1. ' This is a petition in extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court for setting aside of the order passed in Revision (ROR No, 684/1993) on 16-11994 by Member (Cons.) Board of Revenue, Punjab readjusting the respective wandas of the parties and later declining to review it on 12-2-1994 and 11-41994. Second review petition was dismissed on account of its incompetence.
2. ' Petitioner was a landholder in Qila Bulwant Singh of Tehsil Hafizabad. Likewise, respondents Nos. 2 and 3 were owners of the land in the same revenue estate. Lands in the parties' village were subjected to consolidations. Petitioner was adjusted 35 Kanals, 12 Marlas in lieu of his holding in the village. He accepted the adjustment. It included Khasra No, 258, measuring 8 Kanals, 18 Marlas.
3. Consolidation Scheme was approved on 28-121989. Respondent No, 2 Feroze Khan appealed from it to the Collector (Cons.), Gujranwala. He laid claim to Khasra Nos. 244, 251 and also asserted that a path was wrongly carved out, of Khasra No, 240. He did not claim any relief against the petitioner.
4. His appeal was dismissed, on 4-11-1992. A further revision preferred by him to Additional Commissioner (Cons.), Gujranwala also failed, on 23-2-1993. Thereupon, a revision was filed by him before a learned Member, Board of Revenue. He readjusted the wandas. In result, Khasra No, 258 was taken from the petitioner. It was given to Rehmat, respondent. Khasra No, 257 previously given to respondent No, 2 Feroze Khan was substituted for it in favour of the petitioner, Muhammad Shafi.
5. Khasra No,261 previously held by Rehmat respondent was given to Feroze Khan, respondent. It may be noted that Khasra No, 258 measured 8 Kanals, 18 Marlas. Khasra No, 257 substituted for it to the petitioner comprised 6 Kanals, 13 Marlas. Thus, there was a clear short-fall of 2 Kanals, 5 Marlas in the entitlement of the petitioner. Aggrieved of the short-fall and readjustment of Khasra numbers, petitioner sought review of the decision under section 8 of the West Pakistan, Board of Revenue Act, 1957. The review petition was dismissed, on 12-2-1994, by Member (Cons.). A second review petition was then filed before the Board of Revenue. It was also dismissed on 11-4-1994 on the ground of its incompetence. Merits were not touched in the order. Thereupon, above petition was presented in this Court. It was admitted to hearing on 11-5-1994.
6. ' Respondents did not file written statements. Short-fall in the area of entitlement of the petitioner 2 Kanals, 5 Marlas was not disputed. It was agreed that deficiency in the entitlement to the extent of 10 Marlas only was ignorable. Rest was required to be accounted for in adjudication of civil rights.
7. Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960 in its sections 11 and 13 expressly conferred right of appeal aid revision. Review was conspicuous by its absence in it. Right of review like a right of appeal and revision was a substantive right and was not available unless it was expressly conferred in Statute. Case of Muzaffar Ali v. Muhammad Shafi (PLD 1981 SC 94) was in point. Section 8 of West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act, 1957 gave jurisdiction to the Board of Revenue to review its order upon application filed by an aggrieved person. Suo motu review by the Board was not countenanced by the Act. In Umar Din and others v. Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue and others (1984 CLC 17 (Lahore), this view of section 8 was taken by this Court. There was no dispute that in absence of a specific provision existing for review in the Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960, the Board of Revenue , under section 8 of the West Pakistan, Board of Revenue Act, 1957 was competent to review its order at he instance of an aggrieved person. Grounds for review were similar to those specified in Order XLVII, Civil P.C. "or for other sufficient reasons" were added by West Pakistan, Board of Revenue (Amendment) Act, 1964 (Act XVIII of 1964). Addition of it enlarged the scope of review by the Board. Case of Abdullah and another v. Board of Revenue, Sindh and 2 others 1989 MU) 2760 (Karachi) was in support of this view. Thus, jurisdiction to review on specified grounds was not in dispute between the parties. However, there was a clear dispute on the maintainability of second review petition when the first had been dismissed on merits. It was urged for the petitioner that inabsence of a clear prohibition in the Act, there was no bar for a second revive petition. By analogy, Rule 9 of Order XLVII, Civil P.C. Was pressed in service. It was argued that if similar bar to second review petition was intended try the Legislature, a prohibition could have been inserted in the Act. Its absence was clearly indicative of existence of jurisdiction in the Board of Levenue to entertain second review petition. In opposition to it, it was submitted that successive review applications on similar grounds were not permissible in law, because, it would hit at and destroy the rule of finality of judgment. I: was true that like provision in Rule 9 of Order XLVII, C.P.C. Did not exist in the West Pakistan, Board of Revenue Act, 1957. Commenting on Rule 9, Order XLVII, Civil P.C., a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court in Hari Singh v. Muhammad Said and others (AIR 1927 Lahore 200) observed, "It is hid down in Order 47, rule 9 of the Civil P.C., that no application to review an `order made on an application for a review or a decree or order passed or male on review shall be entertained. This does not mean that a second application for review on new grounds cannot be entertained if made within limtation and the view held is that this can be done.
