MUNIR A. SHEIKH, J.- This judgment will also dispose of Intra Court Appeal No.279 of 1984 as in both the appeals questions of facts and law are common.
2. The dispute relates to property No.78 Upper Mall Lahore, It was owned by Mst. Sardar Begum. She had two sisters namely Mst. Dara Tasleem and Begum Almas Daultana.
3. In the year 1965 the Lahore Improvement Trust as it then was started proceedings for the acquisition of this property for NIPA. These proceedings culminated in an Award dated 30.1.1965.
Mst. Sardar Begum challenged these proceedings before this Court through Writ Petition No.1530 of 1967. During the pendency of this Constitutions! Petition Mst. Sardar Begum petitioner died issueless on 1.10.1967. Mst. Dara Tasleem and Begum Almas Daultana her two sisters were substituted as petitioners as her legal heirs. It may be mentioned here that subsequently Dara Tasleem also died issueless. In pursuance of these acquisition proceedings, the possession of the property was taken over by the Government. The said writ petition was accepted through judgment dated 13,8.1971. It was declared that part of all such proceedings from the stage of Section 9 of the Land Acquisition {{PART MISS}} acquisition of this property was issued on 2.12.1981 in pursuance of which iht possession of the property was taken by the Government on 3.2.1982. However, on 11.2.1982 another Notification was published under section 48 of the said Act for withdrawal of the Notification dated 2.12.1981 issued under section 4 stating that the property had already been acquired, and the said fresh Notification was issued in ignorance of the same.
7. On 31.3.1982 the Private respondents made a reference to Collector under sections 18 and 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 alleging that they being the heirs of Ghulam Muhammad deceased who was real brother of Mst. Sardar Begum the original owner of the property as such were entitled to share the 1 compensation awarded
8. The Governor of Punjab simultaneously constituted a committee consisting of the Chief Secretary, Mayor of Lahore Corporation, Commissioner ' Lahore Division and Director General NIPA to consider the feasibility of allotment of a plot to the petitioner in lieu of this property in implementation of agreement dated 28.11.198'. O.i 13 A '1982 a meeting of this committee was held in which it J was pointed out to the appellant that fresh acquisition proceedings initiated through } Notification under section 4 of the Act dated 2.12.1981 had already been withdrawn therefore, the appellant should seek remedy before the L.D.A. Tribunal > in accordance with law if he was aggrieved of the quantum of compensation already j granted under the award delivered on 31.8.1973 in pursuance of the earlier acquisition proceedings. The appellant find Writ Petition No.4077/1984 before this ; Court which was dismissed in limine on 27.11.1984 by the learned Single Judge.
I his judgment/order has been challenged m the connected l.C.A.No.279/19.84. In the said Writ Petition (W.P.No.4077/84) from which said I.C.A, has arisen a declaration was sought that the acts done and proceedings taken by the respondents in reviving the abandoned acquisition proceeding of the disputed property was without lawful authority.
9. On coming to know that the private respondents i.e.Heir o Ghulam Muhammad deceased had find a Reference under Sections 18 and 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, the appellant find Writ Petition No. 11038/91 praying that the proceedings before the L.D.A. Tribunal in the said reference may be quashal. This |Vo*. XVI #tbs Rev. C.11 #the writ petition was dismissed in limine through judgment dated 27.11.1991 which has I icon challenged in this Intra Court Appeal No.24 of 1992.
10. It appears that on the other hand, the Provincial G overnment was convinced that the undertaking given by the Government through agreement dated 28.11.1981 to the appellant should be honoured. The Chief Minister in 1994 constituted a Committee and the appellant on 16.10.1994 was transferred P'ors No.619 to 659 of seven Marlas each total land'of which comes to I6 Kanals in Block G/I of Jfouhar Town Scheme in lieu of the property in dispute w:is measuring 14 Kanals on the Mall Road. An agreement was executed betwgv;n lhc!
L. D.A, and the appellant on 25.1.1995 in which the allotment of the said ploi.s 10 the appellant was confirmed being in full and final settlement of the matter.
11. Begum Almas Daultana died during the pendency of the said reference made by respondertts/heirs of Ghulam Muhammad deceased. The said reference remained pending for about 10 long years, It was decided ultimately on 7.11.1992 on the basis of consent/concession made by the heirs of Begum Almas Daultana that Ghukun Muhammad deceased predecessor-in- interest of the respondents was the brother of Sardar Begum deceased as such his heirs were also entitled to a share in the compensation payable regarding the property in question.
