1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL CHEEMA, J. The petitioner a statutory tenant of the premises transferred to Respondent No. 1 was ejected by the .Rent Controller on ground of default in payment of rent.This finding is not challengedby the petitioner---s counsel before us.On the other hand he was frankly admitted the default but has triedto explain it away. The lower AppellateAuthority set aside the order ofejectment which was restored by the High Court in Second Appeal vide order dated17.6- 1975, from which leave to appeal is sought in this petition.
2. The admitted position is that the respondent is the transferee of the premises the date of transfer being 15-7-1967.Earlier on 3-7-1960, in anticipation of the transfer he entered into an agreement to sell the premises in favour of the petitioner the agreement Exh. R/1 which contains no stipulation exempting the petitioner from payment of rent till the completion of the sale. On the admission of the petitioner that he had paid no rent the Rent Controller made an order of ejectment against him.In appeal however the District Judge took the view that the principle of part performance as containedin section 53-A of the transfer of property Act was attracted and therefore allowed the petitioner---s appeal.This position was however, reversed in Second Appeal by the learned Judge on the High Court.
3. In support of the petitioner, learned counsel for the petitioner contended Firstly; that in the circumstances of the case When during the pendency of the appeal in theHigh Court the landlord had diedthe property had also changed hands notice under section '13-A of the Rent Restriction Order was necessary this point was not raised before the High Court and therefore need not be entertained for the first time particularly when it has not been taken in the grounds Other. It was next contended that the appeal way originally filed by the respondent in the High Court on 6-2- 1968 when was returned on ground of inadequacy of court-fee and was beyond limita--tion. In support of the contention, learned counsel relied on the provisions contained in sections 10 (2) and 12 (2) of the Limitation Act. Having considered the position, we find that the High Court has given good reason. For the condonation of delay, namely, that the ruling of the Karachi High Court on this point reported as Khan Ghulam Hassan Khan v, Dr. Rashid Ahmad (PLD 1967 Kar. 35 ) `vas under challenge before a Full Bench and therefore the respondent's counsel'' could justifiably await this decision before making good the deficiency. Lastly, learned counsel tried to challenge the finding of the High Court on the nor-applicability of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act which embodies the principle of part performance. In support of his pica of part performance, learned counsel raised a novel argument that his clients continued occupation of the premises coupled with the admitted non-payment of rent, which constituted the ground of petitioner's ejectment, were the two over acts on his part towards part performance of the contract. As observed earlier, agreement of sale, Exh. R/1 which formed the sheet-anchor of the petitioner's case did not exempt him from payment of rent and therefore, his continued occupation of the premises in violation of the law could hardly be put forth as a defence or a step towards part performance when admittedly the petitioner had never paid the consideration. The authority relied upon in this behalf, by the learned counsel namely, Kalimuddin Ansari v. Director, Excise &. Taxation (PLD 1971 SC 114) has, therefore; no relevancy as it proceeds on entirely different and distinguishable facts.
4. In view of the above position, no fault can be found with the High Court's order justifying grant of special leave in this case. The petition is dismissed.