' Respondents Nos.4 to 7 are owners of about 867 Kanals of land as described in the impugned notification. By virtue of the notification dated 24-12-1995 issued by respondent No,1 in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by section 5(2) and section 6 of the Punjab Court of Wards Act, 1903 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), respondent No, 1 assumed the superintendence of the persons and property mentioned therein and directed the Deputy Commissioner, Okara, to manage the same on behalf of the Court of Wards. The petitioner claiming to be real brother of Moeen Nawaz Khan, the deceased predecessor of respondents Nos.4 to 7, feeling aggrieved, has filed this Constitutional petition impugning the validity of the notification.
2. Report and parawise comments have been submitted by respondent No,2. Respondents Nos.4 to 7 were also represented in today's hearing.
3. Learned counsel has argued that the impugned notification is void, inasmuch as, the Commissioner, respondent No,1, has no jurisdiction to assume the control and superintendence of the property. Learned counsel has referred to section 5 of the Act to submit that the power vests with the Board of Revenue. To a Court question as to the locus standi of the petitioner, inasmuch as, the real owners have not challenged the impugned notification and in fact have been arrayed as respondents, the learned counsel has repeated the assertion made in para. 3 of the writ petition that the petitioner is promised vendee under an agreement of sale dated 28-7-1990 entered into by the deceased predecessor in consideration of Rs,17,20,655, out of which an amount of Rs,15,00,000 is claimed to have been paid to the deceased. To a further query, the learned counsel has submitted that the suit for specific performance of the aforesaid agreement is pending.
4. It is well settled that a mere agreement to sell does not confer any right in the property. The only right is that of compelling the performance of the agreement. The petitioner therefore, on the strength of the agreement to sell, does not get the status to challenge the impugned notification.
No right of the petitioner has been adversely affected by the impugned notification. In fact, as noted, the petitioner has as yet no right in the property. This petition, therefore, merits dismissal on the ground that the petitioner is not an aggrieved party within the meaning of Article 199 of the Constitution.
5. However, there is no force in the other submission of the learned counsel. Under section 5 of the Act, a land-holder may apply and upon receiving such an application, the Board of Revenue can make an order accordingly. Section 6 of the Act, however, confers the power of assuming the superintendence of the property on its own motion upon the Court of Wards. Section 4(1) defines Court of Wards and, as substituted by amendment Ordinance (III of 1968) its subsection (1) reads as follows:-- "4. Constitution of the Court of Wards and its jurisdiction.---(1) The Commissioner of the Division within the limits of which any wards ordinarily resides, or any property of any wards is situated shall be the Court of Wards in respect of the person and the property of such wards: ' Provided that where any ward ordinarily resides within the jurisdiction of one Commissioner and his property or any part thereof is situated within the jurisdiction of any other Commissioner the Board of Revenue shall determine which Commissioner shall be the Court of Wards in respect of the person and property of such ward."
The perusal of the amended subsection establishes that the Commissioner of a Division is the Court of Wards and under section 6 of the Act, the Court of Wards, acting on its own motion can assume the superintendence of the property or the person and property of the land-holder who is described therein. Reliance of the learned counsel on Fateh Muhammad Khan v. Commissioner, Peshawar Division and others (PLD 1957 (W.P.) Peshawar 112) is fruitless since the amendment in section 4(1), as noted above, came into force on 31-1-1968. There is, therefore, no force in the argument of the learned counsel that it is only the Board of Revenue who can issue a notification for assumption of superintendence of the property of the described persons.
6. No other point was urged. Resultantly, this petition is dismissed with costs.