' Muhammad Idrees, petitioner, and complainant of F.I.R. No,43 of 1994, dated 25-1-1994 under section 302/34, P.P.C. Registered against Muhammad Mustafa respondent, and others at Police Station Chunian, District Kasur has moved this petition under section 497(5), Cr.P.C. For cancellation of bail of the respondent granted to him by the learned Additional Sessions Judge on 7-5-1994 on the grounds that as per F.I.R. Only Japha has been attributed to the respondent and he did not inflict any injury on the person of Muhammad Hanif, deceased. The respondent had been declared innocent by the Investigating Officer on 16-2-1994 as well as by the Inspector/S.H.O., Police Station Chunian on 23-2-1994 and the D.S.P., Pattoki also found him innocent during his investigation vide Zimni No,16, dated 24-31994 and as such was placed in Column No,2 of the report under section 173, Cr.P.C. Making it a case for further inquiry.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the respondent has been named in the F.I.R.
With a specific role and the report was lodged promptly. Accordingly to him, licensed rifle .7 mm belonging to the deceased snatched by the respondent was recovered from him and a case vide F.I.R. No,70, dated 12-2-1994 under section 13 of Arms Ordinance XX of 1965 at Police Station Chunian was registered. Further the respondent has been challaned.
3. Learned counsel for the respondent opposed the petition.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have gone through the record. The deceased was murdered brutally according to injuries 19 and 20 of medico-legal report. The three Investigating Officers within a period of one month and eight days, that is, from 16-2-1994 to 24-3- 1994 completed three investigations and declared the respondent as innocent ignoring the statements of Matloob Murtaza and Shaukat Ali under section 161, Cr.P.C. Without any cogent reasons. Non of the Investigating Officers attempted to explain as to how the gun was taken from Muhammad Hanif deceased and recovered from the respondent. The Investigating Officers tried to support the prosecution case by withholding material information from the learned Additional Sessions Judge. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has given much weight to the opinion of the Investigating Officers based on unsound reasons and against the facts and evidence on record. Mere opinion of the Investigating Officer as a rule cannot be made basis for grant of bail in the absence of opinion forming material. It is the duty of the Court to examine the material available on record to find out whether reasonable grounds exist to connect the accused with the offence and the relevant material be assessed tentatively for the grant of bail. For this view I am fortified by the observations made in the case of Abdul Ghafoor v. Muhammad Ashraf and another 1994 Pcr. L J 804 that the Court has to examine the data available in the case to find out whether reasonable grounds exist to connect the accused with the crime and the relevant material to be assessed tentatively for the grant of bail in a case, is the police report, the nature and credentials of evidence, which is proposed to lead, coupled with the surrounding circumstances relevant to the case. It was further observed that unless there are no reasonable grounds to believe that a person has committed a non-bailable offence, mere need for further enquiry is no ground to grant of bail.
In the case of Muhammad Ashraf v. The State 1971 SCMR 183 it was observed that the police challan is nothing but the opinion of the Investigating Agency and is entirely irrelevant consideration for releasing on bail the accused. The same view was held by their Lordships in Hakim Ali and 3 others v. The State 1979 SCMR 174. Similarly, in the case of Saeed Ahmed v. The State 1981 SCMR 565 it was observed that the opinion of the Investigating Officer cannot be treated as legal C evidence. The Honourable Judges of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Liaqat Ali v. The State PLD 1994 SC 172 held that opinion of the Investigating Officer is not binding upon the Court which can have its own opinion after examining the same and come to a different conclusion and that the opinion of an Investigating Officer holding an accused innocent cannot be made the only basis for grant of bail; due weight though is to be given to such opinion but the Court can examine the material forming basis of the same and if it is based on inadmissible and irrelevant evidence it will not carry any weight at all.
5. Now it is to be seen whether the opinion expressed by the Investigating Officers is based on sound and sufficient material or not. The administration of justice demands that the prosecution should place all the facts relating to a case before the Court of law enabling it to decide the same on merits and meet the ends of justice. The prosecution in the present case concealed the fact of recovery of gun from the respondent and registration of case under section 13 of Arms Ordinance XX of 1965 from the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge due to which the respondent got the concession of bail. It, thus, cannot be said that the finding of the Investigating Officers declaring the respondent innocent are based on sound footings and borne out from the record rather seems to be mala fide.
6. For what has been discussed above, the order, dated 7-5-1994 of the learned Additional Sessions Judge granting bail to the respondent is recalled. D The petition is accepted and is disposed of accordingly.