1. ' This is a petition under section 7 of the Flour Milling (Control and Development) (Repeal)
2. Ordinance, 1977 read with sections 39 and 40 of the Industrial Development Bank Ordinance, 1961, for recovery of Rs,10,98,860.84.
3. ' The ownership and management of the respondent was taken over under the provisions of Act 57 of 1976 and vested in the petitioner Corporation. Act 57 of 1976 was repealed by the Ordinance of 1977 which provided that the possession of the establishments taken over under the Act of 1976 may be returned to the previous owners and that upon possession being handed over the ownership of the establishments would vest in the previous owners.
4. ' Section 5 of the Ordinance of 1977 provides that where the present value of the establishment is higher than the net worth value, the corporation may recover from the previous owner, in accordance with the provisions of section 7 or in any other manner which it may deem fit, the amount representing the difference between the net worth value and the present value. Section 7 of the Ordinance provides that the corporation may, by notice in writing, call upon a debtor to pay the corporation the amount of money due from him to the corporation within a period of 30 days commencing from the date of receipt of such notice by the debtor; and further that upon failure of the debtor to pay the amount due from him within 30 days from receipt of such notice the corporation shall have the same power of effecting recovery as the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan has under sections 39, 40 and 41 of the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, 1961, ' The case of the petitioner is that after the possession of the establishment was handed over to the respondents a sum of Rs,12,22,545.52 was found due and payable by them to the petitioners and that the petitioners, by notice, dated 11th November, 1979 (Annexure 'E' to the petition) demanded payment of the said sum from the respondents. It is further the case of the petitioners that upon representation being made by the respondents their claim was examined and, after adjustment, a sum of Rs,10,98,860.84 was found to be due; and that by notice, dated 13th November, 1990 (Annexure 7 to the petition) the petitioner demanded payment of that sum from the respondents.
5. ' On the 28th April, 1994, Mrs. Merchant had submitted, inter alia, that the petitioner had in fact served a notice under section 7 of the Ordinance in 1977. She was, however, unable to refer to any such notice at that time and the hearing was adjourned to enable her to produce the same. She has now filed the statement stating that she relies on the notice, dated 11th November, 1979.
6. It is a common ground that under section 39-A of the Industrial Development Bank Ordinance, 1961 read with Schedule IV thereof, the present application had to be filed within six years from the date when the right to recover accrued to the petitioners in terms of section 7(1) of the Ordinance of 1977.
7. ' Mrs. Merchant submits that the notice, dated the 11th November, 1979, is, on the face of it, one under section 7(1) of the Ordinance of 1977; that the right of recovery accrued to the petitioner upon expiry of 30 days from the date on which that notice was delivered to the respondents; that the period of six years expired in 1985; and that the present application, having been filed in 1993, is barred by limitation.
8. ' Mr. Siddiqui very fairly accepts that the notice, dated 11th November, 1979 is a notice under section 7 of the Ordinance of 1977 but contends that notice was recalled by the subsequent notice, dated 13th November, 1990, and that the period of limitation is to be reckoned from expiry of 30 days from the date on which that notice was delivered to the respondent. According to him, the subsequent notice of the 13th November, 1990, was issued in consequence of re-examination of the petitioners' claim which re-examination was undertaken upon a representation made by the respondents. The earlier notice, therefore, according to him, must be considered to have been recalled. He further submits that, in any case, the law of limitation only bars a relief but does not extinguish a right and that, therefore, it was open to the petitioners to recall its earlier notice or to revise its claim at any time.
9. ' By the letter dated the 13th November, 1990, the petitioners informed the respondents that the latter's representation had been examined and, after making certain adjustments, a sum of Rs,10,98,860.84 "stands payable to this corporation; and requested the respondents to make the payment "without further delay". The letter does not amount to any fresh demand and is merely a modification of the demand, in respect of the amount claimed, which had already been made by the notice, dated the 11th November, 1979. It does not even purport to recall the notice of 11th November, 1979, and is, in fact, a continuation of that notice as is indicated by the request for payment "without further delay". In any event, the period of limitation, commencing from 1979, having already expired in 1985, the respondents acquired a vested right which could not be taken away by the petitioners purporting to recall the earlier notice and issuing a fresh one. I invited Mr. Siddiqui to cite any rule or principle upon which the petitioners could recall the notice and issue a fresh one after the period of limitation had expired but he has been unable to cite any such rule or principle.
10. It is well-established that once a period of limitation has commenced to run it can only be arrested or extended by the provisions of Limitation Act or by some other statutory provision. Mr. Siddiqui is unable to point out any such provision whereby the period of limitation in this case was extended; and it is in fact not his case the period has been extended.
11. In the circumstances, it appears to be clear to me that the period of six years prescribed by section 39-A of the IDBP Ordinance read with Schedule IV thereof, for filing the present application expired in 1985. The application which was filed in 1993 is, therefore, clearly barred by limitation. No other arguments have been advanced by either of the learned counsel. The petition is, therefore, hereby dismissed as barred by limitation. There will, in the circumstances of the case, be no order as to costs.