' MUHAMMAD MUNIR KHAN, J.---This petition directed against the order dated 15-3-1995 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore arises from the facts that on 10-3-1991 Mst. Walayat Begum respondent filed an application for eviction of Rauf Ahmed petitioner from House No,6, Ibrahim Street, Dhani Ram Road, New Anarkali, Lahore (Property No,S-II-7-S-6/2) on the ground of default in payment of rent and bona fide requirement for use of her son Muhammad Fayyaz, before the Rent Controller, Lahore, who, on 27-7-1991 passed order under section 13(6) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) directing petitioner/tenant to deposit future rent from August, 1991 before the 11th day of each succeeding month and to submit the receipt of deposits in the Court. The application was resisted. Issues were framed. Evidence of the parties was recorded. In 1993, the landlady filed application for striking off the defence of the tenant/petitioner for not complying with order dated 27-7-1991, inasmuch as the rent for the month of February, 1993 to be deposited before 11th March, 1993 was deposited on 12-4-1993. After hearing the parties the application was allowed on 31-7-1993. The defence of the petitioner was struck off.
He was directed to deliver vacant possession of the house to the respondent within thirty days. The appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Lahore on 30-6-1994.
Feeling aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed writ petition questioning the legality of the order of ejectment passed against him, in the Lahore High Court, Lahore, which has been dismissed vide impugned judgment.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the language used in section 13(6) of the Ordinance i,e,, the Controller shall direct the tenant to deposit all the rent due from him, and also to deposit regularly till the final decision of the cases, before the 15th day of each month, the monthly rent due from him", to contend that the tenancy being oral one, rent for month of February, 1993 was due within sixty days from 1-3-1993 i,e, up to 30-4-1993. Neither the Rent Controller could order him to deposit rent for the month of February before 11th of March, 1993 nor by depositing the rent due for the month of February on 12-4-1993, within sixty days from the period for which the rent was payable, the petitioner has violated the order dated 27-7-1991.
3. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel with care. We do not agree with him. We find that the legal objection raised by the learned counsel relatable to the interpretation of the provisions of section 13(2)(i) and section 13(6) of the Ordinance is dependant on the nature of the tenancy. As submitted by the learned counsel himself, this objection/argument would be available in case of oral tenancy. The objection with regard to the nature of the tenancy has been raised for the first time before this Court. This objection was not raised in the written statement, in reply to application under section 13(6), nor before the Rent Controller, Additional District Judge and the High Court. So much so, in this petition for leave to appeal this objection has not been raised. Since it is not a pure legal objection, but is based on the proof of the factum of the tenancy being oral one, the learned counsel cannot and should not be permitted to raise this objection for the first time before this Court. Even otherwise, the objection would be available only when the petitioner is in a position to show or establish that the tenancy was oral one. Before us, he has not been able to show from evidence that the present case is a case of oral tenancy.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner in the alternative requested that some time may be granted to the petitioner/tenant to vacate the house. We are afraid that this may not be possible in a case where leave to appeal is refused. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for granting relief to the petitioner or to extend the time given by the Rent Controller or the lower Courts for doing of something depends upon the grant of leave to appeal. It is not possible for this Court to make any modification in the order of the lower Courts or to give any relief to the petitioner without first granting leave to appeal. No doubt, in certain circumstances, the superior Courts have despite disposing of the matter before them issued mapdatory/restraining orders, the effect of which was to continue beyond the date of the disposal of matter, but we feel that it would not be proper to dismiss the petition for leave to appeal and simultaneously pass order detrimental to the interest of the opposite-party without hearing.
5. Leave to appeal is accordingly refused and the petition is dismissed.