1. ' Appellant Premier Tobacco Industries Ltd. Moved an application under section 14(1) of the Trade Marks Act for registration of a trade mark viz. "Gucci" in class 34 in respect of cigarettes, tobacco manufactured and raw, smokers' articles, matches, gas lighters and cigars etc. Proposed trade mark was published in Trade Marks Journal dated 1-9-1987. In pursuance of such publication, the respondent filed his opposition under subsection (2) of section 15 of the Trade Marks Act. After filing of such opposition the appellant was required to file counter-statement of the grounds of which he sought relief for his application moved under section 14 (1) of said Act, in view of subsection (3) of section 15 of the Trade Marks Act and Rule 32 of Trade Marks Rules. It appears that the appellant filed counter-statement on 22-4-1989 when he was given final extension to file counter-statement by 10-4-1989. With his counter-statement filed on 22-4-1989 the appellant filed interlocutory application for condonation of delay. The Registrar fixed the matter for hearing. On the date of hearing none appeared from the side of the appellant while the respondent was represented by his counsel. Consequently the Registrar under the impugned order dated 6-10-1991 ordered the application under section 14(1) of said Act filed by the appellant, to be treated as abandoned under section 15(3) of said Act. Hence this appeal.
2. ' Mr. Salim Ghulam Hussain, learned counsel for the applicant argued that the Registrar had passed the impugned order without deciding his interlocutory application for condonatiern of delay in filing the counter-statement. It was also argued that the Registrar had powers to dondone the delay. In support learned counsel cited the cases of:
(i) Zahooruddin v. Haji 'Hussain through his L. Rs, and others (PLD 1991 Kar. 205).
(ii) State v. Ziaur Rahman and others (PLD 1973 SC 49).
(iii) Sheikh Ahmad v. M/s. Unilever Limited and others (1983 CLC 258).
(iv) M/s. Premier Tobacco Industries Limited v. Dossul Industries and another (Misc. Appeal No, 18 of 1977, decided on 14-1-1978).
3. ' In the case of State v. Ziaur Rahman and others (PLD 1973 SC 49) it was held that it was well- established rule that the Courts have to gather the intention of the law-maker from the words used by it; and if it has in two clauses of the same Article used different words, then it follows that its intention is not the same, particularly, where such a conclusion also appears to be in consonance with reason and justice.
4. ' PLD 1973 SC 49: It is a well-established rule of interpretation that where in a statute there are both general provisions as well as special provisions for meeting a particular situation, then it is the special provisions which must be applied to that particular case or situation instead of the general provisions.
5. ' Mr. A. Hameed Iqbal, learned counsel for the respondent argued that the Registrar was competent to extend the period under Rule 76 of the Trade Marks Rules, 1963 but he was not competent to condone the delay. It was further argued that even the extension cannot be granted under Rule 76 of said Rules for the period more that one at a time and for total period of six months. In support learned counsel for the respondent cited the case of Rehmat Elahi v. Messrs Hoyo Kabushiki Kaisha (PLD 1992 SC 417).
6. There is force in the contention that the Registrar should have decided the interlocutory application moved for condonation of delay. In the present case the Registrar had not passed any order on the interlocutory application cither accepting it or dismissing it. Learned counsel for the appellant desired the matter to be remanded to the Registrar to decide said application. This prayer would have been accepted but for the provisions in Rule 76 of the Trade Marks Rules to the effect that total period of extension shall not extend 6 months. In present case it is conceded on behalf of the appellant that the total period of extension had already exceeded six months. In view of such limitation contained in Rule 76 of the Trade Marks Rules, no useful purpose would be served by remanding the matter to the Registrar, who has obviously no power to grant extension beyond a period of six months. In the case of Rehmat Elahi (PLD 1992 SC 417) it was held that Rule 76 prescribes for the maximum outer limit beyond which no extension can be granted. In the same case it was held that the Courts have always discouraged appeal against such procedural and interlocutory orders which cause delay in disposal of the main proceedings.
7. In view of the limitation placed on power of the Registrar to grant extension by Rule 76 of said Rules, the cases cited on behalf of the appellant do not change the picture to his advantage.
8. ' For the foregoing reasons I dismiss this appeal with no order as to costs.