is only then that he should exercise his powers U/S 170 Cr.P.C, by forwarding the result of such investigation U/S 173 Cr.P.C, to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on such police report.
It is evident that Sections 169, 170 and 173 of the Code have to be read together because they relate to final report of a case. Section 169 Cr.P.C, relates to cases in which no person is sent tip for trial while Section 170 Cr.P.C, is concerned with cases in which someone is sent up to face trial and Section 173 contains general directions relating to both. "But in exercise of powers under those Section, main duty is cast upon the officer In charge of the police station, no matter, he is the investigating officer of a case himself or the investigation has been done by any of his subordinate.
There is nothing in these Sections to show that police-officials are protected from being questioned in respect of then- investigation at bail stage. The contention of the learned AA.G., that such conduct would amount to "investigation within investigation" is totally misconceived because this Court had not started interfering in any investigation under progress but was going to ask question about the cases in which final report of investigations done by Inspector Tajamul Hussain or by S.I. Abdul Hameed had already been submitted U/S 169 or 170 of the Code. These police officers had shown the applicants arrested and released by now and then and Inspector Tajamul Hussain had submitted a statement before the High Court previously showing the applicants to be involved in two cases only, but as soon as, these criminal misc. Applications became infructuous, he again got the custody of the applicants from Jail which shows that he had failed to prove his competency. On account of these reasons if queries by the Court had been investigation within investigation, as impressed by the learned AAG. Then every trial by any court, after the final report is submitted before the court, would also fall within the ambit of "investigation within investigation."
6. Similarly the view of the learned AAG that the police officers cannot be taken to task on account of their reports U/S 169 or 170 Cr.P.C, is not well founded. For example if any corrupt investigating police official releases the desperate criminals U/S 169 Cr.P.C, on the strength of their being rich, influential or due to bribe or books an innocent person to face trial by misusing his powers U/S 170 Cr.P.C, when the poor accused does not meet the demands of the corrupt police officials, then in all such cases, the Courts are not supposed to remain immune to such barbarism, if the sufferers knock the doors of the Courts. As the well known conduct of the corrupts in the police ranks never remained hides from the Courts, therefore, the superior Courts never treated the police reports U/S 169 or 170 Cr.P.C, as sacrosanct Gospel truth as is clear from the following references.
In the case of Mukhtar Ahmed Versus The State reported in NLR 1984 Cr.691, the police had declared the accused innocent but the Court observed at bail stage that the finding as to the innocence of the accused was not well founded. Hence the bail application of the accused was dismissed.
In the case of Manzoor Versus The State reported in PLD 1972 S.C. 81, the Court gave its observations by saying that "It is obviously not correct to depend on the ipse dixit of police regarding the guilt or innocence of an accused person even in the matter of deciding the question of his bail. In this case bail was refused to the accused by the Supreme Court.
However, the Court can take into consideration the circumstances of each and every case and can refuse or grant bail to any accused in the light of those circumstances and not on the opinion of the police officials. For example in the case of Man shah Versus The State reported in 1976 P.Cr.LJ.
511, two investigation reports had declared the accused persons to be innocent. However, the Court granted bail to the accused on the basis of other circumstances according to which the prosecution had not at all explained some incised injuries which were found on the body of the deceased.
In the case of Gul Ahmad Versus Masan Khan reported in 1977 S.C.M.R. 27, the C.1 A. Staff had held the accused innocent as a result of their investigation. The learned Chief Justice of the Peshawar High Court allowed bail to the accused persons on the basis of that report but the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order of enlevement, because circumstances of the case did not support the result of the investigation done by the police.
In the case of Akbar Khan Versus The state reported in 1977 t\Cr. L.J. 114, the accused was named in F.I.R, armed with pistol and had used the same to kill the deceased but the investigating Officer had declared him innocent . Even his superior officer had affirmed the innocence of the accused but the Court did not believe the police and refused bail to the accused on (he basis of circumstances.
There are only few examples which reflect the character of corrupt police officials who mis-use their powers U/S 169 or 170 Cr.P.C. Can the learned AA.G. Consider that the superior Courts had conducted "investigation within investigation" before reaching any such conclusion to decide the bail application?
7. Perhaps the unreliable conduct of corrupt police officials was one of the reasons of inserting Section 249-A Cr. P.C. In the Code according to which every Magistrate has been empowered to acquit an accused at any stage of the case, if he considers that the charge against an accused sent for trial by the police is ground-less. In other words, the final report of police is not to be supposed as truth and nothing but truth. If a Magistrate has powers to acquit an accused U/S 249- A Cr.P.C, on the basis of record submitted by the officer In charge of the police-station by treating the charge against the accused to be groud less, then it would be a painful frivolity with the High Court, if not an insult or contempt of Court, to consider that a High Court has no jurisdiction to ask questions from an is. Of a case to satisfy itself on any issue concerning the bail application.
