1. ' MUKHTAR AHMED JUNEJO, J.---The petitionors' bid in the sum of Rs,4,50,000 for collection of Octroi Tax of Deh 145 of Union Council Kangoro, Taluka Digri, District Mirpurkhas for the year 1994-95 was accepted under a letter dated 30-6-1994 issued by Government of Sindh, Local Government Department, addressed to the Director, Local Government, Mirpurkhas. This was against reserved price of Rs,3,34,650. In view of such acceptance respondent No,1, M/s. Mumtaz Ali and Basharat Ali & Co., filed Constitution Petition No, 1765/94 in the High Court of Sindh at Karachi for a direction to the Administrator, Union Council Kangoro (respondent No,3) to withhold and cancel the contract awarded to the petitioners. Said Constitution petition alongwith an application for interim stay came up before a learned Division Bench of High Court of Sindh, which passed the following order:- - "Inter alia, it is contented that the Government confirmed the offer of the said Muhammad Hussain and Lala Ram on 30-6-1994 accepting their bid in the sum of Rs,4,50,000 as against the offer of the present petitioner of Rs,10,00,000 which was received by the same Secretary earlier i,e. On 19-6- 1994. From these facts the learned counsel for the petitioner states that the Secretary, Sindh Local Government has abused his powers and his orders are mala fide. The point raised requires consideration. Admit. Notice.
2. Notice. In the meanwhile the impugned order of the Secretary, Local Government dated 30-6- 1994 shall stand suspended."
2. ' Hence this petition for leave to appeal.
3. ' Mr. Usman Ghani Rashid, learned counsel for the petitioners, argued that respondent No, 1 had not made any bid before the Auction Committee and hence bid of the petitioners was rightly accepted. Learned counsel referred to the minutes of the Auction Committee and to the letter dated 29-6-1994 from the Director, Local Government to the Secretary, Government of Sindh, Local Government. In said letter it has been mentioned that right to collect Octroi Tax for Deh 145 of Union Council Kangoro for the year 1994-95 was put to auction four times. That on 13-6-1994 the auction was held and knocked down in favour of Haji Ghulam Muhammad who could not furnish security deposit and hence the contract was cancelled. There is also mention in the said letter that the petitioners had given offer of Rs,4,50,000 against official bid of Rs,3,34,650. In consequence of said letter, the bid pf the petitioners was confirmed under Government of Sindh, Local Government Department letter dated 30-6-1994.
4. ' The learned counsel for the petitioners was called upon to explain, as to why he had come against an ad interim order and had not placed his case before the High Court for vacation of the ad interim order. He replied that the matter was to go to the same Bench which passed the order dated 13-10-1994, reproduced above, and hence he thought it proper to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court.
5. It has not been the policy of this Court normally to interfere with ad interim orders passed by the High Courts. In the case of Islamic Republic of Pakistan Ministry of Railways v. Karachi Development Authority (1986 SCM R 1851) it was held that this Court normally is not inclined to interfere with orders relating to interim injunctions. In the case of Mst. Bakhi v. Election Tribunal and others (1988 SCM R 1185) this Court declined to interfere with an order made by the High Court which was of ad interim nature and the petitioner in the said petition was called upon to agitate the matter before the High Court. In the case of Multan Development Authority through its Director-General v.
6. Muhammad Ramzan and 8 others (PLD 1989 Supreme Court 629) the view taken was that this Court seldom interferes with orders determining the interim relief unless a grave illegality, a clear abuse of power or a gross injustice is easily discoverable. In the case of Lahore Municipal Corporation v. Barkat Ali and others (1989 SCM R 1116) the impugned order was found to be one, which could be examined on various grounds, but yet leave to appeal was declined on the ground that it was practice of this Court to keep interference with the discretionary interim orders passed by the High Court, at the minimum.
7. The perusal of the impugned order shows that as far as the High Court is concerned, it has not taken any view either against the petitioners or in their favour and the scope for consideration of the matter has been kept wide open. With these observations we decline to grant leave and dismiss this petition.