12. Before proceeding further, it may prominently be observed here that Mst. Sardar Begum died on 1.10.1967 whereas Ghulam Muhammad ceased predecessor-in-interest of respondents alleged brother of Sardar Bibi had earlier died on 29.3.1967.Mst. Sardar Begum having left no male heir having died issuless therefore, the respondents as heirs of Ghulam Muhammad are claiming the share in the inheritance of Sardar Begum as residury alongwith Begum Almas Daultana who was the sister of Sardar Begum and was entitled to inherit from Sardar Begum as her sister the other sister namely Mst. Data Tasleem having also died issueless.
13. It is clear from the above facts that the part of initial acquisition proceedings which commenced in 1965 from the stage of section 9 of the Act were declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect and the respondents were directed to take'fresh proceedings from the said stage in pursuance of which Notification under section 17 was issued which culminated in the award'dated I 1.8.1973 but the possession of the property which had earlier been restored to Begum Almas Daultana in compliance with the judgment dated 13.8.1971 passed in the said writ petition remained with her to whom an amount of Rs. 1,30,000.00 as arrears of root for the period during which she remained out of possession was paid and she continued to retain the possession of the property till 1982. On 28.11.1981 in furtherance of negotiation between the appellant and Governor of the Punjab an agreement was executed by which the appellant undertook not to challenge the fresh K.I..It. 1to. < .
Particular when the change of possession at the spot of the property takes place therefore the maximum period of six months was provided to such person to make re I ere see. '
18. The private respondents as alleged by them were closely related to Mst. Sardar Begum the original owner of the property being the heirs of her alleged lirother Ghulam Muhammad deceased as such could not raise a plea that they remained unaware of the acquisition proceedings initiated in 1965 and dispossession of the owner from the premises, filing of Writ Petition No.1530 of 1967 by Mst. Sardar Begum, substitution of Begum Almas Daultana and Mst. Dara Taslcem as her only heirs on her death during the pendency of the said writ petition, restoration of possession of the property to Begum Almas Daultana in pursuance of judgment dated 13.8.1971 passed in the said writ petition, payment of an huge .Amount as root for the period during which Begum Almas Daultana remained out of possession and on the death of Mst. Sardar Begum the continuation of writ petition by Begum Almas Daultana alone as the only heir, the purchase of property by the appellant, the taking over of possession by him and is dispossession in pursuance of agreement dated 28.11.1981 between him and the Governor of the Punjab.
19. We have no hesitation in holding that the L.D.A. Tribunal in these circumstances, was not vested with the jurisdiction to enteratin the reference at the instance of respondents made after six months of the date of Collector's Award therefore the proceedings initiated through the said reference suffered from jurisdictional defect and are liable to be quashed being void, ab initio and the decision made therein being superstructure raised on such void proceedings is equally void and not sustainable.
20. Learned counsel for the private respondents argued that the appellant has not challenged the final order of the L.D.A. Tribunal dated 7.11.1992 in these proceedings therefore question of legality or otherwise of the said order should not be gone into for which the appellant should be directed to seek remedy independently. The Constitutional Petition No. 11038 of 1991 was find by the appellant to challenge the very commencement of the proceedings in the reference made by the respondents before the L.D.A. Tribunal, before final order in the same had been passed. As we have already held that L.D.A. Tribunal was not vested with the jurisdiction to entertain the said reference after a period of six months Imm the date of award of the Collector as such the said proceedings were void ab initio therefore, the final order being superstructure raised on the said void proceedings automatically has to fall on the ground as such it is of no merits to say that the said order should be challenged independently. For the same reasons, we do not feel ourselves in agreement with the learned Siingle Judge that the appellant should have waited for the decision in the said reference for the appellant was aggrieved of the* very initiation of the said reference and jurisdiction of the L.D.A. Tribunal had been challenged to entertain and decide the same. The appellant being a third parly claiming rights in the property not as one of the heirs of the owner therefore, could maintain the Constitutional petition to question the legality of the very institution or filing of the reference and the jurisdiction of the L.D.A, Tribunal to entertain and deal with the same instead of waiting for final decision to be made in the said reference therefore, Writ Petition No. 11038 of 1991 could not have been dismissed on the ground mentioned in the judgment dated 27.11.1991 passed in the said peiition by the learned Single Judge.
21. Faced with this difficulty, learned counsel for the respondents argued that reference had also been made before the L.D.A. Tribunal under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which provision of law does not prescribe any period of limitation for making reference under the said provision of law.
