DECISION ' This appeal arises from an order of Labottr Court No, IV, Karachi whereby the application for reinstatement filed by the appellant Miss Bilques Akhtar against P.I.A. Was dismissed.
2. Miss Bilques Akhtar had joined the P.I.A. On 30-9-1988 as an air-hostess. During a period of her service she was found absent on serval occasions and ultimately on 12-6-1991 she was served with a show-cause notice. She was heard personally by the Director, Flight Service where she pleaded that she was not able to remain present on some occasions due to illness of her mother and that proper enquiry had not been conducted and it was an ex parte proceedings as far as she was concerned as she was not associated with that enquiry. The Director appeared satisfied with her explanation and he let her off with the warning to be careful in future. It is alleged that an undertaking was taken from her for punctuality but admittedly no such written undertaking has been filed before the Labour Court.
3. The appellant was surprised all of a sudden to receive an order of dismissal, dated 25th August, 1992 without any previous notice or any fresh enquiry allegedly for breach of an undertaking of which she was not aware. Reason for dismissal given this time was that you were given chance to improve your performance and kept under observation for three (3) months twice but you continued to remain irregular".
4. The appellant then preferred a departmental appeal provided under Rule 85 of the P.I.A. Rules and waited for a reasonable time for the decision. When no reply was received she gave a grievance notice to the respondent Corporation on 20-11-1992 and thereafter she filed an application before the Labour Court under section 25-A of the I.R.O. The learned Labour Court after hearing the parties dismissed the application as time barred.
5. It has been argued by Ch. Muhammad Ashraf Khan for the appellant that the order of dismissal was issued without serving the appellant with a show-cause notice and without giving her an opportunity to defend herself. She was therefore prejudiced by this procedure as she was not aware that she had given any undertaking and that she had committed any breach of the undertaking making her liable for dismissal.
6. The learned counsel for the appellant has then argued that her grievance application before the Labour Court was not time-barred. She was dismissed on 27-8-1992. She preferred departmental appeal within 11 days on 20-11-1992 as provided but the Departmental Enquiry Rules of P.I.A Rule 85.
There was no time limit for the duration of the enquiry, she therefore waited for a reasonable time.
On 20-11-1992 she gave grievance notice to the Corporation. That the time taken by the departmental appeal has to be excluded under the rules. In support of this contention the learned counsel has cited 1990 PLC 280 in which a previous decision of the Supreme Court has been relied upon in support of the contention that the period consumed by the departmental appeal has to be excluded. In 1985 PLC 468 six months' time was considered to be a reasonable time for waiting for the decision of the departmental appeal. The application for condonation of delay if any under section 5 of the Limitation Act had been preferred by the appellant alongwith her appeal but no order was passed by the learned Labour Court on that application.
7. It has on the other hand been argued by Mr. Masood Ahmed Khan for the P.I.A. Corporation that no departmental appeal had been sent directly to the P.I.A. But it was forwarded by a Federal Minister after three months on 16th December, 1992.
8. The learned Advocate for the P.I.A. Corporation admits that the alleged written undertaking for the breach of which the appellant has been dismissed subsequently is not on the record of the Labour Court nor can he produce a copy of it. Breach of any undertaking for passing of the extreme punishment order is not therefore proved. The departmental enquiry for misconduct had ultimately ended and the penalty awarded was that she was to be kept under observation for three months to see if the misconduct was repeated. After three months more it was found that she had remained absent again and she was therefore subjected to the punishment of dismissal without any further domestic enquiry. Admittedly the appellant had not given any written undertaking after the first enquiry. The first enquiry had ended and she was apparently let off with a warning not to repeat the misconduct of remaining absent for the alleged breach of undertaking and for further instances of misconduct, it was incumbent on the Corporation to hold a second enquiry and charge-sheet but this was not done. On the basis of the first enquiry the appellant was punished without giving her an opportunity to explain the subsequent acts of alleged misconduct. The dismissal without further enquiry and without a fresh show-cause notice was therefore illegal and void.
9. There could be no limitation against a void order, and order violating principles of natural justice.
It has however been shown that excluding the period of departmental appeal the grievance application was within time. The P.I.A. Corporation should not therefore take shelter behind the plea of limitation.
10. Admittedly the appellant has not claimed even in the Memo. Of Appeal that she has remained an employed during the intervening period after her dismissal. The appellant has relied upon provision of the P.I.A. Rules that she has not to take any other employment while in service of the Corporation but the period after dismissal cannot be said to be during that service. Under the circumstances she is not entitled to any back benefits.
11. In the result the order of the learned Labour Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed. The appellant may be reinstated in service as air-hostess within a period of 15 days from date of this