This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 30-9-1992 whereby the appellant is evicted from the two shops in his possession. The case of the respondent/landlady is that she is owner of House No.1749/14, Federal `B' Area, Karachi and shops Nos.3 and 5 located on the ground floor of the said house are on rent with the appellant /tenant at the total rent of Rs.450 per month, that the landlady's husband was serving in Saudi Arabia but his services were terminated on 9-2-1988 due to the closing down of the company in which he was serving and he returned to Pakistan on 15-8- 1988 and desired to start his own business to earn his living and, therefore, required the two shops for his bona fide requirements. It was further stated that on 17-10-1988 landlady's husband requested the opponent to vacate the two shops and also demanded the payment of the rent for the months of August, September and October, which had fallen in arrears and the appellant/tenant thereafter, sent the rent of three months on 24-10-1988 which was accepted against the receipts although the appellant/tenant had become a defaulter and was liable to eviction on that ground and it was stated that the rent was accepted on the assumption that the appellant would be vacating the premises on the request made to him. When, however, the shops were not vacated, the Rent application was filed on 23-11-1988. In his written statement the appellant/tenant stated that there were, in all, five shops in the house of the landlady and the appellant was originally inducted as tenant into three shops (Shops Nos. 2, 3 and 5) whereas Shops Nos.1 and 4 were rented out to some other persons but subsequently the landlady had obtained the possession of Shops Nos.1 and 4 from other tenants and shop No.2 from him and had amalgamated them into the residential portion and on that account he claimed that the requirements of the landlady were not bona fide because if her husband required the shops for his bona fide requirements, the three shops would not have been amalgamated in the residential portion. On the bass of the evidence adduced by the parties before him, the learned Rent Controller however, came to the conclusion that the requirements of the landlady were bona fide and he therefore passed the eviction order against the appellant. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard.
2. The fact that the husband of the respondent/landlady was working in Saudi Arabia but had to come back from there in August, 1988 because of the termination of his service and the closure of the company in which he was serving is not denied by the appellant vide para.2 of his written statement. This is, therefore, an admitted position. Even during the course of the arguments this fact was conceded. The question for decision therefore is only that whether, under the circumstances as enumerated above, the respondent/landlady required the premises for the genuine and bona fide requirements of her husband.
3. Premises No.1749/14, Federal `B' Area is a residential premises located in a residential area.
Judicial notice can be taken of this fact. Under financial compulsions, however, a number of residents, specially if their houses are located on a main road, have converted rooms on the ground floor of their houses into make-shift shops. There was, therefore, nothing unusual, illegal or suspicious if the landlady after acquiring the, possession of the three shops, one shop from the appellant and two shops from other tenants, converted them into residential portion and amalgamated them with the rest of the residential portion. When the husband of the respondent was out of the country, she obviously needed only a skeleton accommodation but now that her husband had returned it was only natural that she should have a full-fledged residential house.
That is why the three shops had been amalgamated into the rest of the residential portion. In view of this position, it does not lie in the mouth of the appellant to argue that had the husband of the respondent genuinely required some accommodation to run a shop for his livelihood, he should not have amalgamated the three shops into the residential portion. It was also argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent/landlady had not come to the Court with clean hands and had not disclosed all the relevant facts and had concealed many of them and this reflected on the bona fides of the personal requirements of her husband. This is not correct. All the relevant facts had been mentioned by the respondent/landlady in her eviction application. It was not necessary for her to state in her eviction application that possession of three of the shops had been earlier obtained by her and she had amalgamated them into residential portion. Those shops had ceased to be shops and had become a part of her residential portion and therefore it was not necessary for her to disclose this fact. At the worst it can only be considered as an omission of a minor fact.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant has also raised the contention that evidence brought on record by the respondent was beyond her pleadings. There is no force in this contention. Evidence brought by the respondent on record is only in respect of personal requirements of her husband.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant has also referred me to the reported judgments in the cases of Rehmat Khan v. Anjum Hayat Mirza 1992 CLC 1102; Malik Islam Akbar v. Mustafa Hussain 1992 CLC 1753; M/s. Bara Imam Bara Trust v. M/s. Hakim A.I & Co. 1992 CLC 2235 and Fida Hussain v. Noor Muhammad Bana 1985 CLC 3014 in support of his contention that the respondent had failed to establish the bona fides of her personal requirements. I am afraid, the reliance placed on the judgments is misplaced. It may be noted that it is an admitted fact that the husband of the respondent/landlady was serving in Saudi Arabia and had returned from there in August, 1989. It is also an admitted fact that there were three other shops in the same premises which the respondent/landlady got vacated and included in her residential portion. It does not lie in the mouth of the appellant/tenant to question the wisdom of respondent's doing this. Obviously enough, she has done because, with the return of her husband to Pakistan, she wanted to give a good shape to her house and required more accommodation than she had when she was living alone. These three shops can no longer now be called shops. They are part of the residential unit.
Now that the husband of the landlady has come to Pakistan and is not in any way employed anywhere, his desire to open his Parchoon Shop in the remaining two shops located in the premises cannot be termed as either mala fide or unreasonable. It may be argued (although it was not argued by the learned counsel for the appellant) that the respondent/landlady could at the most require one of the two shops with the appellant and not both 9f them but this also cannot be argued. Evidently enough, the two shops are so small units that the appellant himself found it necessary to use both of them as one unit. In fact, he was using three shops together as one unit.
As such, requirements of the respondent's husband for both the shops cannot be questioned.
6. In view of what is stated above I find no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.
7. It is an established position on record that the respondent's husband is without employment ever since his return to Pakistan in August, 1988 and the financial strains to which the respondent must have been put during these five or six years can only be imagined. Even so, the appellant is allowed three months' time from today to vacate the premises subject to his depositing the rent in the Court of the Rent Controller by 10th of the following month for which the rent is due. Failing this the eviction order shall be executable at once.