22. Under section 30 of the Act, it is only the Collector who in his discretion can make reference for decision of dispute to the Court as regards the apportionment of the compensation determined under section 11 of the Act or as to the person to whom the same or any part thereof is payable. It is clear from the bare leading of this provision of law that at the time of settlement of compensation under section 11 of the Act if any dispute i/raised or arises before the Collector tis to the person to whom the compensation was payable, the Collector could make the reference. This provision of law does not confer any right on a party to get a relerence made thereunder as a matter of right whereas under section 18 of the Act j a party has a right to make a reference and once an application was made under the said section, the Collector was bound to make the reference and no discretion is vested in him in this regard. We therefore, hold that the reference made on the application of the respondents by the Collector to L.D.A. Tribunal was a reference under section 18, as such the same having been made long after the expiry of maximum period of six months prescribed thereunder, the L.D.A. Tribunal was not vested with the jurisdiction to entertain and decide the same.
23. Apart from what has been discussed above, after examining the record of the reference decided by the L.D.A. Tribunal which was summoned and is available there are convincing reasons that making of the same lacked luma jutes and the initiation of the same was motivated by a desire to grab the property. It was alleged in the reference that the proceedings were kept secret from the respondents and it was not brought to the notice of the Collector while making the award tlv.It they were also entitled to share the compensation as residuries of Mst. Sardar Iiegum being heir of his alleged brother Ghulam Muhammad deceased. As we have already pointed out proceedings for acquisition of property under the act could not remain secret from any person much-less a person who was claiming rights directly in the property as alleged heirs of the owner being his nephews and nieces (heirs of ivoi; xvi #tbs Rev. C. 17 #the admission made by heirs of Begum Almas Daultana in the second written-statement was the result of fraud and collusion between them and the respondents as such even the order of the L.D.A. Tribunal based on that also suffered from the same legal infirmity as such did not create any right. Heirs of Begum Almas Daultana in fact reiterated the stand taken by her about the alleged claim of Ghulam Muhammad deceased being the brother of Mst. Sardar Begum in the first written- statement therefore, it could not have been departed from through collusion by them in the second written-statement. For these reasons also the order of the L.D.A. Tribunal can justifiably be ignored having no legal value in the eye of law. This is apart from the fact that the said respondent did not challenge directly the sale of property made in favour of the appellant at any stage.
25. The appellant was given a solemn undertaking by the authorities that he would be compensated by giving him a suitable plot/land in lieu of the property in dispute if he did not object to the acquisition proceedings. The appellant did not challenge the acquisition proceedings with a hope that the said undertaking shall be implemented in letter and spirit. He continued making efforts to get the same implemented for which he was made to run from the pillar to post.
After a long period he has been allotted plot in the Jauhar Town Scheme of L.D.A, after getting an agreement executed by him that he would not further claim the compensation as the same should be treated to be sufficient compensation for the property acquired, lie accepted the transfer of the said plots and signed the agreement as failing which he would not even given these plots. The appellant in these circumstances has-a justification to raise the question of adequacy of the compensation. The property acquired was situated at Mall Road the area of which was 14 Kanals whereas he has been granted plots of an area of lb Kanals in Jauhar Town Scheme. Taking judicial notice of the value of the property at Mall Road and in the Jauhar Town, in our opinion the grievance of the appellant that he has not been adequately compensated in terms of solemn undertaking given by the authority has substance in it. According to the Injunctions of Islam any part\x to an agreement muchness state is under solemn obligation to abide by the covenants made by him to the other therefore the State Authorities were required to act in a manner that no injustice was done to a citizen who was deprived of his valuable property, therefore, we direct the authorities to consider the case of the appellant for grant of further . Compensation in the form of allotment of some more plots.
2b. Civil Misc. Nos.2584/198b and 28bb/198b moved in I.C.A.No. 279 ofj \ 1984 by the applicants under Order I Rule 10 C.P.C, for impleading them as respondents in the said I.C.A, for reasons stated above stand disposed of.
27. For the foregoing reasons, both the appeals are accepted. The proceedings commenced on the reference made by the respondents under sections 18 am1 30 of the Land Acquisition Act are hereby declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect and the order of the L.D.A. Tribunal dated 7.11.1992 passed in that are hereby declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect and quashed. The act of the respondents of issuance of Notification dated 14.2.1982 for the withdrawal of the fresh acquisition proceedings is also declared to be without lawful authority and the respondents 1 to 3 are directed to further compensate the appellant in terms of agreement dated 28.11.1981 as observed above. The parties are left to bear their own costs.