' This revision petition under section 115, C.P.C. Has been filed to assail the order dated 17-12-1984 passed by the Additional District Judge, whereby the order granting temporary injunction by the triar Court has been set aside.
2. An extra departmental public call office, hereinafter referred to as E.D.P.C.O., was installed at Chak No,348/G.B., District Toba Tek Singh in 1992, in front of the house of the petitioner/plaintiff who is the custodian of the public call office. There is party faction in the village and the inhabitants are divided into two groups. In consequence of a complaint an inquiry was conducted by the Divisional Engineer Telephones, who recommended that on account of party faction the E.D.P.C.O. May be shifted to a common place in the village. For this purpose he recommended that it should be shifted to a room adjacent to the village mosque and it should be manned by a departmental employee. The report of the Divisional Engineer is reproduced below:-- "(i) That the E.D.P.C.O. Has been installed at the West corner of the village in Government land in front of the house of E.D.P.C. Agent Mr. Muhammad Hussain which is the elder brother of Mr. Muhammad Nazir, A.E.T./C. Toba Tek Singh. This village is a smaller one and the place is suitable as it covers the other villages also.
(ii) That the inhabitants of the village are relatives and are divided into two groups which are deadly against with each other.
(iii) That at present E.D.P.C.O. Is in use of the party relating to Mr. Muhammad Hussain E.D.P.C.O.
Agent.
(iv) That the other party does not use the telephone either for incoming or outgoiqg calls as they think their insult to go the house to their opponent.
(v) That the complaining party has requested to shift the E.D.P.C.O. At a common and central place in the chowk of village where a room is available for this purpose attached with the mosque.
(vi) that in my opinion E.D.P.C.O. May be shifted at central place and at departmental E.D.P.C.O.
Operator may be appointed there. Non-appointment of departmental operator will increase the tussle of both the parties, which is already at the extreme. If the income of the E.D.P.C.O. Decreases after shifting it may be closed. This is the only solution to finish their tussle please."
' The petitioner filed a suit for permanent injunction against the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation and others for permanently restraining them from shifting the P.C.O. Or to interfere in his business. It was stated in the plaint that in 1992 the E.D.P.C.O. Was installed in the village in the Government owned land against the quota of the M.N.A. And the plaintiff/petitioner being its custodian spent a lot of money towards its installation. It was stated that if the P.C.O. Was shifted to some other place, he will suffer irreparable loss in his reputation. Temporary injunction sought was granted by the learned trial Court. However, the order granting the temporary injunction has been set aside by the learned Additional District Judge vide the impugned order.
3. The learned Additional District Judge while refusing the temporary injunction has taken the view that the P.C.O. Was neither the ancestral property of the plaintiff nor did he have vested right to oppose the intended shifting of the P.C.O. By the defendants, therefore, it could not be urged that he would suffer an irreparable injury through the assumed dishonour or humiliation. He further observed that since the plaintiff had bound himself through a written agreement to the shifting of the P.C.O. To any other place by the telephone department, he did not have a prima facie case for the grant of temporary injunction.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the petitioner had spent a lot of money for getting the telephone installed and building a room for that purpose. He further argued that the E.D.P.C.O. Was installed at a place which is owned by the Government, therefore, it is already at a public place where everybody can avail of the telephone facility. He also submitted that the petitioner would not only suffer huge monetary loss but would also stand humiliated and dishonoured in the eyes of others.
5. For granting temporary injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. The following factors have to be considered:--
(i) Whether, prima facie, a right exists in the applicant and whether the respondents are likely to infringe that right. This is generally called, whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case in his favour.
(ii) Whether irreparable loss or injury will accrue to the petitioner/plaintiff if the injunction is not granted.
(iii) The inconvenience which the petitioner will suffer if the injunction is not granted will be comparatively greater than that which is likely to arise from granting it. This is generally called that the balance of inconvenience should be in favour of the applicant.