Under Section 497(2) Cr. P.C. Every competent court is empowered to release an accused on bail at any stage of the investigation, inquiry or trial provided it appears to the Court that there are no reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence and there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into his quit. A Judge of a High Court is not supposed to possess some mystical, magical, super-natural or spiritual powers on the basis of which he (now she also) could reach a correct conclusion only by going through the police papers cocause such- papers always show one side of the story as painted by the prosecution. Moreover, the words "at any stage of investigation, enquiry or trial", used infection 497 (2) Cr.P.C, are were enough in their nature. Therefore not only the High court but every competent court has powers to call the I/O of any case at any stage of the case of ask questions to satisfy itself about certain points missing from the police-papers before passing any 'order on bail applications. The concept of the words 'inquiry and 'investigation' used in Section 497(2) Cr.P.C, cannot be different from their definitions given in Section 4(K) and 2(1) of the Code.
8. The learned AA.G. Has referred several cases in support of his contention but mail relied upon the case of the Muhammad Safraz Khan (PLD 1953 Federal Court 317) and of Shahbaz Begum (PLD 1971 S.C. 677). None of the two case were concerned with the bail application.' ce they have nothing to do with the bail applications pending before this Court As I would not like to leave any room for others to call this order " a decision passed sub-silenic", hence I consider it necessary to give the summary of both the cited case with reference to their back-grounds.
In the first cited case, accused Muhammad Sarfraz Khan, accompanied by two servants namely Ramzan (a driver) and Sharif, had visited the brothel house of one Khair Din, in the prostitutes' quarter of the town of Montgomery and after enjoying the musk provided by Mst. Gulzar Begum the daughter of Khair Din, he wished Mst, Gulzar Begum to accompany him to his on house. Neither Khair Din nor her daughter were ready to low before the wishes of Muhammad Sarfraz Khan, hence he started beating Khair Din with the help of his two servants. Two persons namely Yousaf (lover of the second sister of Mst. Gulzar Begum) and Saeed (husband of the third sister) intervened to save him and in this scuffle, Yousaf was shot dead and Saeed was injured. The prosecution brought two versions of the incident before the Magistrate, out of which one had been believed by the Sessions Court. When the case came before the High Court for confirmation of death at appellate stage, the High Court adopted the second version with the following remarks: "This case, which comes to us on appeal from a conviction of murder and reference for confirmation of a death sentence and is the first of its kind in the experience of every one concerned, is a remarkable illustration of how money may thwart the course of justice, screen the real murderer and induce a completely innocent man voluntarity to It a bullet pass through his body and it take the halter round his neck. The actual murderer is Muhammad Sarfraz Khan, a wealthy Zamindar of Montgomery, and the man who from feeling of loyalty for this master or temptation agreed to be shot through the wrist and almost walked-up to the gallows is his chauffeur Muhammad Ramzan".
Hence the Federal Court observed that: These categorical propositions formulated at the very commencement of the judgment indicate with clearness what were the underlying beliefs in the minds of the learned Judges when they approached the task of appraising the evidence".
"Such a mode of approach entails serious risk of prejudice to Sarfraz Khan, the more so as the beliefs were largely, in the judicial sense, unfounded".
It is notable that the High Court had not only started recording additional evidence in support of second version of the prosecution story, of such persons at appellate stage who were not witnesses at the trial, instead of believing the first version believed by the Sessions Court at trial but also expressed its view by saying that:- "We have no hesitation in holding that whoever expressed the opinion that Muhammad Sarfraz Khan was innocent and that the guilty party n was Ramzan could not possibly have arrived that result in fair and honest manner".
In the light of the above mentioned back-ground of the case, it was observed by the Federal Court that:- "In order that it should interfere with a conclusion reached by a High court particularly if the conclusion is in accord with that of the trial Court or other subordinate Court, it is necessary that their should be such a disregard of the forms of legal process, or such a violation of principle as amounts to a denial or preversion of justice. The disregard or violation should not be merely technical in character; it should be both grievous as well as substantial. Lastly, it is necessary that resultant injustice of a serious and substantial character should appear. Unless the violation of procedure or principle be such as, in law, vitiates the entire proceeding, interference will be on the basis of ascertainment and elimination of the effect of the error and findings reached on evidence duly received, by a correct method of approach and appraisement, will be respected, notwithstanding that this Court might itself have taken a different view of the same evidence".
