' MIAN ALLAH NAWAZ, J.---This judgment will dispose of two Intra-Court Appeals bearing Nos. 12 and 13/94-BWP and one Constitution Petition No, 2152-93/BWP. I.CAs. Nos. 12 and 13/94-BWP have arisen out of a single judgment passed by my learned brother Ausaf Ali Khan, J. Dated 22-2-1994 while Constitution petition bearing No, 2152-93/BWP assails the validity of action taken by the Municipal Corporation, Bahawalpur which was the subject-matter of challenge in Constitution Petitions Nos.
2011-93/BWP and 2048-93/BWP. All these causes, raise a common question of law and come from common factual background. These are, therefore, being dealt through the single judgment.
2. The salient features of I.C.As. Nos. 12 and 13/94-BWP and Constitution Petition No, 2152-93/BWP, at the very outset, may be briefly stated:-- ' The dispute in these cases pertains to plot Nos. 170, 185, 186, 188, 189, 195, 196, 197, 199, 202, 206, 208 and 217 which are located within the limits of General Bus Stand, Bahawalpur being run by the Municipal Corporation with the permission of Regional Transport Authority, Bahawalpur Division.
These plots were in occupation of the appellants/petitioners in I.CAs. Nos. 12 and 13/94/BWP and the petitioners in W.P. No, 2152/93-BWP as squatters. The Municipal Corporation, Bahwalpur intended to remove these encroachments and so issued notices to the appellants/peitioners to vacate these plots. When confronted with this situation, the appellants/petitioners did move the Municipal Corporation through direct as well as indirect means. A committee was constituted to examine the problems. On 27-9-1987, that Committee recommended that the persons who were in occupation of plots in dispute within the premises of General Bus Stand, and had constructed their shops there be not disturbed and be further allowed to remain in their respective possession as lessees of the Municipal Corporation subject to payment of rent; that the shops constructed by them be treated as Property of the Municipal Corporation; that those occupants who had not constructed their shops be allowed to complete the construction of shops on plots in their possession with an undertaking to enter into the lease agreements with the Municipal Corporation. These recommendations by the Sub-Committee, surprisingly neither specified the names of the squatters nor had specified the pieces of land in their respective possession nor had specified any rent for any piece of land. These recommendations were approved by the Municipal Corporation, Bahawalpur vide its Resolution dated 1-12-1987. Pursuant to it, it appears that one Muhammad Azhar, ex-Councillor of the Municipal Corporation, started issuing chits of allotment to various persons including the appellants/petitioners. As the differences errupted between the appellants/petitioners and the Municipal Corporation, the appellants/petitioners instituted a suit under section 56 of the Specific Relief Act against the Municipal Corporation, Bahawalpur for grant of perpetual injunction restraining the respondents from evicting the appellants from the premises in their occupation. This suit was contested and status quo order was passed by the learned trial Court. During the pendency of the suit, it appears, that all the appellants were evicted from the shops in dispute by demolition proceedings carried out by the Municipal Corporation in pursuance of the order of this Court passed in Constitution Petition No, 1698/93-BWP.
3. In this factual background Constitution Petitions Nos. 2011 and 2048/93-BWP were filed in this Court in order to seek the following reliefs:--
(1) Declaration that the petitioners were valid allottees of the plots upon which they had constructed shops and their demolition was without jurisdiction and lawful authority.
(2) Direction be issued to the respondents to allow the petitioners to reconstruct the shops.
(3) The respondents be directed to make compensation/damages to the extent of Rs,40 000 to each petitioner.
' These Constitution petitions were dismissed by my learned brother Ausaf Ali Khan, J. Vide a single judgment dated 22-2-1994. This is how these Intra-Court Appeals and the Constitution petition had come to this Court.
4. Mr. Shamsher lqbal Chughtai, Advocate, appearing on behalf of appellants/petitioners in ICAs No, 12 and 13/94 and W.P. No, 2152/93 led arguments. He assailed the impugned order on the following grounds:-- ' Firstly, that while rendering the decision, the learned Single Judge had not correctly applied and construed sub-rule (2) of rule 4 of the Punjab Local Councils (Contract) Rules, 1981 which empowered the Chairman/Mayor of the Municipal Corporation, Bahawalpur to enter into a contract on his own behalf with the appellants/petitioners. On this premises it was contended that the allotment orders made by Muhammad Azhar ex-Councillor of the Municipal Corporation were valid and legally enforceable. It was further contended that the decision of the learned Single Judge was not correct and needed to be set aside.
' Secondly, that the learned Single Judge had erroneously relied upon rule 10 of the Punjab Local Councils (Property) Rules, 1981. According to the learned counsel as a matter of fact the case was covered by rule 11 of the Punjab Local Councils (Property) Rules, 1981. On the strength of this interpretation it was contended that the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge suffered from an error of law apparent on the face of record.
' Thirdly, that Muhammad Azhar, ex-Councillor of the Municipal Corporation had been authorised by the Mayor, Municipal Corporation under subsection (3) of section 170 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 to allot the disputed plots. On these premises it was contended that the learned Single Judge erred in law in holding that Muhammad Azhar ex-Councillor has no authority whatsoever to allot the pieces of land in possession of the appellants/petitioners.
5. Ch. Manzoor Ahmad, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioners in Constitution Petition No, 1252-93/BWP, adopted the arguments advanced by Mr. Shamsher Iqbal Chughtai, Advocate. On the contracry Mr. Masood Ashraf Sheikh, Advocate, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent/Municipal Corporation strenuously supported the impugned decision.
6. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties at a considerable length and after having perused the impugned decision, we are not persuaded to find any merit in the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants/petitioners. The facts, which have led to the filing of these cases are not in dispute. It is a common ground between the parties that the appellants/petitioners were in occupation of the plots in dispute as squatters. It is also not in contest that these plots are located within the premises of the General Bus Stand which is being run by the Municipal Corporation with the permission of the Regional Transport Authority, Bahawalpur. It is also not in dispute that the Municipal Corporation, Bahawalpur had decided to bring an end to encroachments within the boundaries of the bus stand. The main stay of the case of the appellants is that vide a Resolution dated 1-12-1987, the Municipal Corporation Bahawalpur had decided to keep the appellants/petitioners squatters in possession of the disputed plots as tenants and had allowed them tenancy rights on the rates permissible within the General Bus Stand. Furthermore, the case of the appellants/petitioners is that they had been allotted .Plots, by Muhammad Azhar, ex-Councillor in exercise of powers delegated to him by the Mayor, Municipal Corporation under section 170(3) of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979.
7. The question for decision is whether such powers were available to Muhammad Azhar, ex- Councillor. On a bare examination of the relevant applicable law, we are not prepared to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants. No doubt, the Municipal Corporation, Bahawalpur is governed by the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979. Section 39 of this Statute deals with contracts. It reads as follows:-- "39. Constracts.--(1) All contracts made by or on behalf of the local council shall be:--
(a) in writing and expressed to be made in the name of the Local Council;
(b) executed in such manner as may be prescribed; and
(c) reported to the Local Council by the Chairman at the meeting next following the execution of the contract.
(2) No contract executed otherwise than in conformity with the provisions of this section shall be binding on the Local Council."
From the bare reading of this section it becomes quite clear that all contracts made by or on behalf of the Local Council shall be in writing and expressed to be made in the name of the Local Council. These must be executed in such a manner as may be prescribed and are to be reported to the Local Council by the Chairman at the meeting next following the execution of the contract.
Sub- section (2) of section 39 clearly prescribes that a contract executed otherwise than the provisions of this section shall not be binding on the Local Council.
8. The manner of execution of the contract by the Local Council or on its behalf is clearly specified in the Punjab Local Councils (Contract) Rules, 1981 and Punjab Local Councils (Property) Rules, 1981.
Rule 4 of former rules prescribes that if a contract is for an amount exceeding the powers of the Chairman specified in column 2 of Schedule I, it shall not be made without the prior approval of the Local Council. Sub-rule (2) of rule 4 further stipulates that the contract made by the Chairman shall be reported to the Local Council in Form C-I at the meeting next following the making of the contract. The Mayor, Municipal Corporation had been invested with the powers under item 2 of Schedule I to make a contract under his authority when the rental value of the contract does not exceed Rs,4,800 per annum. As the Contract Rules, 1981 were not comprehensive the Punjab Local Councils (Property) Rules, 1981 (hereinafter shortly stated Property Rules) were promulgated in the month of February, 1981 to provide mechanism pertaining to alienation of immovable properties of the Local Council. Rule 10 of these Rules enacted that no immovable property of a Local Council shall be alienated by way of sale or otherwise except through an open auction which was subject to sanction of the Local Council. This rule was followed by Rule 11 which was in the form of an exception to Rule 10. This rule invested the Chairman/Mayor of a Local Council to alienate immovable property of the Corporation on his own authority if the period of lease of the alienated property did not exceed one year. This rule further stated that this power was subject to provisions of Contract Rules, 1981. From, the conjunctive analysis of section 39 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, Rules 4 and 5 of the Contract Rules, 1981 and Rules 10 and 11 of the Property Rules, we are left with no doubt that these rules provided fetters upon power of the Chairman/Mayor of Local Council while dealing with the immovable property of the Local Council/Corporation. The underlying object of these limitations was to save the property of the Local Council from the misuse of unfettered powers of the functionaries of the Local Councils. These limitations were reasonable statutory checks on the greedy and averacious propensities of elected/unelected functionaries of the Local Councils. These restrictions, in our estimation, were based upon the principle of ratiocination gained from experiences and were compulsory in nature. Any act or contracts by the functionaries of the Local Councils in derogation of those checks were clearly illegal and void ab initio. On this analysis we are in entire agreement with the conclusion reached by our brother Ausaf All Khan, J. His conclusions are eminently correct, just and wholly in consonance with the purposive construction of above discussed laws.
9. Judged from the above angle we find that in the first place the Municipal Corporation, Bahawalpur in its resolution neither specified the names of squatters nor specified the disputed plots in possession of the appellants/petitioners nor specified the rate at which these plots were to be given to the appellants/petitioners. Thus, the resolution of the Corporation dated 1-12-1987 was not a resolution in practical terms and was, therefore, unenforceable on account of vagueness and uncertainty. This was not the end of the matter. Furthermore, we find from record that one ex- councillor started issuing chits of allotment of the plots in dispute to the appellants/petitioners without any legal authority. Even no formal contracts were executed by Mayor of the Corporation in favour of the appellants/peitioners. This being the state of affairs, we have no difficulty to hold that the claims of appellants/petitioners based upon chit of allotments are wholly spurious, unfounded and legally untenable.
10. On the above analysis we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge dated 22-2-1994 neither suffers from any jurisdictional error nor any legal flaw apparent on the face of the record. It is eminently correct, just and in consonance with the manifest provisions of law.
11. As a result of above discussion the I.CAs. Bearing Nos. 12 and 13 of 1994-BWP, as well as Constitution petition bearing No, 2152/93-BWP are found to be wholly without any merit. These are accordingly dismissed in limine.