8. ' But nowhere has it ever been held that a plaintiff can go on for ever presenting petition after petition containing the same ground until somehow he succeeds and has the obnoxious order reviewed and reversed. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the Calcutta Courts used to allow review after review but all that Fukheerooddeen v. Kala Chand (19) 1864, 1 W.R. 287), decided was that a second review could be allowed if the first was rejected as founded on insufficient grounds. This does not go beyond what is now the law. Again Nusseerudin v. Indurnarain (20) 5 W.R.
9. 93 BLR Sup. Vol. 367), only went to the length of stating that the Court might in the exercise of its discretion admit a second review even after a prior order rejecting a first review and that applications for review dismissed for mere default might be re-admitted like appeals dismissed for default. But in the body of the judgment towards the bottom of the second column of p. 95 the words used are that when there is an order rejecting a review application that is not a final order, and the Court is not precluded from a admitting the review upon another ground.
10. ' It is not, however, a question of what is or is not the law in British India and what interpretation has been put on certain sections in the past but rather a question of basic principles without which there can no such thing as law or justice. Once a decision has been given and no appeal lies that decision can only be questioned on certain grounds which are not technical in the sense in which the word is often used, of being almost arbitrary and not based on any principle but technical in the sense that the reasons justifying any modification or alteration must be reasons which strictly fulfil the condition of being such that they could not be taken into account at the time the original order was passed and this for no default of the party who seeks reconsideration. A review "is not an appeal. It is not a means of putting right a mistake, however, heinous apart from clerical error or mistake of calculation and reluctant as all Courts must be to admit an application or review they must be doubly reluctant to admit a second application and in the nature of things it is radically in the truest sense of the word, unjust to admit a second application on the same grounds for to do so must be tantamount to reconsidering the correctness of the second if not of the first decision on the same materials. And if this be the case with the second application what is to be said of a third? It can mean nothing more nor less than the denial of all justice to the unfortunate respondent who has succeeded up to that point and sees the success which he has achieved imperiled once more and for all he knows to be imperiled once again should he defeat this last attack". In Dr. M. Afzal Zahir and others v. Mst. Begum. Jan and others (PLD 1966 (W.P.) Lahore 53), on Rule 9 of Order XLVII of the Code, Anwarul Haq, J., as he then was who later adorned the Supreme Court as its Chief Justice in para. 16 of the judgment observed, "The next objection raised by Mr. MA.
11. Rehman in this behalf is that rule 9 of Order XLVII of the Code clearly lays down that "no application to review an order made on an application for a review or a decree or order passed or made on a review shall be entertained", and, therefore, after the dismissal of the first review application of the appellants the second application could not have been entertained at all, with the result that the order admitting the present appeal to a full hearing is without jurisdiction. It was submitted by Sheikh Abdul Haque, the learned counsel for the appellants, that this rule also, like the proviso to rule 4(2), had no application to a case where the opposite party had not yet appeared, but no authority was cited by the learned counsel in support of his submission. It seems to me that rule 9, as worded, does not permit of any distinction to be drawn between a case where at the time of the hearing of the first review application the opposite party was given notice, and a case where this procedure was not followed owing to the reason that the review sought was of a summary order passed by the Court at a stage where the opposite-party had not yet come into the picture. My reason for thinking so is that the object behind rule 9 appears to be to prevent repeated attempts by an interested party to obtain a modification of a judicial order by resorting to successive review applications. Judicial orders, by their very nature, must be clothed with finality as far as the Court or Tribunal passing them is concerned, and the power of review conferred by Order XLVII is indeed of a limited and exceptional nature intended only to correct errors arising out of specified reasons and circumstances, and therefore rule 9 rightly lays down that this power shall not be invoked repeatedly by the parties to a cause.
