' AJMAL MIAN, J.---This is a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment dated 27-7-1992 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal, in Appeal No,175(L) of 1989 filed by the petitioner challenging the orders of the respondent dated 30-5-1989, 19-6-1989. 10-7-1989 and 25-7-1989. By the first order, the petitioner while working as an Assistant on probation was reverted to his substantive post of Senior Clerk, whereas the second order relates to the dismissal of the petitioner's departmental appeal against the above first order. The third order pertains to the rejection of the petitioner's representation against the adverse remarks recorded in his A.C.R. And whereas, the fourth order relates to the petitioners retirement under sub- rule (1) of Rule 3 of the Pakistan WAPDA Employees (Retirement) Rules, 1979, hereinafter referred to as the rules.
2. It may be observed that the last order was substituted by order dated 18-9-1989, whereby the petitioner was retired with effect from 5-10-1989 instead of with immediate effect. Then even this order was substituted by an order dated 9-10-1989, whereby the petitioner was to retire with effect from 3-9-1990.
3. The Tribunal has dismissed the above appeal inter alia on the ground that one appeal was not competent against the three different types of orders i,e. Reversion, adverse remarks in the A.C.R.
And retirement; and secondly, on the ground that the appeal was barred by time. The original appeal was filed on 7-8-1989, whereas the amended appeal was filed on 18-2-1991. The petitioner has, therefore, filed the present petition for leave to appeal.
4. Mr. Muhammad Iqbal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has vehemently contended that the Tribunal was not justified in dismissing the petitioner's above appeal on the above grounds.
5. Even if we were to overlook the factum that one appeal was filed challenging three different types of respondent's orders, the petitioner's appeal was admittedly time-barred. The reversion order was passed on 30-5-1989 and petitioner's departmental appeal against it was dismissed on 19-6-1989 and, therefore, appeal on 7-8-1989 was barred by time. Even on merits as observed by the Tribunal, the above order was unexceptionable as the petitioner was reverted to his substantive post of Senior Clerk while working on probation as an Assistant.
6. As regards the order of retirement, it may be stated that the same was passed on 25-7-1989, but the above order was substituted by an order dated 18-9-1989 and the latter order was substituted by an order dated 9-10-1989; whereas the amended appeal was presented on 18-2-1991 and, therefore, obviously it was barred by time.
7. The Tribunal has treated the above appeal presented on 18-2-1991 as fresh appeal and if this date is to be taken as the date of presentation of the appeal, then admittedly all the impugned orders were passed in 1989 and the appeal was filed in 1991. We are, therefore, of the view that the case does not involve substantial point of law of public importance in terms of Article 212(3) of the Constitution. Leave is refused.