' The only point falling for determination, in this civil revision is, as to whether Abdul Ghaffar (herein respondent No, 1) had made the sale of his entire share in 1/2 of the house to Mst. Iqbal Begum (herein petitioner by means of registered deed dated 27th July 1982.
2. The facts, briefly stated, giving rise to this petition are: that Muhammad Ibrahim and Abdul Rahim were the owners of the suit house in equal share. After the demise of Abdul Rahim, his share/one- half in the house was inherited by his three sons and two daughters namely, Abdul Ghaffar/respondent No, 1, Abdul Jabbar/predecessor-in-interest of respondents Nos. 2 to 6, Abdul Razzak/respondent No, 7, Mst. Iqbal Begum/petitioner and Mst. Saeeda Begum/respondent No, 11.
By means of registered sale-deed dated 24-5-1979 (Exh. P-4), Mst. Iqbal Begum and Mst. Saeeda Bibi transferred their shares in the suit house in favour of three brothers, Abdul Ghaffar, Abdul Razzak and Abdul Jabbar. Resultantly, the aforesaid brothers became the owners of 1/3rd share each in 1/2 of the house to the exclusion' of their sisters. On 26th May, 1979, Abdul Razzak/herein respondent No, 7 sold his share in favour of Abdul Ghaffar and Abdul Jabbar by means of registered deed. This was not the end of the matter. Vide registered sale-deed dated 29th August, 1979, Abdul Gaffar and Abdul Jabbar retransferred the share, which they have purchased from Abdul Razzak, to him. As a result of this transaction, Abdul Ghaffar, Abdul Razzak and Abdul Jabbar became the owners of 1/2 of the house in equal shares, Abdul Ghaffar, thereafter, by means of registered deed dated 27th July, 1982 made the sale of his share to Mst. Iqbal Begum, herein petitioner.
3. Abdul Gaffar/respondent No, 1 brought a suit for partition of 1/2 of the house against petitioner and remaining respondents/alleging therein that he was the owner of 2/8th share in 1/2 of the house; that the petitioner and respondents were not allowing him to enjoy the use of his share in the house. The suit was contested by Mst. Iqbal Begum. She, in her written statement, pleaded that Abdul Ghaffar had, in fact, made the sale of his entire share in 1/2 of the suit house and had, therefore, no locus standi to institute the suit. On the divergent pleadings of the parties necessary issues were framed. Upon the consideration of the evidence adduced by the parties, the learned two Courts below came to the conclusion that Abdul Ghaffar, had made the sale of share which he had purchased from Mst. Saeeda Bibi and Mst. Iqbal Begum; that he was still the owner of share which he had inherited at the demise of his father, and so he was the co-sharer. On these conclusions, the learned trial Court passed a preliminary decree for partition which was affirmed by the first Court of appeal. This is how this revision petition has come to this Court.
4. The main point, raised on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioner, was that from the language of registered sale-deed dated 27th July, 1982, it was clear that Abdul Ghaffar had made the sale of his entire share in 1/2 of the house to Mst. Iqbal Begum and so he had ceased to remain owner in 1/2 of the house. Continuing the learned counsel contended that the learned two Courts below have committed an error of law by ignoring the operative part of the registered sale-deed dated 27-7-1982 (Exh. P.4). Reliance was placed upon L.A. v. Mrs. Mussarat Imtiaz (PLD 1993 Lahore 933).
5. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the respondents vigorously supported the impugned decisions rendered by the two Courts below.
6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and have perused the record of the case. Before I proceed to deal with, the point in issue, I feel it necessary to reiterate the three well-settled principles of construction of documents.
Firstly: Every contract is to be construed with reference to its object and the whole of its terms and accordingly, the whole context must be considered in endeavouring to collect the intention of the parties, even though the immediate object of inquiry be the meaning of an isolated clause. "It is a true rule of construction that the sense and meaning of the parties in any particular part of an instrument may be collected ex antecedentibus consequentibus; every part of it may be brought into action in order to collect from the whole one uniform and consistent sense, if that may be done." See Chitty's Treatise on the Law of Contracts (10th Edition), page 151).
