1. ANWARUL HAQ, J.--This petition for leave to appeal has arisen out of a pre-emption suit filed by Mst. Sardar Begum, predecessor-in-interest of the present petitioners. The suit was decreed in her favour by the trial Court on the 30th of January 1968, and she was directed to deposit the pre-- emption money by 24-2-1968. She filed an appeal in the District Court for seeking a reduction in the sale price fixed by the trial Court. On 24-2-68. The learned District Judge passed an order allowing the plaintiff-appellant to furnish security for the pre-emption money instead of depositing the same as directed by the trial Court. The appeal was ultimately dismissed by tire District Court on the 19th of April 1969, but no direction was made regarding the time allowed for depositing the pre- emption money. The plaintiff deposited the amount in question in the trial Court on 6-6-69, but her application for the execution of decree was dismissed on the 20th of June 1969, on the ground that the pre-emption money had not been deposited within the time, fixed by the decree, and no extension had been allowed by the appellate Court.
2. In order to meet this situation the plaintiff filed lien application under section 152, C., P. C. For the amendment of the decree so as to fix a time limit for depositing the pre-emption money. This application was accepted by de learned Additional District Judge by placing reliance on the decision of this Court in Shah Wall v. Ghulam Din (P L 13 1966 8 C 983). He observed that the pre-- emptor had deposited the pre-emption money within, a reasonable time and was, therefore, entitled to get her decree executed.
3. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Additional District Judge, the vendees preferred a revision petition in the High Court, which was accepted by a learned Single Judge on the 30th of November 1972. The High. Court has held that the case was governed by the dictum of the Supreme Court in Ansari Brother v. Holy Trinity Church. Trust (P. L. D. 1971 SC 700) to the effect that the omission to lay down a time limit in the appellate decreed was not such as could be corrected under section 152.
4. C. P.1 C., and that in such cases the deposit was to be made within a reasonable time, and that the test was Ito be applied by the executing Court and not by the Court which had omitted to specify the time limit. Applying this dictum the present case the learned Judge took the view that time taken by the a pre-emptor to deposited the pre-emption money after the dismissal of her appeal on 19-4-69 was not reasonable, and, therefore, the learned Additional 'District Judge wets in error in holding that the decree could be executed.
5. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the High Court is not right in thinking that the omission to specify time for depositing the pre--emption money was not susceptible of correction under section 152. C. P. C. It is contended by the learned counsel that the decision of this Court in the case of Shah Wali, relied upon by the learned Additional District Judge, was fully applicable to this case and the appellate decree was accordingly rightly corrected so as to cover the period actually taken by the pre-emptor to deposit the pre-emption money after the dismissal of her appeal. Nevertheless, the learned counsel concedes that it is not possible for him to explain the delay that took place on the part of the plaintiff to deposit the amount soon after the dismissal of the appeal.
6. Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down that :- "Clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders or errors arising therein from, any accidental slip or omission may at any time be corrected by the Court either of its own motion or on the application of any of the parties."
7. It will be shoe that this section permits the correction of clerical oil arithmetical mistakes in judgments and decrees etc. Or of error: arising from any accidental slip or omission, but does not authorise the Court to the supplement its judgments, decrees or orders by directions which require application of mind, and have the effect of taking away rights which may have otherwise accrued to one party or the other. It may be possible to achieve this result by way of review of the judgment, decree or order under question, but we, express no considered opinion on this point as it does note arise in this case. The High Count was, therefore right in thinking that the omission to specify a time limit for depositing the pre-emption money was not one which could be supplied under section 132 of the Code.
8. We find that the judgment of this Court in the case of Shah Wali, on which reliance is plated by the learned counsel for the petitioners, does not lay down the rule that such an omission could be supplied under section 152 of the Code. The fads in that case were entirely different inasmuch as a specific time limit was laid down by the appellate Court for the deposit of the pre-emption money but the, deposit fell short by a certain amount owing to a mistake on the a part of the pre-emptor he had also filed on appeal in the High Court which had been dismissed to limine. He sought extension of time to deposit it the deficit amount, but the same was refused by the trial Court holding that it had, no jurisdiction to extend time, for deposit of pre-emption money under the decree of the appellate Court. The pre-emptor thereupon went upon in appeal to the District Court, which accepted the same and extended the time for depositing the preemption amount. The vendee approached the High Court by way of revision, but this petition was dismissed. In the Supreme Court, the learned Chief Justice expressed the view that ache appellate Court could in such cases fix reaso0able time under the pt visions of section 151. C. P. C., but such power could not have been invoked then the appeal had been dismissed in limine for the reason that the Court could not be said to have become seized of the appeal, S. A. Rahman, Fazle Akbar and Muhammad Yaqub Ali, JJ. Took the view hat the pre-emptor's suit, stood dismissed for his default is making payment off' the correct amount within the time fixed by the appellate decree, there was no question extension of the time involved, either by the original` Court or by the appellate Court thereafter, the appeal or revision from the appellate decree having already been dismissed.
9. Hamoodur Rahman, J (as his Lordship then was) opined that the proper view to take in such cases would be that the deposit may be made within a reasonable time from the date of the appellate decree. It will be seen that none of the learned Judges, who dealt with this case, held that the omission of the appellate Court to specify the time limit could be rectified under section 152 of the Code; the nearest approach being by Cornelius. C. J., to the effect that an appropriate order fixing reasonable time may be made by the Court under section 151 of the Code.
10. A similar question fell to be decided by this Court in the case of Ansari Brothers in regard to the deposit of rent required to be made by a tenant under section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rant Restriction Ordinance, 1959, and the Court approved the rule of "reasonable time" mentioned by Cornelius. C. J. And Hamoodur Rehman, J., in the case of Shah Wali. We are of the view that this is the utmost concession that can be allowed to a pre-emptor who had failed to make the deposit within the time specified in the decree granted to him by the trial Court or the appellate Court, and in whose case no fresh extension of time is granted by the higher Court acting in first appeal, second appeal or revision as the case may be. In all such cases the deposit must be made within a reasonable time from the decision of the last Court, failing which the suit must be dismissed in terms of the original decree.
11. Coming now to the facts of the instant case, we have already stated; that the period fixed for the deposit of the pre-emption money by the trial Court had expired by the time the pre-emptor's appeal was dismissed by the District Court on 19.4-69, on which date the interim order made by the appellate Court suspending the original decree with regard to the deposit of the amount also came to an end. There being no specific order by the appellate Court granting an extension of time for this purpose, the deposit should have been made within a reasonable time, but it was not made until the 6th of June 1969. No explanation was furnished by the pre-emptor for her failure to make the deposit for a period of one month and 13 days after the dismissal of her appeal, The learned Additional District Judge granted her extension of time for this period without applying his mind to the circumstances which had prevented the deposit from being made soon after the dismissal of the appeal. The High Court was, therefore, right in the circumstances in holding that the deposit had not been made within a reasonable time.
12. The petition, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed.