' AJMAL MIAN, J.---By this common order, we intend to dispose of the above four petitions for leave to appeal which involve common question of facts and law.
2. The brief facts giving rise to the filing of above petitions are that one, Mst. Saiqa Khanum, addressed a letter to Mr. Justice Muhammad Amir Malik of the Lahore High Court complaining that the teachers were recruited not on merits, but on the basis of quota allocated to M.P.As. And that though she was on merits far better, than those teachers who were recruited on the above basis, but she was ignored. The above letter was registered as Suo Motu Writ Petition No, 2599 of 1993. A copy of the said letter was sent to the Secretary Education and District Education Officer, Jhang, to submit parawise comments. They were also directed to submit recruitment rules and policies. It appears that while the aforesaid writ petition was pending some other writ petitions and miscellaneous applications numbering several hundred for getting impleaded were filed. The stand taken by the Government of Punjab was that factually recruitments of teachers had taken place in violation of Recruitment Policy and Law. On 14-4-1993, the learned Judge in Chambers passed the following order:-- "Learned Advocate-General has informed the Court that he has already informed the Secretary, Education and the other relevant authorities that Recruitment Policy as laid down by the Government be strictly followed and recruitment made on merits. The candidates who have sent in their letters have been handed over to the learned Advocate-General including the two namely, Muhammad Zafar Khan and Muhammad Ashraf. Not only these applicants who have written letters to the Court but all the candidates who had submitted applications would be considered on merits and decision taken as expeditiously as possible preferably within a month. Adjourned to 19-5-1993."
3. It seems that pursuant to the above order, the cases were examined by the department and services of a large number of teachers were terminated including of petitioner No, 1 in Civil Petition No, 1261/L of 1993, who filed Writ Petition No, 10245 of 1993 against the termination order received by her on 18-7-1993, which was allowed as under:-- "8 The upshot of the above discussion is that the writ petition is accepted and the impugned order is declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect with the result that the petitioner shall be deemed to be in service. The competent Authority shall summon the petitioner and pass a speaking order in the matter of his appointment exclusively on the basis of merit list already prepared by the Department. Needless to add that in case it is found that the petitioner does not fall within the merit list, she shall not be entitled to continue in service and formal termination order would be passed by the competent Authority in this behalf. The matter shall be decided within a period of two weeks positively, under intimation to the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) of this Court. No costs."
' It is the case of petitioner No, 1 in Civil Petition No, 1261/L of 1993 that after the above judgment she was issued a show-cause notice on 9-9-1993 for appearance and she was informed on the same date that her services were terminated.
4. It seems that the aforesaid Suo Motu Writ Petition No, 2599 of 1993 was finally disposed of by a detailed judgment dated 22-8-1993. The operative portion of the same is as under:-- "14. The upshot is that the writ petition on behalf of Saiqa Khanum and the applicants who joined her case later on and similar writ petitions mentioned above, are disposed of with the order that the appointments will be made in accordance with the Merit Policy and if during the course of the proceedings appointments have been made in accordance therewith the same would hold the field, subject to the reservation indicated above in the body of the judgment. The Civil Miscellaneous petitions and the writ petitions on behalf of the oustees are dismissed on merits."
5. It may be pertinent to mention that Annexure 'A' to the impugned judgment mentions 212 civil miscellaneous applications, which were filed in the above suo motu writ petition; whereas Annexure 'B' refers to the 25 writ petitions, which was filed after the registration of aforesaid suo motu writ petition in respect of various districts of Punjab mentioned therein.
6. It may be pertinent to observe that the petitioner in Civil Petition No,1252/L of 1993, Muhammad Iqbal, filed I.C.A. No, 416 of 1993 against the above final judgment dated 22-8-1993 passed inter alia in Suo Motu Writ Petition No,2599 of 1993 and he also challenged the termination of his service by an order dated 31-5-1993. Whereas, I.C.A. No,366 of 1993 against the above judgment dated 22-8- 1993, was filed by 14 petitioners, in respect whereof Civil Petition No,1253/L of 1993 has been filed by 93 petitioners. The above I.CA. Was disposed of on 4-9-1993 as under:-- "At this stage, Mr. Farooq Bedar, AddlA.-G. States that the case of the petitioner shall be considered for his appointment on merits according to law. The appellant is satisfied with this statement. This being so, this appeal stands disposed of."
I.-CA. No, 416 of 1993 came up for hearing on 8-9-1993. It was disposed of more or less with the above quoted identical orders. The appellant in the above appeal has filed aforesaid Civil Petition No,1252/L of 1993.
' Civil Petition No, 1261/L of 1993 has been filed by above petitioner No, 1, Mah Jabeen, and 25 others impugning the above judgment dated 22-8-1993. Whereas Civil Petition No, 1296/L of 1993 has been filed by 10 petitioners assailing the aforesaid judgment dated 22-8-1993.
' Thus, in all the above petitions, subject-matter of the petitions for leave to appeal, is the aforesaid judgment dated 22-8-1993 which was passed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court inter alia in the above Suo Motu Writ Petition No,2599 of 1993.
7. We have heard Mr. Mahmood A. Qureshi, learned A.O.R. For the petitioners in the above first two petitions, and Sayed Zahid Hussain, learned ASC for the petitioners in the remaining two petitions.
The grievance of the petitioners is that the petitioners' services were terminated pursuant to the above interlocutory order dated 14-4-1993 passed by the learned Judge in Chamber in aforesaid Writ Petition No, 2599 of 1993 and that further action was taken pursuant to the above final judgment dated 22-8-1993 passed therein. According to the petitioners, their appointments were made in accordance with law. The learned Judge in Chambers has, in fact, reiterated the principle of law enunciated by this Court in the case of Munawar Khan v. Niaz Muhammad and 7 others (1993 PLC (C.S.) 797) wherein this Court has inter alia held as under:-- "6. What we have noticed in all these cases which are under-consideration before us is that appointments of both the parties contesting the appointments were made without such advertisements, publicity or information in the locality from which the recruitments were to be made. In view of the Constitutional requirement and the interim order already passed in Human Right Case 104 of 1992 it is expected that in future all appointments shall be made after due publicity in the area from which the recruitments had to take place. This will, however, not apply to short-term leave vacancies or to contingent employment.
7. As regards the policy of making appointments against land grants, we find that this amounts to, in fact, sale of public office for property. Not only it is against the Constitutional law applicable to public office but is not conducive to public interest. What could be done within the framework of the law was to create a margin of preference for those who make such grants, other conditions of eligibility and suitability and fitness being equal. We, therefore, overrule this practice prospectively.
8. As regards the allocation of quota of posts to the local M.PAs. Or M.NAs. For recruitment to the posts, we find it offensive to the Constitution and the law on the subject. The Ministers, the Members of National and Provincial Assemblies, all are under an oath to discharge their duties in accordance with the Constitution and the law. The service laws designate, in the case of all appointments, a departmental authority competent to make such appointments. His judgment and discretion is to be exercised honestly and objectively in the public interest and cannot be influenced or subordinated to the judgment of anyone else including his superior. In the circumstances allocation of such quotas to the Ministers/MNAs/MPAs and appointments made thereunder are all illegal ab initio and have to be held so by all Courts, Tribunals and Authorities."
8. If the petitioners' appointments were in accordance with law as contended by them, termination of their services without any justifiable reason would entitle Chem to maintain appeals before the Service Tribunal and not a writ petition or Intra-Court Appeal or the present petitions for leave to appeal. The Service Tribunal is competent to go into the question, whether their appointments were made in accordance with law and whether termination of their services was warranted by law in view of clear provision of Article 212 of the Constitution. In this behalf, reference may be made to a recent judgment of this Court in the case of Muhammad Anis and others v. Abdul Haseeb and others (PLD :1994 Se 539). We are, therefore, of the view that the present petitions for leave to appeal are misconceived. The petitioners should approach Service Tribunal. It was pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners that if the petitioners will now file appeals before the Tribunal, the same may be treated time-barred. It will suffice to observe that the petitioners may file applications for condonation of delay and the learned Service Tribunal will consider the above applications keeping in view the peculiar facts of the present case and the factum that a large number of people are involved therein.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also apprehended that the Service Tribunal will be prejudiced by the various observations by the learned Judge in Chambers in the above judgment dated 22-8- 1993.
10. In this regard, it may be pertinent to observe that the learned Judge in Chambers was dealing with the broader Constitutional/legal issues and not with the cases of the petitioners individually.
He has not determined, as to whether the petitioners were appointed in accordance with law and whether termination of their services is warranted by law. These points are to be determined independently by the Service Tribunal after examining the factual and legal aspects. With the above observation, leave is refused.