' This writ petition arises out of a matrimonial dispute. Respondent No,1 Mst. Bushra Shaheen was married to the petitioner Muhammad Ashraf. After some time differences arose between them and ultimately the petitioner sent a notice of divorce to respondent No,1 on 6-4-1993 which became effective on 5-7-1993. On 28-7-1993 respondent No,1 filed an application under section 9 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, for grant of maintenance for the period from 1-12-1992 to 5-7- 1993 at the rate of Rs,3,000 per month before respondent No,2 Chairman, Arbitration Council, Ward No,79, Ichhra, Lahore. This application was accepted vide order, dated 20-1-1994 and petitioner was directed to pay maintenance to respondent No,1 at the rate of Rs,3,000 per month for the period from 1-12-1992 to 5-7-1993 total amount being Rs,21,500.
2. The petitioner challenged the order, dated 20-1-1994 through a revision petition which was dismissed by respondent No,3 District Collector, Lahore on 7-8-1994. Hence this petition.
3. The first argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was against the assumption of jurisdiction by respondent No,2. He contended that since the petitioner had divorced respondent No,1 and the divorce became effective on 5-7-1993, respondent No,1 had ceased to be the wife of the petitioner and as such she could not have invoked the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Council under section 9 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, recourse to which could only be had during the subsistence of the marriage, and not after she had ceased to be the wife of the petitioner.
' The learned counsel has further contended that the order by respondent No,2 was passed ex parte and the petitioner came to know of the proceedings and passing of ex parte order on 24-3- 1994 when notice for execution of the ex parte decree was served upon him by the Tehsildar. Thus, he has been condemned unheard. He immediately thereafter filed revision petition before respondent No,3. He has further argued that application for setting aside ex parte decree could be made within 'reasonable time and no fixed time limitation has been prescribed.
4. I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the, petitioner and have also perused the record with his assistance. The first Question regarding jurisdiction of respondent No, 2 to entertain the application for maintenance after the dissolution of marriage has been examined by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Muhammad Najeeb v. Mst. Talat Shahnaz and others 1989 SCM R 119 wherein it was held that:-- "When an application is made by an ex-wife for maintenance regarding period when the wedlock was intact and also for the Iddat period, it would be made by the so-called divorced wife and would be covered by the word 'wife' as contained in section 9."
' This precedent has been followed by this Court in Muhammad Banaras v. Chairman, Union Council 1991 M LD 112 and Ghulam Mani v. Deputy Commissioner/Collector, Sialkot 1991 CLC 1813. I hold that the application has been competently filed before the Arbitration Council.
5. As regards the contention that the petitioner did not receive notice of the proceedings, the learned revisional Court has observed in para. 4 of the impugned judgment that the petitioner acknowledged the receipt of registered letter for 22-8-1993 and a notice was pasted at his residence for 4-11-1993. Again a notice was pasted at his residence to appear on 9-12-1993 and finally a notice was published in Daily "Mashriq" on 30-12-1993 summoning the petitioner to appear before the Arbitration Council on 13-1-1994, after which ex parte proceedings were adopted which are in accordance with law on the subject.
6. As to the argument advanced by the learned counsel that reasonable time is to be allowed, he has cited Matloob All Khan v. Additional District Judge 1988 SCM R 747 to contend that rule 16 of the Rules framed under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, providing that an application for the revision of a decision of an Arbitration Council shall be preferred within a period of 30 days from the passing of the order by the Arbitration Council, is ultra vires the Ordinance. I have examined the above-cited judgment. It is not relevant to the present case. In that judgment rule 13 of Family Courts Rules has been declared ultra vires section 9(6) of the Family Courts Act, 1964. It has been held that a plain reading of section 9(6) of the Act makes it clear that the statute provided no time limitation for making application for setting aside an ex parte decree passed by a Family Court.
The point to be noted is that this is not a case where the statute is silent with regard to the period of limitation for making an application of this nature, but a positive provision has been made permitting the making of such application "within the reasonable time of the passing" of the ex parte decree. The question is whether in the face of such statutory provisions, the rule making authority could frame a rule in any way limiting the period of limitation to a fixed period. 'The rule- making power has been vested in the Government under section 26 of the Family Courts Act for making rules to carry into effect the provisions of the Act. When the Act itself provides for making the application within reasonable time, apparently fixing a period of limitation for general application to all cases cannot be in consonance with the provisions of the Act and cannot be said to carry into effect the provisions of the Act".
7. The order which is being assailed in the present writ petition has been passed by the Collector exercising his powers under section 9(2) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. Section 9(2) provides as under:--- "9(2). A husband or wife may, in the prescribed manner, within the prescribed period, and on payment of the prescribed fee, prefer an application for revision of the certificate, to the Collector concerned and his decision shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court."
' The procedure for filing revision is prescribed in rule 16(1) of the rules framed under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, which reads as under:--- "16(1). An application for the revision of a decision of an Arbitration Council under subsection (4) of section 6, or of a certificate under subsection (2) of section 9, shall be preferred within thirty days of the decision or of the issue of the certificate, as the case may be, and shall be accompanied by a fee of two rupees."
8. It can be seen in the present case that the statute is silent with regard to the period of limitation for making an application for revision and no positive provision has been made permitting the making of such application within reasonable time of passing of the ex parte decree. Thus, the procedure and the time limit has been left to the rule-making authority who can prescribe the manner and the period and the fee for preferring a revision. Rule 16(1) is thus intra vires the statute and the revision must be filed within thirty days of the certificate issued by the Arbitration Council under section 9(1) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961.
9. Even if the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was taken into consideration to the effect that reasonable time is to be allowed for this purpose, the learned revisional Court has dealt with the matter of time at length and has not been satisfied that the petitioner has come within reasonable time or that the petitioner was not duly served or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was heard, therefore, the revisional Court has fully satisfied himself that the revision petition was barred by time.
10. There is no reasonable explanation on the part of the petitioner for approaching the revisional Court with a delay of two months and twenty days. In these circumstances, there appears to be no ground to interfere with the decision of the revisional Court. For the reasons aforesaid there is no force in this petition and it is dismissed in limine.