1. ' Short legal question for decision in civil revision was whether the appeal filed in the Court below was barred by limitation and its delayed institution deserved to be condoned under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Lower Court held it barred by limitation and declined to overlook its delayed filing out of time.
2. ' Relevant facts bearing on the decision of the question briefly set out were these:-- ' Respondents Nos.1 and 2, namely, Muhammad Ibrahim and Muhammad Yasin instituted a civil suit for partition for separating their share from a residential house. They claimed ownership of 3394/4338 share in it. Defendant No,2 Muhammad Nawaz petitioner resisted the suit. Necessary issues were raised in it. On examination of the evidence adduced at the trial, the suit was decreed on 14-3-1993 and a preliminary decree for separation of the plaintiffs' share in the house was made. A Local Commissioner was appointed to suggest its mode of partition.
3. ' Aggrieved of the preliminary decree, defendant No,2--Muhammad Nawaz preferred an appeal in the District Court at Kasur on 5-6-1993. It was assigned to a learned Additional District Judge in the District for its hearing. Memorandum of appeal was accompanied by an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 for condonation of the filing of the appeal out of time. Ground of illness was taken in it for excusing of the delay. In support of illness a medical certificate was annexed with it. Plea of illness was not considered sufficient cause by the Court hearing the appeal. It dismissed it as barred by limitation on 14-9-1994. The judgment given in appeal was in revision before this Court. So, the crucial point for decision was the bar of limitation and condonation of delayed filing of appeal on account of illness of the petitioner.
4. ' Reference to material dates shall be helpful. The trial Court gave the judgment on 14-3-1993. It was pronounced in open Court. Appellant applied to the Copying Agency for certified copies of the judgment and decree of the trial Court, on 15-3-1993. These were prepared on 21-4-1993. Delivery of certified copies was taken on 22-4-1994. The appeal was actually filed, on 5-6-1993. Upon deducting the time requisite for obtaining certified copies of the judgment and decree appealed from, the last day for filing the appeal fell on 22-5-1993, in case date ()factual delivery of the certified copies was included in the "time-requisite". In case, the date of preparation of certified copies was taken as the time-requisite", the appeal was required to be filed on 21-5-1993. By Limitation (Amendment) Act, 1991 (Act XIII of 1991), subsection (5) was added after subsection (4) to section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908. It reads:-- "(5) For the purposes of subsections (2), (3) and (4), the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence, order, judgment or award shall be deemed to be the time intervening between the day on which an application for the copy is made and the day actually intimated to the applicant to be the day on which the copy will be ready for delivery."
5. It was not the case of the appellant that the Copying Agency had not intimated any day to him for the preparation and delivery of certified copies by it. Therefore, the time requisite rightly deductible under section 12 of the Limitation Act commenced from the date of the application for copies and their preparation by the Copying Agency, i,e, 15-3-1993 to 21-4-1993. In Fateh Muhammad and others v. Malik Qadir Bakhsh 1975 SCM R 157, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed: "It is well-settled that the time requisite for obtaining copy of order within the meaning of section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908 means only the 'interval between the date of application for supply of copy and the date when it is ready for delivery. Even during this interval, due diligence on the part of the litigant is required by law, and no delay, unless such as was caused by circumstances over which he had no control and which he could not by due diligence be avoided, can form part of time 'requisite" for obtaining the copy. The time when the date on which the copy is ready for delivery, and the date on which the applicant chooses to take delivery therefor is not portion of the time "requisite" for obtaining a copy". In the later portion of the judgment, it was observed that delay of each day, after expiry of the prescribed period of limitation, unless satisfactorily explained, was fatal. In para. 3 of the application for condonation of delay, the appellant averred that he had applied for copies on 15-3-1993 and these were received by him on 21-4-1993. His statement about delivery of the certified copies on 21-4-1993 did not coincide with the date of delivery given in the endorsement by the Copying Agency on the judgment and decree of the trial Court. It showed that delivery was taken on 22-4-1993. Para. 4 of the petition under section 5 of the Limitation Act averred that the appellant fell ill, on 16-5-1993, and upon recovery from illness filed the appeal. He further added that upon his recovery from illness, holidays for Eid-ul-Azha followed and the appeal was filed on expiry of these holidays. These averments were supported by his affidavit. His alleged illness was supported by the medical certificate from a private medical practitioner of Kot Murad Khan, District Kasur. Medical practitioner was Dr. Munir Ahmad Gohar, M.B.,B.S., R.M.D.C. It was issued on 16-5-1993 by him. Illness described in it was "fever for 3 days". The certificate prescribed medicines and advised rest till recovery from fever. Nature of fever and its severity was not disclosed. Precise. Date of recovery from fever was also not divulged in the application for condonation of delay. Certified copies of the judgment and decree of the trial Court were taken on 22-4-1993. Presence of the appellant before the Local Commissioner appointed by the trial Court was noticed by him, on 23-5-1993. Appellant appended his signatures on the report against his name at Serial No,4 (on page 137 of the trial Court's file). Obviously, by them he must have recovered from 'fever'. His presence before the local commissioner on 23-5-1995 reinforced it.
6. Therefore, assuming that the appellant was ill for some period and on account of illness was precluded to prefer the appeal earlier, there was no bar for him to file his appeal on 23-5-1993 or the day following it. As far holidays on account of Eidul-Azha, the Courts were closed from 1st to 3rd June, 1993, vide notification from the High Court dated 20-5-1993. 4th June, 1993 was a Friday. After Eidul-Azha holidays, the Civil Courts reopened on 5-6-1993 i,e, the Saturday. In order to avail of the benefit under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, for overlooking the delay on account of sufficient cause, the party in default was required to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not filing the appeal right up to the date on which the appeal was actually presented. In other words, he was obliged to satisfactorily account for each day's delay. Unless, the delay was properly accounted for the satisfaction of the Court, it had no authority in law to condone it. Sickness per se was not a sufficient cause for overlooking the delay in filing an appeal or application, unless the effect of it was such as in the circumstances will afford reasonable excuse for the delay. The certificate did not mention appellant's total incapacity to move out or to instruct somebody on his behalf to file the appeal even during the period of illness. As said above, every day's delay must be properly accounted for and explained. Even an unexplained one day's delay could prove fatal. Here in the case, there was an unexplained delay of many more days and the illness was not such as could incapacitate the appellant from attending to his ordinary avocations. The certificate was issued by a private medical practitioner. Its correctness could also be subjected to doubt. It may have been procured merely to support the plea of illness for saving the appeal from the firm grip of bar of limitation. Be that as it may, lower Court examined the plea in its attendant circumstances and gave reasons for ignoring to condone the delay. Its reasons were plausible. When an order had been passed by the lower Court in proper exercise of its discretion either allowing or refusing an application to extend time, it could not be interfered with in revision. In the instant case, exercise of discretion by the lower Court was not defective on any score. Therefore, the case did not qualify for interference in revision. It appeared to be a case of negligence on the part of the petitioner to delay the filing of appeal much out of prescribed time. Therefore, there was little scope for interference.
7. On merits also, the trial Court found that there was no dispute about ownership of the parties. In the suit-house and its private partition between them was not established by convincing evidence.
8. ' As a result of the above, civil revision must fail in limine. It is, therefore, dismissed accordingly.
9. ' Original records especially requisitioned for the purpose of the present revision must be returned.