1. The appellant has called into question the order passed by the learned IIIrd Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller (South) Karachi, dated 30-11-1991 ordering ejectment of the appellant from the demised premises on the ground of non-payment of rent.
2. The facts of the case upon which there appears to be no controversy are that, the respondents became the new landlords of the premises situated on Marriot Road, Karachi, where the appellant was the former's tenant. The previous owner of the said premises had instituted ejectment proceedings against the appellant on the ground of non-payment of rent and during the pendency of the said proceedings, the property changed hands and the respondents became its new landlords. Thereafter, an application was filed on behalf of the respondents, who wanted to be joined as a party to the proceedings, as they had acquired interest in the said property. It is an admitted position that the said application was granted without any objection being raised on behalf of the appellant and in consequence thereof the said respondents were substituted as applicants in place of the previous landlord. However, thereafter, the matter was dismissed in default, as the respondents failed to appear before the Court when the matter was fixed before it for evidence, but thereafter the present ejectment proceedings were instituted by the respondents before the learned Rent Controller. There is no controversy on the point that the respondents failed to serve any notice under section 18 upon the appellant but it has been contended on behalf of the respondents that a copy of the sale-deed was received by the appellant alongwith the application filed by the respondents before the learned Controller under Order I, Rule 10, C.P.C. Be that as it may, but there also appears to be no controversy on the point that the respondents had acquired the ownership of the property in question and the fact was throughout known to the appellant although, as pointed out earlier, no notice under section 18 had been received by it from the respondents.
3. The learned Controller, in view of the said circumstances, came to a conclusion that notwithstanding the fact that notice under section 18 had not been received by the appellant but since after acquiring knowledge that the respondents had become the new landlords of the property, the appellant failed to tender rent to the said respondents and consequently default had been committed by it. Consequently, he ordered ejectment of the appellant from the demised premises, as pointed out earlier.
4. The main question in the present case that arises is, whether any wilful default has been committed by the appellant. As has been pointed out earlier, the appellants were aware of the ownership having changed hands, yet admittedly they continued to deposit rent with the Rent Controller in favour of the previous landlord and it was only after their ejectment was ordered by the Rent Controller that rent was deposited in favour of the new landlords.
5. Both the learned counsel for the parties have invited my attention to the relevant case law on the point. The first being my own judgment in the case of Bushra Fayaz v. Ismail 1987 CLC 399. In this case the respondent had been regularly depositing rent with the Rent Controller notwithstanding the fact that the ownership of the premises in question had been transferred and the previous landlord was no longer the owner of the property. However, in view of the conduct of the landlord, the conclusion arrived at by me was that no wilful default had been committed by the tenant and even if the default had been committed, the same was of a technical nature and consequently the order of the Rent Controller declining to pass an order of ejectment against the tenant was upheld.
6. However, Mr. Suleman Kassam, learned counsel for the respondents, has invited my attention to a large number of cases decided by the Supreme Court on the point. In Major (Retd.) Muhammad Yousaf v. Mehraj---ud-Din and others 1986 SCMR 751, the tenant had not paid rent to the landlord even after filing of the ejectment proceedings and the tenant was held to be liable to be ejected, because according to the Supreme Court, institution of ejectment petition itself amounted to notice under section 13-A of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. In Muhammad Yousaf and another v. Nadimuddin Malik PLD 1993 Lah. 101 the tenant was held to be liable to ejectment for default in payment of rent since he had knowledge regarding the property having changed hands.
7. In Suleman and another v. M.A. Mallick 1988 SCMR 775 it was held that after receiving notice under section 13-A of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, the tenant ought to have tendered rent to the new landlord instead of the previous landlord. Somewhat similar view was held in the case of Muhammad Ashraf v. Abdul Hameed and others 1982 SCMR 237(2.) and Ghulam Samdani v. Abdul Hameed 1992 SCMR 1170. In another unreported case (C.P.LA. No.569-K/92 Islamuddin and another v. Mst. Sakina Begum and another) the Supreme Court upheld the order passed by this Court in appeal, dismissing the appeal filed against the order passed by the Rent Controller ordering ejectment of the tenant from the demised premises on the ground that the tenant after learning about transfer of property had continued to deposit rent in the name of the previous landlord. It is pertinent to point out that in this case the plea taken by the tenant that he had already paid one year's rent in advance to the landlord was not accepted by this Court.
8. It may be pointed out that, as has been held in various judgments of the Supreme Court and this Court, the main object behind section 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance or section 13-A of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance appears to be to inform the tenant that the property has been transferred to the new landlord. However, when it was sufficiently established before the Court that the tenant was already in possession of such knowledge, the requirement of a formal notice in this regard could be dispensed with. As was held in the case of Major (Retd.) Muhammad Yousaf 1986 SCMR 751 even receipt of notice by the tenant after filing of the ejectment proceedings could sufficiently meet the requirement of notice under section 13-A of Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance and the order ejecting tenant from the demised premises on the ground of default was upheld. Reference in the said judgment was also made to the case of Syed Azhar Imam Rizvi v. Mst.
9. Salina Khatoon 1985 SCMR 24 and Muhammad Siddique v. Mst. Sharifan and another 1969 SC (Law Notes)
78. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that formal notice, under section 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance was not received by the appellant can hardly render any ejectment proceedings filed before the Controller non-maintainable. However, the fact that remains to be considered is, whether the appellant made any intentional default in respect of payment of rent because admittedly he continued to deposit rent with the learned Controller, although in the name of the previous landlord, notwithstanding the fact that the ejectment case earlier filed against it was dismissed for non-prosecution. As was pointed out earlier, the circumstances of the case indicate that the appellant had knowledge about the property having been transferred to the new landlords. A question would, therefore, arise whether there was any justification for the appellant to deposit rent in favour of the previous landlord when it was in its knowledge that the property had changed hands. Contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that it had asked for transfer documents in respect of the property but the same were not supplied to it by the respondents as it had been contended on their behalf in the ejectment application as well as in the affidavit in evidence that copies of the transfer documents had been supplied to the appellant when the respondents had sought permission of the Rent Controller to be joined as a party to the ejectment proceedings. However, the question whether such copies had been demanded by the appellant is hardly material since that was not the requirement of section 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance. In any case, when there is no controversy .In regard to the appellant having subsequently acquired interest in the property, it was incumbent upon the appellant to tender rent to the respondents instead of continuing to deposit the same with the learned Controller in the name of the previous landlord. Reference in this regard may be made to the case of Islamuddin v.
10. Mst. Sakina Begum C.P.LA. No.569-K/92 decided by the Supreme Court on 15-3-1993 reference to which has earlier been made in this judgment. In my opinion the facts of the said case are not materially different from those of the present case. In fact, in that case the tenant appears to have deposited rent for one year in advance in favour of the previous landlord, but it was held that failure on his part to tender rent to the new landlord amounted to wilful commission of default. In the present case no doubt, the appellant has already parted with the rent by depositing the same with the learned Controller but the mere fact that the appellant was already depositing rent would not save the appellant from the penal consequences of default because, in any case, after ejectment proceedings had been instituted by the respondents against it, rent should have been paid to the respondents instead of the previous landlord. I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the order passed by the learned Rent Controller is not open to exception.