17. There is, however, some authority for the view that a second application for review of the original order is admissible when some fresh ground is advanced in support of such application, which the applicant was not in a position to adduce in the former application. See 107 P R 1883 and AIR, 1915 Cal.
432. In such a case it can perhaps be said that the second application falls within the purview of sub-rule (1) of rule 1 of Order XLVII. I am, therefore, inclined to agree that although rule 9 forbids a second review application, such an application might be considered if it discloses a fresh ground which was not available to the applicant at the time he made the first application for review". In Muhammad Yusuf Khan (Defendant) v. Abdul Rahman Khan (Plaintiff) reported in the Indian Law Reports, Calcutta Series Vol. XVI, there were observations that second application for review was incompetent. No clear authority on the competence and maintainability of successive review applications under section 8 of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act, 1957 was brought to my notice by the learned counsel for the parties and I have also not been able to lay my hands on any.
12. As far Rule 9 of Order XLVII, Civil P.C., there was a specific bar provided in it for successive review applications. Obviously, the object behind was to prevent erosion from the finality of judgment of a competent Court. Successive applications for review on similar grounds jeopardised rule of res judicata firmly embedded in jurisprudence. Besides, it led to uncertainty also. In my opinion if a ground for review was available but, was not taken in first application for review, rule of constructive res judicata. Precluded its agitation in the subsequent review petition. Otherwise, successive applications on different grounds at different times could be filed time after time for their endless agitation. In that eventuality, finality shall never be in sight. Therefore, an aggrieved person must once take all the available grounds for review of the decision sought by him. If any ground is omitted by him , it could be added by amendment to the application for review. However, once a final decision was reached on review application, a subsequent application for review, in absence of a clear available course must not lie. I am conscious of the fact that there was no express prohibition for a second review application in the West Pakistan, Board of Revenue Act, 1957 but it did not either expressly or impliedly exclude the general principle of res judicata and rule of finality of the judgment. Therefore, except for the clerical or arithmetical mistakes or accidental slips or omissions in the decision which every Court, Tribunal or authority had inherent jurisdiction to correct, second application for review after the decision of the first on its merits could not be competently instituted. To this extent, the learned Member was correct in his last order and I would uphold him on this score. As far his first decision in revision on 16-1-1994 by which he had disturbed and readjusted the respective wandas by reallocation of Khasra numbers between the parties and the order passed on review petition on 12-2-1994, I found it difficult to agree with him.
13. Readjustment, consistent with law of consolidation and its equity, learned Member had jurisdiction to make but reduction in the entitlement of the petitioner without any plausible justification, I am afraid, the learned Member could not make. Existing record gave no justification for reducing the entitlement of the petitioner to the extent of 2 Kanals, 5 Marlas. It must be a valuable land for him, if not to others. In the first review application, the petitioner provided an occasion to the learned Member for meeting the deficiency in his entitlement. The occasion was unjustifiably lost by the learned Member. In fact, he was stated to have merely glossed over it. It was not a proper disposal of the review application. On this score alone, it must be set aside. People love their property and they do not allow it to go waste easily. It was a natural desire. Courts must not show disrespect for it. On the previous date of hearing, Mr. Talib Hussain Awan, Advocate on instructions from his, clients agreed to meet the deficiency of area in the High Court for avoiding, remand to the Board of Revenue. I was reluctant to adopt this course on the view that it was for the Board of Revenue to re- hear and decide the matter afresh on merits in accordance with law. I would, therefore, accept the writ petition; set aside the impugned orders dated 16-1-1994, 12-2-1994 and 11-4-1994 of learned Member (Cons.), Board of Revenue and declare these to have been made without lawful authority and of no legal effect. As a necessary consequence of it, revision-ROR No, 684 of 1993 shall be revived for its reconsideration and decision on merits in accordance with law by the learned Member, Board of Revenue.
14. ' As a result of the above, writ petition is allowed with no order as to its costs in this Court.