The Federal Court, therefore, guided us by annotating that: "The salutary rule appears to us to be that the Judicial committee purported to lay down in the case of Emperor V. Khawaja Nazir Ahmed (1) Their Lordship observed as. Follows:- "The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping, and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and other is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its on function, always, of course, subject to the light of the Court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under section 491 Cr. P.C. In such a case as the present, however, the Court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it and not up til then."
We express our respectful concurrence with these observations which have direct application to the present case. It is no less important for judicial authority to respect the boundary placed by the Code between the functions of the police and the judiciary, than it is for the police to refrain from interfering in the judicial sphere, and the damage to the cause of justice involved in either violation is of serious and fundamental nature. If the functions are defined and distinct, it cannot be within the scope ci the powers belonging to them under Code. It appears to us to be clear than the provisions of sections 169 and 170, Cr.P.C., are intentionally expressed in the widest terms, so as to allow the maximum of discretion to police officers acting under those sections".
These were the reasons, with reference to the above mentioned back-ground that the Federal Court treated the conduct of the High Court at appellant stage to be "Investigation of the Investigation". But the conduct of the High Court in shahnaz Begum's case (PLD 1971S.C. 677) was termed as Investigation within -investigation" because the High Court of sindh had taken certain steps suo-motu respect of an investigation when it was already in progress to find out the cause f death of one Mustafa Zaidi, an Ex.C.S.P. Who was found dead into his house in ne bed room while Shahbaz Begum was found un-conscious in another room.
In the local newspapers highlighted its sensational aspects with particular peculations as to the cause of death with the back-ground of Shahbaz Begum ho was connected with highly placed personages, the Senior Puisne Judge of the High Court considered it fit to take action suo-motu to examine 'if the conduct of he investigation has been fair or impartial or the ends of Justice require that ether investigation of the case be entrusted to another officer or .a Court of Law. He Court also passed several orders after issuing the notice. Being aggrieved by e conduct of the learned Judge, Shahbaz Begum approach^ the Supreme Court d leave was granted to examine the question whether "The learned Judge had diction at all to take such Suo-moto action.
These facts clearly shows that the cited cases have nothing to do with the es pending before this Court because the questions were going to be asked m the I.Os about their completed investigations and not about the investigation progress, although the same was also not barred by any law.
9. I have neither any doubt in my mind nor any hesitation to say that st of the Magistrates are responsible directly or indirectly regarding the regularities or illegalities committed in broad-day- light by the investigating lice officials. For example it is known to every Magistrate that:
(i) No person can be detained by any investigating Police officer in custody after the expiry of 24 hours fixed by Section 61 Cr.P.C, unless authorised by any Magistrate U/S 167 Cr.P.C. But for this purpose;
(a) There must be reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation or information against the accused was well founded;
(b) The police officer making the investigation is bound to transmit copy of the entries in diary relating to the case as is evident from tl use of words 'shall' in Section 167 (1) Cr.P.C..
It has been mostly observed that neither the Magistrates ask for the entries in | diaries relating to the case nor take pain to go through the nature of accusation information for believing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that I accusation/ information against the detained accused is well-founded.
The routine adopted by most of the Magistrate in not only un-appreciably but is also against the basis spirit of law. Most of the Magistrate usually write 1 fallowing or similar words as a routine whenever any accused is brought' be of them for the purpose of remand: "The accused does not complain maltreatment against the police. 1 is remanded to police custody foredays" These two sentences I mostly written by die Magistrates inspire of their knowledge that t accused are never kept on the bed of roses Even, if the Magistral sight the visible signs of torture, most of them do not dore to ren remand to the police. On account of their immoral, illegal a criminal act of deliberate over-looking, several cases of "tortured! Death" take place in the Police- Stations but their conscience ream dormant.
The Magistrate must realise this fact that open if there is complaint agal the investigating police officer, it cannot be the ground of granting or refill remand. The only ground for granting remand by the Magistrate is to see I nature of accusation and grounds to believe that the same are well found against the accused.
(ii) The words 'from time to time used in Section 167(2) Cr.P.C, are very important. It has been observed that several Magistrates authorise I detention of the accused in custody of the police by granting remand for 'fin days' at a time. Such conduct is against the requirement of the words 'from to time' If the Magistrates grant remand for fifteen days at a time, then1 concept of the words " from time to time" is totally shattered. The purpose ol words 'from time to time' must be in mind of all Magistrates when they reim an accused in police custody. They must go through the diaries of the easel reference to its progress and necessity of further remand. If they find that fin detention of the accused in police custody is un-necessary, they must order accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction. OR In alter they should refuse to authorise detention of the accused in the custody cl police. It has been observed that majority of the Magistrates ignore I requirements of Section 167 (2) Cr.P.C.
(i.e) . The words 'in the whole' used in Section 167(2) Cr.P.C, do not n the investigating police officer to get the custody of an accused for fifteen cm each case. It has become a shameless routine of several corrupt police officials, that they arrest an accused in a blind FIR, get remand for fifteen days from any Magistrate, show him released on papers U/S 169 Cr.P.C, and then arrest Him in another blind FLR. If the Magistrate go on remanding the accused into the custody of the police in each case by neglecting the words 'in the whole' used in Section 167(2) Cr:P.C. Then they are also responsible for the illegal custody of the accused person and are liable to be taken to task for such conduct. An officer In charge of the police-station must see that an accused must not be kept in custody for more than 15 days in his police-station for the purpose of investigation because the law permits them to keep the custody of the accused person only for fifteen days if authorised by any Magistrate in the whole' and not for each case. Therefore the Magistrates are also bound to keep their eyes open while giving remand to the police. They must satisfy themselves that the accused was not previously in the custody of the same police-station for more than fifteen days. It would be better for them to get in writing from the police officials who bring the accused for getting his remand in the police custody that the accused was not in custody in their police station prime to the said remand.
(iv) . Sub-Section (4) of Section 167 Cr.P.C, was substituted as a result of Law Reforms 1972 according to which ft ft binding upon the Magistrates to forward a copy of their orders (in respect of remand) with their reasons for making such orders to the Sessions Judge. It has been mostly observed that no record of such orders ft kept either by the Magistrates cm- by the Session Judges. It would be better for the Magistrate as well as for the Sessions Judges to maintain the record of such orders so that, whenever the same ft called by the High Court, it should not be missing. Absence of such record ft sufficient to presume that the concerned courts have not only ignored the instructions of the High Court but also ignored the requirements of law especially U/S 167 (2) Cr.P.C, to encourage e misdeeds of corrupt officials.
10. The Magistrate, therefore, must realize themselves that any rantism, obscurantism or spectatorship on their part would encourage the irrupt official to increase their conduct of savagery which is the root-cause of eating dissatisfaction among the people. Such conduct of the Courts amounts to wing the seeds of corruption and the result of such cultivation would be obvious ,e. a crop of corrupts intoxicated officials armed with un-fettered, un-challengable d untouchable powers of non-accountability regarding their barbarity shielded o those orders and conduct of the Magistrates which are not supported by law as ointed out in the above-lines. Be that as ft may, this reality remains unshattered at no one is above the law and if anyone violates any law, he can be taken to sk irrespective of their status, being a Magistrate or a police-officer no matter is in service or has been retired, Such conduct becomes much more serious hen the innocent citizens are forced to scramble to their miseries under the eight of atrocities of certain barbarians to such an extent that none of them earns to rise and fight for 'respectable survival' in accordance to the amental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. However, if the sufferers or pie of faith and courage, who suffered due to the illegalities or irregularities committed by any responsible person, agitate their well founded allegations against the judicial or police officials in any competent Court, then discouragement to such people would be unforgivable sin on the part of the Court in the Eyes of Al-Mighty Allah.
11. In the light of above discussion I answer the question formulated for decision in the affirmative and hold that 'every investigating police officer has a statutory duty to investigate a cognizable offence U/S 157 and he is entitled to carry the investigation to its conclusion in accordance with the provisions of the Code but the High Court has jurisdiction to ask questions from the investigating police-officer or the provincial law officers before granting or refusing bail to an accused at any stage of the investigation, inquiry or trial, as the case may be to reach a conclusion or to satisfy itself that there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into the guilt of the accused/applicant, Such queries especially in respect of completed investigation, do not amount to investigation within investigation and particularly when specific allegations are made against the police officers regarding their final report submitted U/S 169 and 170 Cr.P.C, read with Section 173 Cr.P.C, inspire of the widest scope as discretion to be used justifiably and not to be misused as carte blanches Both those I.Os of the case are required to be present in the court on 28.9.1994, when the bail applications of the applicant and his companions are heard by this Court.
The copy of this order be sent to all the Deputy Commissioners in the Province of Sindh, who are required to send its copies to all the Magistrates for their information about the observations made by this^Court Especially about their conduct at the time of remanding an accused in the custody of police.