DECISION ' This appeal arises from the Order of Fourth Sindh Labour Court at Karachi whereby the grievance application of one Amanul Haque was allowed and he was ordered to be reinstated with all the back benefits.
2. The appellants, Dawood Cotton Mills Limited, terminated the services of respondent Amanul Haque on 18-2-1993. Amanul Haque, at that time, was working as Hanks Clerk and the post of Hanks Clerk was abolished as a result of reorganization. The order of termination, in writing, was delivered to the respondent while he was on duty at the mills. The respondent, it is said, refused to accept hand delivery in the presence of witnesses Sabir Ali and Saiful Malook, who both signed this order as witnesses of the refusal to accept delivery. The service became effective but, as a precaution, the same order was sent through. Registered Post to the respondent on the address given by him. After 18th February the respondent stopped attending to his duties in the mill. He was issued another letter on 23-2-1993 informing him of the termination of his services. Lastly this termination was published in Daily `Mashriq' on 18-3-1993.
3. It is the case of the respondent that he was the General Clerk and not the Hanks Clerk therefore the abolition of the post of Hanks Clerk did not effect him. It has, on the other hand, been shown by the Advocate for the appellants that he has produced the applications of respondent himself for loan etc. In which he has mentioned his designation as Hanks Clerk. All these applications have been produced on record. It appears that the respondent was recruited as a General Clerk and then posted as Hanks Clerk. When the post was abolished he was serving as Hanks Clerk.
Regarding service of the order of termination the respondent has admitted in his cross- examination that the address on which the letter was sent was correct. He also admits that he was on duty on 18-2-1993 when termination order is alleged to have been personally served upon him.
The respondent has also admitted in his own application that he fell ill and did not attend office from 20-2-1993.
4. Regarding plea of the respondent that he had remained absent because he fell ill the respondent has not summoned the Doctor, under whose treatment he remained in the hospital, for evidence. The fact of his illness has been denied by the appellants. They have argued that the Certificate of the Doctor that he was ill from 19-2-1993 up to 1-4-1993 is not genuine. The Advocate for the respondent could not reply to the question put to him as to the nature of the serious illness the respondent was suffering from. The respondent, himself was asked, what was his illness. He has replied that he had Diarrhoea. It is not to believe that a person would continue to suffer from Diarrhoea from 20-2-1993 to 31-3-1993 for nearly forty days.
5. Lastly it has been argued by the Advocate for the respondent that the order of termination was mala fide as the respondent was victimised on account of union activities. This is, however, the stereo typed defence in almost all such cases. The burden lies on the respondent workman to show that there was any Union Dispute and he had taken active part in the dispute. There is no evidence to that effect.
6. I, accordingly, find that the termination of the respondent, under Standing Order 12(3) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, was in order and the services were terminated due to abolition of the two posts of Hanks Clerks as these duties were assigned to other members of the staff as a result of the reorganization.
7. The order of the Labour Court is, accordingly, set aside and the appeal is allowed.