' The disputed mutation is 2015, sanctioned on 29-44974.
2. By this mutation the respondent No, 2 Qamar Ishtiaq son of Muhammad Ilyas respondent No, 1 exchanged land with the petitioner Rab Nawaz. The petitioner Rab Nawaz obtained land from Qamar Ishtiaq under Mutation No, 2015, relating to Village Jandanwala, and gave him in exchange land, under Mutation No, 1980 sanctioned on 7-5-1974, in Village Harnoli.
3. Muhammad Ilyas, father of Qamar Ishtiaq, applied to the Prime Minister against certain mutations, which according to Muhammad Ilyas also included Mutation No, 2015. This application was sent to the Commissioner on 7-7-1985, who forwarded it to the Deputy Commissioner/Collector, who in turn sent it to the Assistant Commissioner for a report:
4. When the Deputy Commissioner/Collector received the report he heard the parties and passed the impugned order on 17-10-1987, by which he allowed review of Mutation No, 2015 (alongwith some other mutations). The present petitioner, Rab Nawaz, went in a revision petition to the Additional Commissioner, who by his order dated 5-4-1988 rejected the revision petition. This order, as well as the order of the District Collector, have been impugned before the present Court. I will decide this case on the following arguments:
(i) Mutation No, 2015 was sanctioned in 1974. The respondents have not produced a copy of Muhammad Ilyas's application to the Prime Minister and therefore it is not clear whether Mutation No 2015 was also attacked in that application. This is relevant because the District Collector in his order dated 17-10-1987 refers to two applications of Muhammad Ilyas to the Prime Minister, and the District Collector also in the first few lines of his order mentions the mutations which had been assailed by Muhammad Ilyas, but Mutation No, 2015 is not mentioned by the District Collector as being one of them. If Mutation No, 2015 was mentioned by Muhammad Ilyas in his application to the Prime Minister, then he sought to challenge it after 11 years, but if this mutation was first mentioned by the District Collector in his order, then it was brought under discussion after 13 years of its sanction.
' In either case by that time it had found entry into successive Jamabandis. As such the proper forum to challenge it was a Civil Court.
(ii) Apart from the alleged minority of the vendor Qamar Ishtiaq, the respondents have not referred to any other consideration justifying review after such a long time.
(iii) The respondents also did not argue before the lower Courts, nor before the present Court, that Qamar Ishtiaq had not taken possession of the land obtained by him in exchange under Mutation No, 1980.
(iv) Nor have they argued that they still retain possession of the land transferred to the petitioner under Mutation No, 2015.
This means that want of knowledge of Mutations Nos. 2015 and 1980 is not one of their grounds justifying delay of so many years.
(v) In fact it is interesting to mention here Mutation No, 3219 sanctioned on 28-8-1978 through which Qamar Ishtiaq sold the area obtained in exchange by him from the petitioner in Village Harnoli under Mutation No, 1980. The respondents have not denied the existence of Mutation No, 3219.
' This shows that on the one hand they wanted to take advantage of Mutation No 1980 despite Qamar Ishtiaq's alleged minority, and on the other hand they wanted to take advantage of this alleged minority only in relation to Mutation No, 2015., In other words, they wanted both to eat their cake and have it.
(vi) The above arguments also attract the doctrine of estoppel against the respondents.
(vii) From the point of view of the respondents, as well as the reasoning in the orders of the District Collector and the Additional Commissioner, the single damning fact against Mutation No, 2015 is that when it was sanctioned the vendor Qamar Ishtiaq was not of age. The District Collector and the Additional Commissioner based their conclusions about it on a solitary piece of evidence viz, a photo copy of the Identity Card of Qamar Ishtiaq, The original was never produced. It is not clear why the original was not ordered to be produced by the District Collector, and whether the petitioner had anything to say concerning it. Producing a photo copy of an Identity Card to establish the minority of a vendor after 11 or 13 years of the mutation is not enough material for a Revenue Officer to review that mutation, which has already found its way into so many Jamabandis.
