1. ' IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, J.---In this Constitutional petition, Sikandar Khan and Muhammad Alam have claimed the following relief:- "The petitioners therefore pray that:
(i) That the route-permits No, 457/91 for Mazda Bus No, QAD-1697 meant for Kajeer-Anjani- Barshore-Pishin route on 8-5-1991 by the respondent No,3 and route-permit No, 376/91 covering Bus No, QAE-3341 by the respondent No,3 for Kajeer-Anjani-Barshore-Pishin route, in favour of the respondents Nos.1 and 2 respectively may please be declared to have been issued illegally, unlawfully, without jurisdiction and consequently be declared as such.
(ii) Any other relief which may be deemed fit and proper in the circumstances of the case may also please be granted.
(iii) Cost of the petition."
2. ' The undisputed facts of the 'case are that petitioners are plying their Buses/Stage Carriages on the route Quetta-Enjini-via Pishin-Barshore and vice versa., whereas private respondents have also obtained route permits to ply Public Carriages Buses on the route `Kajeer via Enjini-Barshore-Pishin, vide Permit No, 457/91 covering Mazda Mini Bus No, QAD-1697 and Route Permit No, 376 of 1991, covering Bus No, QAE-3341, respectively, issued by the Regional Transport Authority.
3. ' It may be observed that the permits granted by the Competent Authority to petitioners as well as private respondents are for different and distinct routes. Evidently, petitioners ply their Stage Carriages from Quetta-to. Enjini, whereas respondents ply their Buses locally from Kajeer to Pishin and vice versa. It is an undisputed position that Quetta is situated at about 50 k.m. From Pishin and similarly the place known as Kajeer, is also away from Enjini i,e. The starting point of the petitioners'
4. Buses. However after the issuance of Route permits in favour of respondents, the petitioners through their Attorney Qalandar son of Samandar, submitted an application to the Executive Engineer, Building and Roads Department, to certify, whether the Road between Enjini and Kajeer has been taken in the charge of B&R Department or not. The Executive Engineer, on the application, passed the following remarks:-- "Road between Injini and Kajeer does not exist in B/R Division Barshore and not in the charge of B/R Department."
5. ' On earning the above observations, petitioners through their Attorney started submitting applications to various authorities, grudging against the issuance of route permits in favour of respondents, mainly on the ground that no B & R Sub-Division Road exists over there nor such route has been specified by the Regional Transport Authority, therefore, their route permits be cancelled.
6. It appears that the request so made by them could not bear fruit as such, having left with no option, ultimately, they submitted an application under section 62 of the West Pakistan Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965 before the Provincial Transport Authority (Appellate Authority). The application was considered accordingly and vide impugned order dated 16th January, 1994, the same was dismissed. Operative para. Therefrom is reproduced hereinbelow:-- "I, therefore, uphold the orders of Commissioner/Chairman, RTA, Quetta regarding route permits Nos. 457/91 and 376/91 issued to the respondents and dismiss the appeal. I further direct the Chairman/Commissioner RTA, Quetta to call for a meeting of the Transporters of the route and finalize the time-table on the principle of first come first serve basis. The copies of the order be supplied to all concerned."
7. Petitioners feeling aggrieved from the above order, have preferred instant petition, by invoking the provisions of Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.
8. ' Mr. W.N. Kohli, learned counsel for petitioners, stated that Regional Transport Authority had no jurisdiction under the law to grant permits to respondents for a non-specified route. To substantiate his plea, learned counsel time and again referred to the remarks given by the Executive Engineer of B&R Department and contended that since the road from `Kajeer to Enjini' is not in the charge of B&R Department, therefore, no one can be allowed to ply a Stage Carriage on it. Learned counsel also took us through various provisions of the Motor Vehicles Ordinance, including the definition of Stage Carriage. The general provisions and the procedure and the conditions attached therewith, which are required to be followed while allowing application for granting a permit.
9. ' On the other hand, Mr. - M.S. Rukhshani, learned counsel for respondents opposed the petition, mainly objecting on the locus standi for respondents to initiate a baseless and frivolous proceedings, seeking cancellation of route permits, with which, they have no concern, directly or indirectly. He stated that various provisions of the Motor Vehicles Ordinance have been strictly followed by the Authority while granting Route permits. He further stated that a portion of the road being Katcha, is not in the control of B&R Department, as such it would not furnish a ground in favour of petitioners for getting cancelled the route permits. He further stressed that proceedings have been initiated without any legal cause, just to create harassment and unnecessary botheration for the respondents, because from Enjini to Pishin, the route of petitioners and respondents are common. Although number of stage carriages are plying in this portion, but petitioners have selected only to respondents for victimization with an attempt to have their monopoly over there.
