' ZAKAULLAH LODHI, J.- The petitioner has assailed the decision dated 20th March, 1975, whereby the Sind Labour Court No. V, Karachi, directed the petitioner to re-instate in service the workers who have been numbered as "2nd respondents" in Petitions Nos. 305/75 to 316/75. Since the appeals filed by the 2nd respondents in these petitions were consolidated and disposed of by a common order by the Sind Labour Court No. V, I find it convenient to dispose of these writ petitions by a common order because common questions of law are involved in these petitions. The 2nd respondents were employed in the petitioner's organization in different capacities. Since 2nd respondents were not satisfied with the working conditions therefore they made a representation for the acceptance of several demands raised by them. Among other disputes a controversy had also arisen over the non-payment of dearness allowance which intensified the workers' movement against the Management. Since demands of the workers were not considered sympathetically by the Management the workers resorted to strike. The strike was considered illegal by the petitioner who on 27th August, 1974, charge-sheeted the 2nd respondents for resorting to illegal strike and inciting other workers to strike the work. A charge of habitual negligence of duty was also levelled against the 2nd respondents, Mohammad Hussain and Javed but the last mentioned persons are not the contestant in these petitions. As a result of the departmental enquiry the charges of resorting to illegal strike, inciting the workers to go on an illegal strike and neglecting the work were proved and the Enquiry Committee gave a report on 2nd November, 1974, that the charges levelled by the petitioner against the 2nd respondents had been proved against them. Subsequently, a second show-cause notice was issued to the 2nd respondents and the 2nd respondents were beard in person on 16th November, 1974. The second respondents submitted a written reply also to the show-cause notice but their reply was not found satisfactory and finally they were dismissed from services on 18th November, 1974.
The 2nd respondents without giving any grievance notice to the petitioner within the meaning of section 25-A (1) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, filed applications under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 for their re-instatement in service before the Junior Labour Court who rejected all the applications on 31st January, 1975.
The second respondents feeling aggrieved of the order of the Junior Labour Court preferred appeals in the Labour Court which were .Decided by the Sind Labour Court No. V, Karachi by an order dated 20th 'March, 1975, whereby it was held that the enquiry conducted against the 2nd respondents was violative of the principles of natural justice except in case of Mohammad Hussain and Javed who are not respondents before this Court. The order of the Junior Labour Court was set aside and the petitioner was directed to re-instate the 2nd respondents and pay them full back benefits.
5. Before dealing with the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner I may point out that at the very outset the maintainability of the writ petitions was challenged by the learned counsel for the 2nd respondents on the ground that the petitions had been filed against Hotel Inter- Continental which was not a juristic entity. In this connection I may point out that before the Junior Labour Court and Labour Court the 2nd respondents had impleaded Pakistan Services Limited as a party. Pakistan Services Limited are owners of the Inter-Continental Hotel and are a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act of 1913. The learned counsel for the petitioner in reply to the argument of the learned counsel for 2nd respondents that Hotel Inter-Continental not being a juristic entity in law could not file the petitions within the meaning of Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, replied that he had inadvertently omitted to implead the Pakistan Services Limited as a party to the case. He referred me to an application made by him on 6th November, 1975 under Order I, rule 10, C. P. C. Praying therein that Pakistan Services Limited may be impleaded as a party to the case. He further referred me to Karachi Road Transport Corporation Limited v. Faze! Brothers Limited (1) wherein this Court had allowed an amendment in the title of the suit as the same had been misdescribed. It was held by the Court that the subsequent amendment in the title of the suit so as to implead the correct party in the suit does not amount to prevent a new party to the suit for the purposes of limitation. Though the question of limitation is not involved in this case but it is obvious that even at the appellate stage misdescription could be allowed to be corrected. Besides this, it may also be mentioned here that the second respondents themselves have impleaded Hotel Inter-Continental as a party to the case before the Junior Labou Court and Labour Court. In the interest of justice I consider it necessary to allow the application of Pakistan Services Limited in order to meet the objections of the 2nd respondents that the Hotel Inter-Continental no being a juristic entity in law could not file the petitions.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the grievance procedure had not been complied with by the 2nd respondents before filing their applications before the Junior Labour Courts and therefore the applications were not tenable in law. Section 25-A (1) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 provides that a worker feeling aggrieved of an order passed by his employer should bring his grievance to the notice of the employer in writing either himself or through his shop steward or trade union within three months from the date on which the cause of such grievance arises before approaching the Junior Labour Court. The provisions of section 25- A(1) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 are mandatory and not merely directory. Non- compliance of these provisions is therefore fatal. The learned counsel for the 2nd respondents admitted that grievance notice had not been served upon the petitioner by the 2nd respondents before approaching the Junior Labour Court. He, however, contended, that