Secondly: In the construction of all instruments it is the duty of the Court not to confine itself to the force of particular expressions, but to collect the intention of the parties from the whole instrument taken together but, where by the use of general words such intention is clearly and unequivocally expressed, every Court is bound by it, however capricious it may be, unless it be plainly controlled by other parts of the instrument. So in Barton v. Fitzgerald (1812) 15 East 530 it was held that the generality of a covenant for title in an assignment of a lease was not restrained by other covenants which went only to provide for or against acts of the assignor himself or those who claimed under him. There was no intention disclosed to restrain the general words. (See Chitty's Treatise on the Law of Contracts (10th Edition), page 156).
' Thirdly: When the words in the operative part of an instrument are ambiguous the recitals may be used as a test to discover the intention c of the parties and to fix the true meaning of those words.
But clear words in the operative part of an instrument cannot be controlled by the recitals. The rules as to the effect of recitals are set out by Lord Ex. P Dawes, re Moon (See Chitty's Treatise on the Law of Contracts (10th Edition), page 156). The above principle of construction of documents was noted with approval in Hamid Bakshu v. Irahim Meah (PLD 1956 Dacca 132) and L.D.A. v. Mrs. Mussarat Imtiaz (PLD 1993 Lah. 933).
7. Having noted relevant principles of constructions of the documents, I herein proceed to determine the question falling for consideration noted above. It is common ground between the parties that Abdul Rahim was the owner of 1/2 of the house. It is also not in dispute that after his demise, his share was inherited by three brothers and two sisters named above. It is also not contested that Mst. Iqbal Begum and Mst. Saeeda Bibi, in the first instance, sold their share to their brothers vide a registered sale-deed dated 24-5-1979. It is also not in controversy that Abdul Razzak/respondent No, 7 sold his share to. Abdul Ghaffar and Abdul Jabbar by means of registered sale-deed dated 26th May, 1979. It is also not in issue that Abdul Ghaffar and Abdul Jabbar re- transferred the share purchased from Abdul Razzak back to him by registered sale-deed dated 29th August, 1979. Now comes the controversial document dated 27th July, 1982 by which Abdul Ghaffar made the sale of his share to Mst. Iqbal Begum/petitioner. The case of Abdul Ghaffar/respondent No, 1, precisely stated, is that he had made the sale of that share which he had purchased from his sisters vide a deed dated 24-5-1979. On the contrary, the stand of Mst. Iqbal Begum is that Abdul Ghaffar had made the sale of his whole share in 1/2 of the house by virtue of the aforesaid sale-deed. In order to resolve the controversy reference had to be made to the principles noted above, that the sale-deed dated 27th July, 1982 had to be examined as a whole in order to discard what was transferred by it to Mst. Iqbal Begum and secondly the plain language of the operative part had to be given effect to by the Court irrespective of any extrinsic evidence. This being the legal position, I would like to peruse Exh. P-4/registered sale-deed dated 27th July, 1982. It reads as under:-- {{URDU TEXT}}
8. The plain language of this document clearly indicates in unequivocal and categorical terms that respondent No, 1 had made the sale of his entire share in favour of Mst. Iqbal Begum. The parties had used the word "Saalem Hissa"({{URDU TEXT}} ). The Salem means full/entire. This is antagnostic to the term Adha (L j) or Juzvi {{URDU TEXT}}(0.9)-F ). The perusal of this document, however, shows in the beginning Bainama 1/3 Makan . The reading of these two words clearly shows that there is no discord between the recital and the operative part of the document. This being the legal position, I have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the express and plain language of the sale- deed dated 27th July, 1982 shows that .Abdul Ghaffar/respondent No, 1 had made the sale of his entire share to Mst. Iqbal Begum and so he had ceased to remain the owner of the property in dispute. He, therefore, had no locus standi to file the suit for partition. The contention raised by the learned counsel for respondents is on the face of it highly untenable and contrary to manifest intendment of the parties. On these conclusions, I have no manner of doubt in coming to the conclusion that the decisions rendered by the two Courts below suffer from I violation of the principles of construction pertaining to documents and so cannot be sustained.
9. As a result of foregoing discussion, this revision petition is accepted. I accordingly set aside the judgments and decrees passed by the learned appellate Court dated 13-6-1989 and learned trial Court dated 1-10-1988. Resultantly, the suit filed by Abdul Ghaffar/respondent No, 1 is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.