' The relevant facts are that the petitioner No, 1 was serving as Director Administration with the respondent-Corporation. He was to retire on attaining the age of superannuation on 11-3-1994 while the petitioner No, 2 was serving as Joint Director and had retired on 11-12-1993. The Board of the respondent-Corporation in its meeting held on 18-12-1993 decided to appoint them on contract basis for a period of 3 years and 2 years respectively. The orders of their appointments were issued on 2-3-1994 and 19-1-1994, which have been placed on record as Annexures 'E & D' respectively.
The petitioners joined duty. However, the respondent in the meeting held on 29-3-1994 proceeded to review the earlier decision and decided to terminate their services. Accordingly, office order dated 31-3-1994 placed as Annexures 'F & G' on the file were issued. The petitioners immediately coming to know of the resolution proceeded to file this writ petition, which was admitted to hearing and notice was issued to the respondent, who has appeared through Raja Mahmood Akhtar, Advocate and contested the petition.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the petitioners having been duly appointed under rule 73 of Punjab Small Industries Corporation Rules, 1976, framed under section 36 of Punjab Small Industries Corporation Act, 1973 (Punjab Act No, XV of 1973) (hereinafter to be referred as Rules of 1976 and Act No, XV of 1973 respectively). Thereafter, they joined duty, therefore, their services cannot be terminated except under Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975 (hereinafter to be referred as Rules of 1975). These rules were adopted again under section 36 of Act, 1973 vide Notification dated 2-11-1981 and made applicable to all employees of the Punjab Small Industries Corporation with retrospective effect from 12-3-1975. It is maintained that once the appointment was made, acted upon, the respondent lost right to repent and cannot terminate the service at will and arbitrarily. In this behalf; reliance is placed on Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh and another v. Sher Muhammad Makhdoom and 2 others (PLD 1991 SC 973). The petitioners could only be now dealt in accordance with E&D Rules of 1975.
3. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent argued that the petitioners cannot maintain a Constitutional petition to enforce contractual obligation. The learned counsel in this behalf has referred to Ahmad Faraz v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad and 2 others (1991 PLC (C.S.) 407), Millat Tractors Employees Trust and 2 others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Labour, Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis, Islamabad and 6 others (PLD 1992 Lah. 68), M. Enver Shaukat v. Federation of Pakistan and another (1981 PLC (C.S.) 15) and Muhammad Afzal v. Chairman, Lahore Development Authority, Lahore and 2 others (1993 PLC (C.S.) 1116). It is added that relationship between the petitioners and respondent is that of master and servant, therefore, the petitioners cannot maintain Constitutional petition and in case of illegal termination the only remedy available under the law is suit for damages. The learned counsel in this behalf has referred to Mrs. M.N. Arshad and others v. Miss Naeema Khan and others (PLD 1990 SC 612). The Principal, Cadet College, Kohat and another v.
Muhammad Shoab Qureshi (PLD 1994 SC 170) and Karachi Development Authority and another v.
Wali Ahmed Khan and others (1991 SCMR 2434). In the end it was argued that the petitioners cannot maintain one petition. They should have filed separate petitions because they were appointed through different letters.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioners while summing up the arguments maintained that the writ petition is competent because the petitioners are governed by statutory rules. The learned counsel in this behalf has referred to Mrs. Anisa Rehman v. P.IA.C. And another (1994 SCMR 2232). It is added that mis joinder of the parties is not fatal. In this behalf, the learned counsel has referred to Abdul Malik and others v. Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and others (PLD 1967 Lahore 520).
5. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties, gone through the record, relevant provisions of Act 1973 and Rules 1975 and 1976. The foremost point for determination is the status of the petitioners. It is provided in the rule 7.3 that the appointments can be made on temporary or permanent basis, on contract or on deputation. The relevant rule reads as under:-- 7.3. Appointments may be made on a permanent or temporary basis on contract or on deputation."
' It is, therefore, clear that the persons appointed on contract basis shall be considered regular employees. As against that there is no such provision in the Civil Servants Act, 1973, therefore, appointment under the Civil Servants Acts would be purely of contractual nature and not regular appointment.
6. Now coming to the first preliminary objection that contractual obligation cannot be enforced through Constitutional petition is clearly misconceived. The petitioners although employed for a specified period yet are regular employees, therefore, they will be governed by Rules of 1975 and 1976. This brings us to the second preliminary objection that the relationship between the parties is that of master and servant, therefore, writ petition is not competent. It is admitted that Rules of 1976 are statutory rules, therefore, relationship between the parties is not that of master and servant.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court has made this distinction clear in the judgment of Mr. Anisa Rehman (supra). The relevant portion of the judgment reads as under:-- "5. As regards the above second contention of the learned counsel for the parties, it may be stated that it is true that the Court has consistently held that in the absence of any statutory service rules the relationship between respondent No, 1 and its employees was that of Master and Servant."
' In this behalf, reference can also be made to M.H. Mirza v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Cabinet Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 2 others (1994 SCMR 1024).
This is not end of the matter because rule 13.2 of Rules of 1976 provides termination without assigning any reason by giving one month notice. The case of the petitioners is fairly and squarely covered by this rule. There is nothing wrong with the section. I am fortified in my view by the judgments in the cases of Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan and 2 others v. Muhammad Sharif (1988 SCMR 597) and Gordhandas v. Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) and another (1989 SCMR 14).
8. The upshot of the above discussion is that this writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.