6. The learned lower appellate Court has found that the petitioner does not have a prima facie case because no right exists in his favour. It is to be remembered that the E.D.P.C.O. Unlike individual telephone connections, vests in the Telephone Department and the subscriber is only the agent of the Department and custodian of the apparatus. It is provided in para. No,11 of the contract entered into between the petitioner and the General Manager of the Telecommunication Corporation that "I shall have no objection to the shifting or closure of P.C.O. And removal of the apparatus or their fixtures connected therewith at any time and without assigning any reason thereof'. Similarly, para. No,14 provides that the department reserves the right to close the P.C.O. At any time without assigning any reason. The petitioner, admittedly, signed this agreement with the Telephone Department. In view of this written agreement it cannot be said that the petitioner has a right to insist that the P.C.O. Cannot be shifted to any other site. The learned appellate Court has, therefore, rightly held that petitioner does not have a good prima facie case.
7. In the instant case, it is not denied by the learned counsel that there is enmity between the two factions in the village and the order for shifting the E.D.F.C.O. To a place adjacent to the village mosque in the village chowk and have it manned by a departmental employee was in consequence of a complaint made by the inhabitants of the village. The Divisional Engineer who is a responsible officer in the Telephone Department himself visited the spot and reported that the E.D.P.C.O. Was installed at the western corner of the village in Government land in front of the house of E.D.P.C.O. Agent Mr. Muhammad Hussain who is the elder brother of Muhammad Nazir, A.E., Toba Tek Singh. He also found that there was party faction in the village and the E.D.P.C.O. Was in use of the party relating to Muhammad Hussain, E.D.P.C.O. Agent. It was in the background of these facts that he recommended that the E.D.P.C.O. Should be shifted to a central place in the chowk of the village in a room attached to the village mosque. It has to be remembered that the public call office is for the use and convenience of the general public and it has to be installed at a place where every inhabitant of the area can freely go to avail the telephone facility. The fact whether the balance of inconvenience lies in favour of granting the temporary injunction has to be decided keeping in view the paramount consideration that the telephone facility should be freely available to the general public. Admittedly, the E.D.P.C.O. Is presently installed in the corner of the village in front of the house of the petitioner/plaintiff. This is also admitted that there is strong party faction in the village. Therefore, it is but natural that the persons belonging to the party opposite to that of the petitioner would not like to go and avail the facility at a place which is in front of the petitioner's house. In view of the social conditions prevailing in our society, especially the rural society, it is difficult to imagine that a person would like to go for the purpose of availing of the telephone facility under the control of his enemy and at a place near the residence of that enemy. In these circumstances, the balance of inconvenience does not lie in favour of the petitioner for the grant of temporary injunction.
8. Similarly, the view taken by the learned Additional District Judge that the temporary injunction cannot be granted simply because the petitioner will feel dishonoured and humiliated has to be endorsed. The honour and humiliation as such are not the relevant considerations for granting or refusing temporary injunctions because these considerations are related to human feelings. Such considerations ought not to weigh with the Courts. The Courts are concerned only with the rights and remedies. If a right vesting in a litigant is infringed or threatened to be infringed only then a litigant is entitled to the grant of a temporary injunction. Dishonour, if any, has also to be inferred only in the case of infringement or threatened infringement of a right, but not otherwise.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the petitioner has built a room by spending a lot of money. I am afraid, this is not a relevant consideration. A monetary loss has never been considered to be an irreparable loss for the purpose of granting or refusing temporary injunctions.
10. The above discussion shows that all the three factors go against the petitioner. The learned Additional District Judge, therefore, was right in recalling the order granting the temporary injunction. Power under section 115, C.P.C. Is essentially to correct errors of jurisdiction. It can be exercised where the subordinate Court has passed an order in excess of jurisdiction or where it failed to exercise the jurisdiction or where the order passed is based on no evidence or it is based on inadmissible evidence or it is perverse or arbitrary or palpably unjust.When the order impugned has been passed in the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction by the subordinate Court, as is the case herein, the conditions prescribed under section 115, C.P.C. Will have to be strictly construed in favour of maintaining the order passed by the subordinate Court in its discretion. In the instant case, while passing the impugned order, the learned lower appellate Court has relied on the evidence which was annexed by the plaintiff himself with the plaint and the conclusions arrived at by him are neither perverse nor arbitrary. Therefore, the impugned order cannot be revised or set aside under section 115, C.P.C.
11. The sum total of the above discussion is that the impugned order does not suffer from lack of jurisdiction, excess of jurisdiction, illegality or material irregularity in the exercise of the jurisdiction.
Moreover, it is substantially a just order, in the circumstances of the case. Resultantly, the revision petition is dismissed in limine.