' AJMAL MIAN, J.---This is an appeal with the leave of this Court against the judgment dated 10-9- 1991 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh in Constitution Petition No,D-930 of 1991, filed by respondent No,1 against the enforcement of Notification No, LAB-III-1/67 dated 15-10-1968, hereinafter referred to as the Notification, issued by the Government of Sindh (respondent No,2) extending the application of the provisions of Social security Ordinance, 1965, hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance, by withdrawing in May, 1991, the suspension orders passed in 196869 by respondent No,1, whereby the operation of the notification was suspended on the administrative side upon the representations made by respondent No,1 and the other establishments, allowing the same on the ground that withdrawal of the above suspension orders without prior hearing of respondent No,1 contravened the principle of audi alteram partem. Against the above judgment and the judgments passed in the connected Constitution petitions, the appellant filed petition for leave to appeal, which were granted to consider the point noticed in the leave granting order.
2. We have heard Mr. S.A. Sarwana, learned ASC appearing for the appellant and Mr. Noor Muhammad, learned ASC appearing for respondent No,1. A Bench of this Court comprising three Judges through a judgment dated 23-11-1993 passed in Civil Appeals Nos.211 to 226-K, 660-K and 663-K of 1992 allowed the above appeals for the following reasons:-- "7. We are unable to agree with the above submission of Mr. Noor Muhammad. There is no legal requirement that the Provincial Government, prior to issuing a notification under section 1(3) of the Ordinance for the application of the provisions of the Ordinance, should give a prior show-cause notice to an establishment. But it does not mean that the extension of the provisions of the Ordinance to an establishment cannot be challenged on a ground permissible under the law through appropriate proceedings in accordance with law. If the Provincial Government was not obliged to hear respondent No,1 before issuing the Notification in 1968, it must follow that respondent No,1 could not have claimed right of hearing at the stage when the Provincial Government decided to withdraw the suspension orders, particularly when there is no provision in the Ordinance under which suspension orders could have been passed. The suspension orders were passed without reference to any provision of the Ordinance on administrative side probably in order to consider the representations made by various establishments referred to in the Notification. We are, therefore, of the view that the suspension orders did not create a right or a benefit in favour of respondent No,1 of the nature which warranted the application of the dictum audi alteram partem. The case of Glaxo Laboratories (Pak) Ltd. (supra) cited by Mr. SA. Sarwana to some extent supports the case of the appellants."
3. We do not find any justification to deviate from the above view. The above appeal is, therefore, allowed, with no order as to costs.