1. Haji Muhammad was employed in Crescent Sugar Mills, Lyallpur. He was removed from service on 1st October 1974. He applied to the Junior Labour Court for re-instatement. His application was dismissed on the ground t1hat no grievance notice was served by him on his employer as provided under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and so his application was not maintainable. He has filed this appeal against this order.
2. The law relating to dismissal and re-instatement has constantly remained under a change by different enactments. Originally Standing Order No. 18 of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, y 1968 provided grievance procedure. It covered all types of grievances of a worker including re-instatement in case of wrongful dismissal. In order to seek redress under Standing Orders Ordinance, it was imperative on the worker to observe the procedure, laid down in Standing Order No. 18. A worker aggrieved by his dismissal was required to give notice to his employer of his grievance within 15 days of the grievance being brought to his notice. And the employer was required to give his decision within 30 days of the receipt of the communication from the worker but if the employer failed to give his decision or if the worker was aggrieved by his decision, the worker was entitled to file an application in the Industrial Court for the redress of his grievance within 60 days of his bringing his grievance to the notice of his employer. It was further provided in the Standing Order that no complaint shall lie against an order of termination of the employment of workman unless the workman concerned is an officer of registered Trade Union and his employment is alleged to have been terminated for his Trade Union activities, or unless the workman concerned whether an officer of registered Trade Union or not- has been deprived of the benefits accruing to him under this Ordinance. It follows from the above provisions that only an offer-bearer could challenge his dismissal on the ground of unfair labour practice or every worker could challenge his removal from service if he could prove that the dismissal eras a wrongful one under any of the Standing Orders. Standing Order No. 18 was omitted from the Standing Orders Ordinance, by the Labour Laws (Amendment) Ordinance IX of 1972 on 13th April, 1972, and substituted by section 25-A of the said Ordinance. Now this section as originally enacted, entitled a worker to bring his grievance to the notice of his employer either directly or through his Shop Steward or Trade Union and to enlarged period within which he could prosecute his grievance. Regarding re-instatement the scope was widened. Every worker could challenge his dismissal on the ground of his Union activities irrespective of the fact whether he was an office- bearer or not of a Trade Union. It may be seen that under both the provisions i.e. Standing Order No. 18 and section 25-A, it was imperative on the worker to serve a grievance notice on his employer before knocking the door of the Labour Court.
3. Section 25-A was amended twice in 1972 and finally, it was amended on 9th February, 1973 by Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act XXIX of 1973. The original section contained five subsections.
4. In all those subsections the Labour Court was substituted by Junior Labour Courts. Two new sub- sections were added. Subsection (6) reads as under: - "Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1) to (4) any worker aggrieved by the termination of his employment as a result of retrenchment, dismissal, discharge, lay-of, lock-out, or otherwise not earlier than to months preceding the commencement of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Ordinance, 1972, may within a period, of to months from the commencement of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 1973 or the temination of the employment whichever is later, either himself or through his Shop Steward or Trade Union, taken the matter directly to a Junior Labour Court having jurisdiction in the area in which the establishment is situated."
5. This subsection relates to the termination of employment only. The opening words "No withstanding anything contained in subsections (1) to (4)" clearly lays down that the grievance procedure will not be applicable to a case which relates to termination of employment. As far as period within which proceedings can be commenced in the Junior Labour Court is concerned, subsection (6) provides that this period will be 2 months. This subsection covers to types of cases.
6. Firstly, it relate3 to those cases in which cause A of action arose earlier than 2 months preceding the commencement of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Ordinance, 1972. In all such cases a worker was competent to file his petition before the Junior Labour Court within to months commencing from 9th February, 1973 which is the date of enforcement of Act XXIX of 1973.
7. Secondly, this subsection covers all other cases where the cause of action arose after the commencement of Act XXIX of 1973. The major change brought by this subsection was that a worker was authorised to take his grievance directly to the Junior Labour Court either himself or through his Shop Steward or Trade Union.
8. In the present case, the appellant Haji Mohammad did not give any grie--vance notice to his employer but directly instituted his petition in the Junior Labour Court. It was argued on behalf of the employer that his petition was not maintainable because he did not serve any grievance notice on the emplo--yer. Regarding subsection (6), quoted above, the argument of the employer was that this subsection was enacted for the limited purpose to provide a remedy in those cases only where cause of grievance had arisen within a period of to months preceding the commencement of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Ordinance, 1972 and it did not cover any other case. My view is that this interpretation is erroneous. In subsection (6) a comma has been given and thereafter words "or the termination of the employment whoever is later" clearly denote that this subsection covers at those cases where termination has been done after the enforcement of Act XXIX of 1473. If the argument of the employer is to be taken as correct then there was absolutely no need to add the above words in this section. The position which emerges after the introduction of subsection (6) is that the grievances to the workers have been divided into to parts.
9. Subsections (1) to (5) cover all the grievances of workers except termination from service. In cases of termination of service the provisions of sub-sections (1) (4) do not apply. In such cases the provisions of subsection (6) apply. The effect of the amendment would be that the grievance notice is not necessary in a case of termination of service and the matter can be brought before the Junior the Junior Labour Court directly either by the worker or his Shop Steward or his Trade Union. In all other cases a grievance notice must be given to the employer and then only the matter can be brought to the Junior Labour Court.
10. Another argument on behalf of the employer was that subsection (7) further lays down that where a matter is taken to the Junior labour Court under subsection (6) the Junior Labour Court shall give its decision thereon in the manner laid down in subsections (4) and (5), in view of this provision again the subsections (1) to (5) will apply. The argument is repelled on the ground that by applying subsection (4) the intention of the Legislature was that a case of a worker regarding termination of service must be decided within 7 days by the Junior Labour Court. The final conclusion is that a case of grievence notice is not necessary where the Junior Labour Court is B trying a case of termination of service.
11. For the above reasons, the appeal is accepted and the order of the Junior Labour Court is set aside.
12. The case is remanded to the Junior Labour Court for re-trial of the case on merits in accordance with law. Parties are directed to appear before the said Court on 22-1-75.