10. ' The official respondents did not contest the petition. However Mr. Yakub Khan Yousafzai, learned Advocate-General was asked to assist the Court in this case. According to him, no error or irregularity has been committed by respondent No,3 (Regional Transport Authority) in awarding the route permits to contesting private respondents. The competent Authority always grant permits for plying the Buses in the largest interest of the public of that area, notwithstanding the fact, whether the road is in the charge of B&R Department or the inhabitants of the area have constructed the same at their own to avail the facility of transport at self-help basis. Learned Advocate-General also opposed the petition by contending that jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, can only be invoked if a functionary has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred upon it or exercised the authority in an unlawful manner. Therefore, permission cannot be granted to convert a Constitutional Forum into an Appellate Court, just for the sake of settling personal differences, relating to running of business of Buses etc. ' We have heard the learned counsel for parties at length and have also thoroughly gone through the relevant provisions of the law referred to by the learned counsel for petitioners, but we failed to associate ourselves with him on any one of the points, urged by him.
11. It is to be seen that under the scheme of Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965, a Permit to ply a Stage Carriage cannot be refused on the ground that road of the route is not under the control of B&R Department. However, it is for the owner of the Public Transport to take the risk of plying his vehicle on the road which is Katcha built. In the instant case, it is important to observe that the petitioners have got absolutely different and distinguishable route for plying their Stage Carriages, therefore, legitimately they cannot grudge as to why route permits have been issued in favour of respondents for a portion of the route where both the parties ply their buses i,e. From Enjini to Pishin.
12. Every one has got a Constitutional right to do a business/trade, subject to certain limitations imposed from time to time by the Law-Givers. In the instant case, respondents did qualify the requirements, as such respondent No,3 considered their request favourably and conceded to it, strictly in accordance with law.
13. Mr. W.N. Kohli, Advocate also stated that the route is not classified one as is required under rule 57- A of the West Pakistan Motor Vehicles Rules, 1969. In this behalf it may be noted that on 18th June, 1970, the said rule was inserted, whereby the Provincial Transport Authority was allowed to determine the routes under 'A', 'B' & 'C' categories for Stage Carriage Permits, on the basis of density of traffic and conditions of the routes. The learned counsel failed to specify that in which manner the Authority has committed the violation of this rule, as well. It was obligatory upon the learned counsel to bring material on record to satisfy the Court that the Permit which has been issued in favour of respondents does not fall in any one of the above-referred categories. In absence of any material, it is not possible to hold contrary.
14. ' The learned counsel at one stage, made reference to PLD 1984 Quetta 106 (Aziz Ahmad v.
15. Secretary RTA, Quetta and 6 others) in support of his contention. A perusal of the same indicates that the dictum laid down therein is neither applicable nor relevant on the facts of the instant case.
16. We are fully in agreement with the learned Advocate-General and hold that in absence of any order passed by the Functionaries beyond its jurisdiction or without lawful authority, a Constitutional petition cannot be preferred. In our view, the Functionaries under the Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965, had strictly acted in accordance with law and action in granting route permits to private respondents is not open to any exception. So much so the facts and circumstances of the case lead us to hold that petitioners have no locus standi to initiate any proceedings against the respondents expressing their objection as to why the route permits have been granted to them. It would not be out of place to note that the Regional or. Provincial Transport Authority, under the Motor Vehicles Ordinance, have been allowed to grant permits for plying the Buses, generally in the public interest in exercise of their administrative powers, therefore, such action even if suffers from any technical defect cannot be declared illegal in exercise of writ jurisdiction, solely for the reason that a large number of people are getting benefit out of it and to satisfy the ego of few persons, who otherwise have also got no vested right, such action cannot be declared illegal and void. In forming this view we are fortified with the case reported in PLD 1958 SC 437.
17. Before parting with the judgment, we are constrained to observe that it is the high time to check the frivolous and baseless litigation, on account of which, not only the precious time and energy of the Courts are being wasted but also the public is dragged in the Courts, where they have to suffer for years together, without any justification. Although such endurance cannot be measured in terms of money but just to console them and to provide deterrent to such like-minded persons, it would be appropriate to impose special cost, so that in future no one should dare to resort to the baseless litigation. The case in hand is the one where absolutely without any reasons or Rhyme, petitioners are dragging the respondents from one forum to other. As such, to meet the ends of justice as well as to achieve the object, we are inclined to impose special cost on the petitioners.
18. ' Accordingly for the discussion made hereinabove, we see no force in the petition which is dismissed, with special cost of Rs,5,000 (Rupees five thousand) to be deposited by the petitioners with the Registrar of this Court, within thirty days.
19. ' These are the reasons of our short order dated 6th June, 1994.