the grievance notice was not necessary because the 2nd respondents filed their applications within the meaning of subsection (6) of section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. According to him it was not necessary for a workman to give a grievance notice before approaching the: {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1971 Kar. 583 {{FOOT NOTE}} Junior Labour Court. He argued that it depended upon the choice of the worker either to give a notice to the employer within the meaning of section 25-A (1) before filing application in the Junior Labour Court or to file an application directly within the meaning of subsection (6) of section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Elaborating his argument he started that in such cases where the workers did not entertain any hope that their grievances would be satisfied by the Management outside the Court it was not necessary for them to give a grievance notice and they could directly file their application before the Junior Labour Court within the meaning of subsection
(6) of section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 which according to him caters for such cases. Subsection (6) of section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 is reproduced below for reference :- 'Section 25-A (6).--Notwithstanding anything contained in subsections (1) to (4) any worker aggrieved by the termination of his employment as a result of retrenchment, dismissal, discharge, lay-off, lock-out, or otherwise not earlier than two months preceding commencement of Industrial Relations (Amendment) Ordinance, 1972, may, within a period of two months from the commencement of Industrial Relations (Amendment) Ordinance, 1972, or the termination of the employment, whichever is later either himself or through his shop steward or trade union, take the matter directly to a Junior Labour Court having jurisdiction in the area in which the establishment is situated."
' A study of subsection (6) would reveal that this provision has been inserted in section 25-A subsequent to its enactment. It provides that the cases' arising during the period not earlier than two months preceding the coming into force of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Ordinance, 1972 could-be filed directly in the Junior Labour Court within two months from the promulgation of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 1973 or the termination of the employment whichever is later. Subsection (6) therefore does not in any manner affect the provisions of section 25-A (1) to (4). If the argument of the learned counsel that the grievances of the workers could be entertained by the Junior Labour Court directly under the provision of subsection (6) of section 25-A is accepted then the provisions of subsections (1) to (4) of section 25-A would be rendered redundant which cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be the intention of Legisature. Subsection
(6) therefore provides for a particular category of cases, and for those cases for which this provision had been enacted it be dispensed with the requirement of abiding by the provisions of subsections (1) to (4) of the section 25-A. In all other cases which did not arise within the period which has been mentioned in subsection (6) itself the procedure laid down in subsections (1) to (4) of section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 is mandatory. The argument of the learned counsel for the 2nd respondents that was elective for the aggrieved worker either to approach the Labour Court directly or to follow the provisions of subsections (1) to (4) of section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 before approaching the Junior Labour Court is therefore fallacious. In this case, admittedly, the grievance notice as envisaged by section 25-A (1) was not given therefore the application before the Junior Labour Court were not competent.
' The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Labour Court was by law restricted in the matter of exercise of its jurisdiction in case which involved the examination of the proceedings of domestic enquiry and it could not go into the merits of the enquiry like an appellate Court. According to him some degree of sanctity is attached to the departmental enquiries and the Junior Labour Court and Labour Court could not scrutinize the proceedings of domestic enquiry or sit upon the judgment of the enquiry officer like an appellate Court. He has relied upon United Distributors Limited v. Zahid Hussain Khan and others (1). In this case it is held that "the Labour Courts or Tribunals cannot function as a Court of appeal on the decisions taken in the domestic enquiries and that the orders of the enquiry officer should not be interfered with by the Labour Courts in the absence of any plausible reasons." In the instant case I find that sufficient opportunity was given to the second respondents to contest their case and therefore there was no scope left for the Labour Court, who decidedly enjoyed limited jurisdiction to examine the correctness of the procedure adopted by the enquiry officer. A perusal of the record shows that a thorough enquiry was made by the enquiry officer who c finally came to the conclusion that strike was illegal as it was resorted to without observing the procedure laid down in section 26 (1) and (3) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The Labour Court was legally debarred from examining the validity of the domestic enquiry unless there was any patent irregularity apparent on the face of record. In this case, however, no plausible reasons have been shown by the learned Labour Court to justify interference with the results of the enquiry and give a finding that the charges of illegal strike, taking out of procession, abusing the officers and manhandling a photographer against the 2nd respondents were baseless.
8. For the foregoing reasons I find that the impugned order passed by the Sind Labour Court No. V, on 20th March, 1975, ordering the re-instatement of the 2nd respondents in these petitions is patently illegal and without jurisdiction. Consequently, the petitions are allowed and the impugned order passed by the Labour Court is set aside. The parties are however left to bear their own costs.