' In this Constitutional petition legality of order/direction dated. 18-12-1994 issued by the Provincial Government and consequential letter dated 18-1-1995 issued by respondent No,3 has been called in question.
2. The facts giving rise to this Constitutional petition shortly stated are that vide Notification dated 28-3-1994 Union Council No,16, Chak No,50/MB, District Khushab levied and imposed taxes at the rate, mentioned therein. Learned counsel for the petitioner admitted that since then the petitioner had been paying the said taxes. The imposition of the said taxes was challenged before the Assistant Commissioner in appeal which was accepted. The order of the Assistant Commissioner was challenged before this Court through Constitutional petition which was accepted, the legal consequences of which was that the levy and imposition of the said taxes was upheld. Further, appeal before the Supreme Court against the judgment of this Court in the said Constitutional petition was admittedly dismissed.
3. The present petitioner since then had been paying the said taxes. However, subsequently the Provincial Government in exercise of powers vested in it under section 139 of the Local Government Ordinance, 1979 issued a direction that the Union Councils should not be allowed to levy any tax on the goods coming in and going out of their areas as envisaged by item No,12 of Part I of Second Schedule of the said Ordinance or otherwise. It appears that the said direction was not complied with which fact was taken note of in W.P. No,7755 of 1991 filed before this Court by the Chairman of the Union Council challenging the legality of the said direction. This Court considering the effect of subsection (2) of section 139 which deals with the powers of the Provincial Government to issue consequential order in case its earlier direction was not complied with held that the said direction had not yet taken legal effect and could not operate as an impediment in the way of the petitioner in recovering the said taxes levied by it. It was, however, observed that the Provincial Government had the power to get the compliance of the said direction in accordance with subsection (2) of section 139 of the Ordinance.
4. The Provincial Government on 25-6-1992 issued direction under subsection (2) of section 139 of the Ordinance to all the Assistant Directors, Local Government and Rural Development in the Punjab to get compliance of the said earlier direction prohibiting the Union Councils from levying and imposing the said taxes. In pursuance thereof on 21-6-1993 a letter was addressed to the Chairman, Union Council in question to comply with the said order of the Government dated 18-8- 1991. Subsequently through another letter dated 29-6-1993 the said Union Council was exempted from the purview of direction dated 18-8-1991 and letter dated 25-6-1992 as a consequence of which the respondent Union Council started levying and collecting the said taxes. Through another letter dated 18-12-1994 impugned in the writ petition it was clarified by the Provincial Government that its directive dated 9-6-1994 prohibiting Union Councils from levying and imposing taxes would not be applicable to those Union Councils which were charging octroi duty prior to the issuance of the said direction and they shall be allowed to continue to charge the same and no other Union Council should levy octroi duty without prior approval of the Government.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that once the Provincial Government in exercise of powers under section 139 (1) of the Ordinance had issued direction for abolition of any tax already levied and imposed by the Union Council, the same would not automatically be revived and leviable if subsequently the said direction was withdrawn or modified unless the Union Council passes another resolution after making compliance with the procedure for levying and imposition of taxes afresh. He also argued that no tax can either be levied or imposed unless prior thereto rules under section 144 had been framed. He further argued that there are no rules for imposition and levy of taxes by the Union Council have so far been made whereas rules have been framed for levying and imposition of tax by the Municipal Corporations and Municipal Committees, therefore, the power to impose and levy tax by any Union Council under the Ordinance could not be exercised.
6. I would take up the second argument first for disposal as it can be decided simply with reference to the relevant provisions of the Ordinance. A Under section 144 of the Ordinance, all what is required is that all taxes and other charges levied by a local council shall be imposed, assessed etc., in such manner as may be provided by the rules. In exercise of powers under section 144 read with section 167 of the Ordinance the Governor of the Punjab promulgated Local Council (Taxations) Rules, 1980. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner on the assumption as if no rules had been framed, for, levy and imposition of taxes by the Union Council has, therefore, no substance. Apart from this the said taxes were levied and imposed on 25-6-1992, the imposition of which was challenged in appeal and the legality of the same was upheld in Constitutional petition by this Court. The petitioner had been paying the said taxes without any objection of the kind which has been raised now. The argument, therefore, has no merits which is hereby repelled.
7. As regards the other arguments to the effect that after issuance of directive under section 139 of the Local Government Ordinance, 1979, prohibiting Union Council from levying and imposing the said tax which had the effect of abolishing thereof for all purposes and could be revived after the withdrawal of such direction and procedure afresh should be followed by the Union Council for imposition of any such taxes through fresh resolution has equally no force. The Provincial Government under section 139 in this case directed the Union Council not to collect and impose the tax levied by it. It was not a case of abolition of tax imposed by the Union Council as argued by learned counsel for the petitioner and even if it be so with the modification or withdrawal of such a direction the tax or taxes already levied and imposed stood automatically revived and no fresh resolution for levying and imposition of the same was necessary.
8. For the foregoing reasons this writ petition has no merits which is hereby dismissed in limine.