(ix) In connection with the issue of the age of Qamar Ishtiaq, the present Court's attention has been drawn to Mutation No, 1518 of 11-10-1968, which is earlier than Mutation No, 2015, in which Qamar Ishtiaq is a vendor. Also a copy of the {{URDU TEXT}} "r" C Z 1/12.J " of Qamar Ishtiaq has been produced before this Court according to which on the date of his marriage i,e, 16-10-1971, he was 20 years of age.
(x) Since these two documents were not produced before the lower Court,' he cannot form a firm basis for an argument against the minority of Qamar Ishtiaq; yet seen in the contexts of the very weak case made out of his minority before the lower Courts, a glance at them is not amiss.
(xi) In any case, whether or not Qamar Ishtiaq was a minor in 1974 is a matter of fact requiring rigorous evidence after so many years of the impugned mutation, and this again points to adjudication by a Civil Court.
(xii) However, apart from the above arguments and considerations, there is a very important point of law involved here which needs elaboration. As the narration of the facts at the beginning of the present order shows, the respondent Muhammad Ilayas never applied to the Revenue Officer for review of Mutation No, 2015. On receipt of his application from the higher quarters, the Deputy Commisioner/District Collector sent it to the Assistant Commissioner/Collector for enquiry and on the report of the Assistant Commissioner/Collector heard the parties and passed the impugned order allowing review of this mutation.
' In this connection reference must be made to subsection (2) of section 163 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967. The scheme of this subsection is very clear. An aggrieved person has to apply for a review of the order to the Commissioner, Collector or the Assistant Collector whose order he wants to be reviewed, and not to their superiors. It is for the authority that has passed the order sought to be reviewed to entertain an application for review, and if necessary, obtain the sanction of the higher authority (designated in the proviso to subsection (2), before proceeding to modify, reverse or confirm the original order under his review jurisdiction. The Board of Revenue cannot directly entertain an application requesting it to direct the Commissioner to review an order passed by him, and similarly the Commissioner cannot directly entertain such application and direct the Collector to proceed to review one of his orders. Similarly, the Collector cannot directly entertain an application for review of an order passed by an Assistant Collector.
' While it is almost unheard of for the Board of Revenue or a Commissioner to directly entertain review applications against the order of a Commissioner or a Collector respectively, it is unfortunately a common practice for the District Collectors to entertain applications for review of the orders of an Assistant Collector particularly, applications for review of mutations sanctioned by an Assistant Collector. The letter of the law is consistent and uniform in subsection (2) of section 163 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 concerning the powers of the Commissioner, Collector and Assistant Collector as regards their jurisdiction to receive and entertain applications seeking to review orders passed by themselves; and none of them is on a higher jurisdictional pedestal enabling him to receive such applications directly concerning orders passed by their subordinates.
Yet the District Collectors have assumed this jurisdiction against the clear letter of the law.
' Subsection (4) of section 163 ought also to be read in this context. This subsection says that no appeal shall lie from an order refusing review or confirming on review the previous order. In the present context, it does not mean that such an order in relation to a mutation is the order of the District Collector refusing or confirming on review the mutation in question; it is the order of the Assistant Collector doing so. In other words, there is no appeal from an order refusing review of a mutation, or confirming on review mutation, passed by an Assistant Collector.
5. The upshot of the above discussion is that no application for review of an order passed by Assistant Collector can be entertained by the District Collector. If he does so and passes an order on such an application, this order will be illegal as being without jurisdiction, and any structure built upon it will A also be illegal and of no force. When the letter of the law is clear, principles of natural justice cannot be invoked. As Aristotle has put it, a Judge who tries to be cleverer than the law is a fool.
6. Reverting to the present case, I would declare the proceedings before the District Collector, culminating in his order dated 17-104987, against section 163(2), for the reasons given above.
7. I would accept the present petition and set aside the order of the Collector dated 17-10-1987 as well as the order of the Additional Commissioner dated 5-4-1988 concerning Mutation No, 2015.
APPROVED FOR REPORTING ON THE POINT "that under section 163(2) of the Land Revenue Act, 1967, Collector cannot directly entertain an application from an aggrieved party for B review of an order passed by an Assistant Collector (for example an order sanctioning a mutation) and pass an order declining to permit review or directing the Assistant Collector to review his order."